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Under the U.S. Constitution, as amended by the Sixteenth 
Amendment, any federal tax that is a “direct tax” (which is not an 
“income tax”) must be apportioned among the states in accordance 
with the respective populations of the various states.1  The thesis of 
this Article is that the category of “direct tax” (subject to the appor-
tionment requirement) is limited to requisitions, capitation taxes, 
and taxes on tangible property.  (A “requisition” is a tax on the state, 
payable by the state government by whatever means it chooses.)  Ap-
portionment among the states “works” for requisitions, because the 
states themselves are the nominal taxpayers.  A capitation tax is a tax 
on a person because of the person’s existence.  Thus, apportionment 
among the states by population works easily for a capitation tax, at least 
if such a tax is a fixed-amount-per-person tax with no exceptions.  But 
requisitions are a heavy-handed imposition on the states, and univer-
sal capitation taxes are (1) unpopular, (2) incapable of producing 
significant revenue, and (3) inequitable (as bearing no relation to 
ability to pay).  In fact, the federal government has never imposed a 
requisition or capitation tax, and for all practical purposes these are 
“off the table.”  But any “direct tax” other than a requisition or head 
tax would also be off the table, because apportionment mandates va-
rying tax rates among the states, which is a facial inequity that could 
not be tolerated (except possibly in the case of dire national emer-
gency). 
The apportionment requirement (and the triggering category of 
“direct tax”) is implicated by the recent surge of interest, at least on 
 
 1 U.S. CONST. art. I., § 2, cl. 3.  The Sixteenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, states that any 
tax on “incomes” is not subject to the apportionment requirement.  U.S. CONST. amend. 
XVI.  For a discussion of the Sixteenth Amendment, see generally Joseph M. Dodge, 
Murphy and the Sixteenth Amendment in Relation to the Taxation of Non-Excludable Personal In-
jury Awards, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 369 (2007), which addresses federal constitutional provisions 
concerning taxation, interpretation of the Sixteenth Amendment, and exclusionary theo-
ries. 
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the part of legal academia, in wealth taxes and periodic taxes on a 
person’s aggregate property net worth.2  There is also interest, at least 
for economic and liberal political theory, in taxes on human-capital 
endowment (earning capacity).3  Of course, an unapportioned fed-
eral wealth tax or endowment tax would be unconstitutional if either 
is a “direct tax.”4  I argue here that both taxes, neither of which are 
income taxes, would be unconstitutional, the first because a tax on 
tangible property (especially real estate) is a direct tax, and the sec-
ond because an endowment tax would be either a capitation tax or a 
direct tax. 
The view offered herein of what “direct tax” means in the Consti-
tution differs from that offered by recent commentators.  At one end 
of the spectrum, Erik Jensen argues that “direct tax” means any tax 
not capable of being shifted, which is deemed to encompass any tax 
on the economic attributes of persons (including a tax on a person’s 
aggregate consumption).5  At the other end of the spectrum, Bruce 
Ackerman argues that that the Thirteenth Amendment (abolishing 
slavery) effectively repealed the apportionment requirement, because 
the clauses containing the apportionment requirement were invented 
to effectuate a compromise over slavery.6  Calvin Johnson goes almost 
as far in arguing that “direct tax” means only a tax capable (without 
effort) of fair apportionment among the states in accordance with 
population, thereby limiting that term to requisitions and universal 
head taxes.7  My “middle of the road” position is that apportionment 
 
 2 The Spring and Summer 2000 issues of Tax Law Review are, in their entirety, devoted to 
personal wealth taxes. 
 3 See, e.g., DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 162–66 (1986) (discussing 
accrual income and consumption bases for taxation); see also other authorities cited infra 
note 432. 
 4 See Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax With a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 423, 441–
42 (2000) (opining that a wealth tax might be upheld if it were cast as a low-rate tax on 
the risk-free return from property). 
 5 See Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of “Incomes,” 
33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1091–107 (2001) [hereinafter Jensen, Incomes] (arguing that a tax 
on aggregate personal consumption would be subject to the apportionment require-
ment); Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of “Direct Taxes”:  Are Consumption Taxes Constitu-
tional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334 (1997) [hereinafter Jensen, Consumption Taxes] (same). 
 6 Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 28, 58 (1999) (“Giv-
en the Reconstructionist Amendments, there is no longer a constitutional point in en-
forcing a lapsed bargain with the slave power.”). 
 7 See Calvin H. Johnson, Fixing the Constitutional Absurdity of the Apportionment of Direct Tax, 21 
CONST. COMMENT. 295, 297–99 (2004) [hereinafter Johnson, Apportionment] (arguing that 
apportionment should not be a barrier to any federal tax); Calvin H. Johnson, The Appor-
tionment of Direct Taxes:  The Foul-Up at the Core of the Constitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
1, 71 (1998) [hereinafter Johnson, Foul-Up] (“[T]he ‘direct tax’ should be construed 
 
 
Apr. 2009] FEDERAL TAXES SUBJECT TO APPORTIONMENT RULE 843 
 
is still alive, but (apart from requisitions and capitation taxes) is con-
fined to federal taxes on real estate and tangible personal property.  
This position differs from the apparent state of current doctrine, 
which is that “direct tax” also encompasses taxes on intangible per-
sonal property.8 
My thesis is based upon (1) the constitutional text bearing on the 
federal taxing power, (2) its early history, (3) the ideological basis of 
the apportionment requirement, (4) the instrumental purposes and 
effects of the apportionment requirement, (5) the doctrinal evolu-
tion of “direct tax,” and (6) the policy purposes that would be best 
served by the apportionment requirement in the context of a federal-
ist system. 
Part I offers as background material an explanation of the opera-
tional effect of the apportionment requirement and the constitu-
tional provisions bearing on the federal taxing power, as well as how 
these provisions came to be in the Constitution.  Part II rejects a 
broad meaning of “direct tax.”  Part III offers possible rationales and 
purposes for the direct-tax apportionment requirement.  Part IV re-
jects various theories that view the rule of apportionment as being 
dead.  Part V argues that “direct tax” should be interpreted so as to 
exclude taxes on intangible personal property.  Part VI offers applica-
tions of the analysis to issues of current interest. 
I.  BACKGROUND OF THE APPORTIONMENT REQUIREMENT 
This Part describes how the apportionment requirement operates, 
its place in the constitutional text, and how it came to be in the Con-
stitution. 
A.  The Apportionment and Uniformity Requirements 
In order to apportion a federal tax among the states according to 
population, the following steps must be taken.  First, the revenue tar-
get must be ascertained for the nation.  Second, this target amount 
 
functionally, but ahistorically, to refer to head taxes and requisitions from the several 
states, but nothing else.”). 
 8 The last Supreme Court case that squarely faced the issue of the scope of “direct tax” was 
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I), 157 U.S. 429, 480 (1895), which reaffirmed 
that an non-apportioned federal tax on real estate would be unconstitutional.  Upon re-
hearing the case, the Court held that a non-apportioned tax on personal property would 
also be unconstitutional.  Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock II), 158 U.S. 601, 
627–28 (1895). 
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must be allocated among the states according to population (as de-
termined by the most recent census).  The resulting “quota” for a 
state can be collected from the state government if the tax is in the 
form of a requisition, in which case the state could either pay the tax 
out of its treasury or lay one or more state taxes for the purpose of 
raising the quota.  If the “direct tax” is not a requisition, the state qu-
ota must be collected (by federal officials) from people, property, or 
transactions within the state, but any such tax would require a subject 
matter (federal tax base definition) that can produce the quota 
amount.  The third step is to divide the state’s quota by the state’s ag-
gregate tax base to produce a tax rate for the state.  If the direct tax 
takes the form of a universal capitation tax, the quota is divided by 
the population of the state to yield the per-person tax.  If the tax base 
is determined in terms of some economic indicator (such as property 
values), then the state’s quota is divided by the aggregate tax base lo-
cated within the state to determine the rate, which is then applied 
against the particular items constituting the tax base in order to de-
termine the tax owed for each item. 
Since the direct-tax apportionment formula is keyed to the popu-
lation of the various states, apportionment of a universal capitation tax 
will produce a uniform national rate.9  Apportionment of any other 
kind of (non-requisition) direct tax will necessarily result in different 
tax rates for different states because the specified tax base will not be 
found among the states in the same proportion as population (except 
by purest random chance).  To illustrate this proposition, suppose 
that Maryland and Louisiana have the same population but that the 
aggregate amount of the subject of the direct tax (say, widget values) 
is twice as much in Maryland as in Louisiana.  The apportionment 
requirement dictates that the tax quota allocable to each state must 
be exactly the same, because the population is the same.  It follows 
inexorably that the tax rate (tax divided by aggregate widget values) 
would be twice as high in Louisiana as in Maryland.  This point is il-
lustrated in Table 1. 
 
 
 9 Suppose the United States consisted of three states having populations of one million, 
three million, and six million persons, respectively, for a total of ten million persons, and 
suppose the federal government lays a universal capitation tax of $1 billion for the entire 
country.  The quotas for each state will be $100 million, $300 million, and $600 million, 
respectively, and the per-person tax (quota divided by population) will be $100 per per-
son in every state. 
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TABLE 1:  OPERATION OF THE APPORTIONMENT REQUIREMENT 
 POPULATION QUOTA (FIXED) 
AGGREGATE 
WIDGET VALUES TAX RATE 
Maryland 5 million 10 billion 100 billion 10% 
Louisiana 5 million 10 billion 50 billion 20% 
 
From the perspective of individuals across the nation, every con-
ceivable kind of (non-requisition) apportioned tax (other than a uni-
versal head tax) must necessarily operate in an inequitable manner.  
As Table 1 illustrates, if the subject of tax is the value of widgets, then 
taxpayers in the poorer state (Louisiana) will pay tax at twice the rate 
as taxpayers in Maryland.  This produces a form of inequity that no-
wadays would be seen as perverse, in that the higher rate is imposed 
on taxpayers holding the lower per-capita values. 
Any federal tax not subject to the apportionment requirement is 
subject to the uniformity requirement.  The uniformity requirement 
is satisfied if the same tax (same tax base, same rate schedule) is ap-
plicable, as a matter of law, throughout the United States.  Thus, the 
federal government cannot impose a salt tax only on salt extracted 
within a named salt formation that exists only in Michigan and Ohio.  
However, the uniformity requirement is satisfied if the federal gov-
ernment imposes a tax on salt extracted anywhere in the United 
States, even though it happens that salt extraction is concentrated in 
a narrow geographical area. 
B.  Constitutional Provisions Relating to the Validity of Federal Taxes 
Under Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, of the Constitution (hereinaf-
ter referred to as the “Taxing Power Clause”), Congress is granted au-
thority to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises,” with-
out limitation as to subject matter or taxpayer.  It is probable that 
“requisitions” on states are included within “Taxes,”10 although the 
 
 10 The Constitution does not expressly mention requisitions, and the Framers sometimes 
used “requisitions” in opposition to the word “taxes,” suggesting that “taxes” might ex-
clude requisitions.  See, e.g., The Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Governor Randolph, June 7, 1788) 
[hereinafter Virginia Debates], in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON 
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL 
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 114–15 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891) [he-
reinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES], reprinted in Appendix C.  (Elliot’s Debates is a five-volume 
compilation, initially made in 1830, of Framing-period materials, including Madison’s 
Notes of the 1787 Constitutional Convention and notes of various state ratifying conven-
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issue has never squarely arisen (as no requisition has been enacted by 
Congress under the Constitution). 
The aforementioned Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1 goes on to state 
that “all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the 
United States.”  This uniformity requirement has been construed by 
the courts to prohibit only patent or intentional discrimination based 
on geography.11  Uniformity does not require flat rates without ex-
emptions.12  The uniformity requirement has been extended by judi-
cial decision to all federal levies (including “taxes”) not subject to the 
apportionment requirement.13 
The “direct tax” concept appears in Article I, Section 2, clause 3 
(hereinafter referred to as the “Representation Clause”), which pro-
vides that both representation in the House of Representatives and 
direct taxes are to be apportioned among the states in accordance 
with population (“numbers”) as determined by a periodic census.14  
In tallying population, slaves were to be counted as three-fifths of a 
person.15  The three-fifths rule became meaningless after slavery was 
abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment, ratified in 1866. 
Article I, Section 9, clause 4 (hereinafter referred to as the “Capi-
tation Tax Clause”), states in full:  “No capitation, or other direct, 
 
tions.)  There are persuasive arguments that requisitions are within the federal taxing 
power:  (1) the term “requisitions” is a subcategory of “taxes,” (2) the power to lay requi-
sitions was assumed to be so obvious as not to require explicit statement, and (3) requisi-
tions were considered to be a viable federal taxing option in 1796.  See THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 36, at 213–20 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003), reprinted in Appen-
dix B; Erik M. Jensen & Jonathan L. Entin, Commandeering, the Tenth Amendment, and the 
Federal Requisition Power:  New York v. United States Revisited, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 355, 
357 (1998); Calvin H. Johnson, Homage to CLIO:  The Historical Continuity from the Articles of 
Confederation into the Constitution, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 463, 486–89 (2004). 
 11 See United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 85 (1983) (allowing even geographical classifi-
cations to stand if based on neutral principles); Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 359 
(1945) (reciting the test that a tax is uniform if it is applied the same way wherever the 
subject is located). 
 12 See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 83–92 (1900) (rejecting the notion that uniformity 
requires equal taxes or uniform rates). 
 13 See Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 11 (1916) (holding that the Sixteenth 
Amendment frees income taxes from the apportionment requirement); Hylton v. United 
States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 173, 176, 181 (1796) (holding that all non-direct taxes avoid 
the apportionment requirement). 
 14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.  Prior to the census, which was to be taken within three years 
of the first meeting of Congress, representation was apportioned according to a fixed al-
location.  See infra note 288. 
 15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
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Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or enumeration 
herein before directed to be taken.”16 
There is no definition of “direct tax” in the Constitution, and 
none was offered to the delegates in the 1787 Constitutional Conven-
tion.17  Thus, the matter has been left to judicial construction.  To 
make a long story short, early Supreme Court cases upheld various 
unapportioned federal taxes as “excises,” but the 1895 case of Pollock 
v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.18 invalidated the unapportioned 1894 in-
come tax.  Pollock was (to say the least) highly controversial both po-
litically and legally, and two responses emerged.  First, the Supreme 
Court reverted to its earlier propensity of holding contested unap-
portioned federal taxes to be excises.  Second, political developments 
eventually resulted in the Sixteenth Amendment (proposed by Con-
gress in 1909, and ratified in 1913), which states: 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from 
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several 
States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.19 
Congress enacted a personal (individual) income tax in 1913, which 
has continued (with numerous alterations) to the present.  The Su-
preme Court upheld the 1913 income tax in 1916, stating that the 
purpose of the Sixteenth Amendment was merely to remove the ap-
portionment requirement from federal income taxes, rather than to 
affect the definition of “direct tax.”20 
Thus, viewing the various tax-related provisions of the Constitu-
tion together, the apportionment requirement currently applies only to a fed-
eral direct tax that is not an income tax.21  All other federal taxes are sub-
ject only to the uniformity requirement.22 
Since 1913, the “direct tax” issue has largely lain dormant, as the 
federal government has been able to satisfy its wants from taxes and 
duties that are not viewed as being subject to the apportionment re-
quirement. 
 
 16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
 17 Rufus King of Massachusetts asked the 1787 Convention for the meaning of “direct tax,” 
but no reply was given.  James Madison, Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 (Aug. 
20) [hereinafter Madison’s Notes], in 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 451. 
 18 157 U.S. 429 (1895). 
 19 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 20 Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916). 
 21 See Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 109 (1916) (noting that the Sixteenth 
Amendment “exceptionally authorized” only the income tax to be free from the appor-
tionment requirement). 
 22 See Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 18–19 (holding that the post-Sixteenth Amendment income tax, 
no longer having to be apportioned, is subject to the uniformity requirement). 
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C.  How Apportionment Found Its Way Into the Constitution23 
Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal government had 
only the power to lay requisitions on its constituent members, the 
states themselves, in proportion to the value of land and improve-
ments thereon.24  The states could, and did, refuse to comply,25 and, 
as a result of an ineffectual taxing power,26 the Confederation gov-
ernment was feeble.  The Constitutional Convention of 1787 largely 
resulted from an effort (led by Virginia) to create a national govern-
ment with a meaningful taxing power.27  The Convention was held in 
Philadelphia on May 25, 1787 without a delegation from Rhode Is-
land.28  No official history was taken of the deliberations.29  The ac-
 
 23 A more elaborate history of the taxation clauses is found in Charles J. Bullock, The Origin, 
Purpose and Effect of the Direct-Tax Clause of the Constitution (pts. 1 & 2), 15 POL. SCI. Q. 217 
(1900) [hereinafter Bullock, Part I], 15 POL. SCI. Q. 452 (1900) [hereinafter Bullock, 
Part II]. 
 24 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VIII.  
 25 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 103 (noting that the 
states treated requisitions as “mere recommendations”); Virginia Debates, supra note 10, 
at 114–18, 121 (noting that a system of voluntary requisitions would be ineffective); John-
son, Foul-Up, supra note 7, at 13 (noting the difficulty of states undertaking honest real-
estate appraisals when their self-interest commanded systematic undervaluation). 
 26 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII (allowing amendment of the Articles only by a 
unanimous vote of the states); 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 92–106 (chronicling 
that the Articles authorized only requisitions, and a 1783 proposal to authorize import 
duties was vetoed by Rhode Island). 
 27 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 388 (1821) (“That [the requisitions of 
Congress] were habitually disregarded, is a fact of universal notoriety.  With the knowl-
edge of this fact, and under its full pressure, a convention was assembled to change the 
system.”); Madison’s Notes, supra note 17, at 112 (stating that the “radical infirmity” in 
the Confederation was the voluntary requisition system).  See generally ROGER H. BROWN, 
REDEEMING THE REPUBLIC:  FEDERALISTS, TAXATION, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1993) (arguing that the power of federal taxation was central to the con-
stitutional enterprise); ROBIN L. EINHORN, AMERICAN TAXATION, AMERICAN SLAVERY 26 
(2006) (discussing the states’ failure to collect federal requisitions); CALVIN H. JOHNSON, 
RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES 1–2, 43–45 (2005) (stating that one of the most 
important reasons for the need of the Constitution was to allow the federal government a 
source of revenue). 
 28 See Gordon Lloyd, TeachingAmericanHistory.org, Introduction to the Constitutional Conven-
tion, http://teachingamericanhistory.org/convention/intro.html (last visited March 26, 
2009) (providing a brief pre-history of the convention). 
 29 See Madison’s Notes (May 29), supra note 17, at 126 (noting that there was to be no offi-
cial secretary at the Convention).  Nevertheless, a journal was kept of the motions and 
votes on those motions.  The journal is published as Journal of the Federal Convention, 
in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 139–318. 
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counts that have come down to us, principally James Madison’s 
notes,30 are sketchy and mainly of a narrative quality. 
Governor Randolph of Virginia opened the substantive proceed-
ings on May 29 by offering the so-called Virginia Plan (drawn up by 
James Madison),31 which was strongly nationalist/federalist,32 but 
which expressly mentioned taxes only in the following item: 
2.  Resolved, therefore, that the rights of suffrage in the national leg-
islature ought to be proportioned to the quotas of contribution, or to the 
number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem best in 
different cases.33 
The foregoing only states that representation (in each of the two houses 
of the national legislature) should be proportional to either the requi-
sition quotas (which, according to the Confederation rule, were then 
based on real property values) or population (excluding slaves).  This 
provision assumes that significant federal taxes under the new gov-
ernment are to be apportioned among the states,34 as was the case 
under the Confederation.  The power to tax is not specifically men-
tioned, but is implicit in Article 6 of the Virginia Plan providing for 
the broad categorical grant of federal powers, including powers to in-
validate state laws and to compel states to fulfill their duties (pre-
sumably including requisition quotas).35  The Virginia Plan was re-
 
 30 See supra text accompanying note 10.  For an account of Madison’s role in the convention, 
ratification, and Federalist periods, see IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON:  FATHER OF THE 
CONSTITUTION, 1787–1800 (1950). 
 31 See Madison’s Notes (May 29), supra note 17, at 126–28. 
 32 The term “Federalist” is commonly used to refer to advocates of a strong federal govern-
ment (but without abolition of the states), and “Anti-Federalist” is used to refer to those 
who opposed ratification of the proposed Constitution. 
 33 See Madison’s Notes (May 29), supra note 17, at 127. 
 34 Another plan submitted by Charles Pinckney of South Carolina has been lost, but it ap-
parently would have given the federal government the power to lay import duties and 
compulsory requisitions on the states.  See Am. Hist. Ass’n, Sketch of Pinckney’s Plan for a 
Constitution, 1787, 9 AM. HIST. REV. 735, 739 (1904) (noting that Pinckney’s plan also in-
cluded the power to levy duties on imports and regulate commerce more broadly).  Al-
though a plan supposedly authored by Pinckney appears in the May 29 entry to the Jour-
nal of the Federal Convention, Mr. Pinckney’s Draft of a Federal Government, in 1 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES, supra note 10, at 145–50, Madison later expressed doubt as to its authenticity.  
See Note of Mr. Madison to the Plan of Charles Pinckney, May 29, 1787, in 5 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES, supra note 10, at 578–79. 
 35 In addition to the against-the-state powers mentioned in the text, three general types of 
powers were listed:  (1) powers vested in Congress by the Confederation, (2) powers to 
legislate where the states were incompetent, and (3) powers to achieve harmony among 
the states.  At this point, the doctrine of enumerated powers had not emerged, but it sur-
faced on July 16, see Madison’s Notes, supra note 17, at 317, and came into the open with 
the Report of the Committee on Detail of August 6, see id. at 378–79 (listing the powers 
over states that were to be vested in the legislature).  On July 17, the Convention removed 
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ferred to the Committee of the Whole, which reported on June 13, 
1787, a plan that again made no specific mention of taxes but pro-
vided for a bicameral legislature, with representation in both houses 
being apportioned according to population, with slaves counting as 
three-fifths.36 
At this point, the nationalist agenda began to succumb in part to 
assaults first from the small states and then from the hard-core slave 
states, Georgia and the Carolinas.  Both assaults were bottomed on a 
states-rights (but not Anti-Federalist) stance:  the small-states agenda 
was to have equal representation for states,37 and the deep-South 
agenda was to preserve slavery.38  The small-state agenda was embod-
ied in the New Jersey Plan, which would have (among other things) 
limited the federal taxing power to the levying of customs duties and 
stamp taxes, as well as to the laying of quasi-mandatory requisitions to 
be apportioned among the states according to population (including 
slaves as three-fifths).39  The New Jersey Plan was rejected on June 
19,40 with Alexander Hamilton denouncing the idea of apportioning 
a major revenue source (requisitions) according to population,41 but 
the small-states faction persisted until it was agreed that the Senate 
 
the power, advocated by Madison, to invalidate state laws.  See id. at 321–22.  The power of 
taxation might have been thought to fall into category (2), because the states would not 
be competent to lay a federal tax.  See id. at 257 (stating that the new government would 
have the power to tax the people themselves). 
 36 On June 11, John Rutledge of South Carolina had proposed that representation be by 
quotas of contribution, but this motion was amended by James Wilson of Pennsylvania 
and Pinckney to read as described in the text.  See id. (June 6, 7, 11, 13) at 164, 170, 178, 
181. 
 37 A subsidiary states-rights issue was appointment of representatives and senators by state 
legislatures rather than election by the people, a point of view that prevailed for the Sen-
ate.  See id. (June 6) at 160–64.  Another point advanced by the states-rights faction is that 
the Convention only had the authority to amend the Articles of Confederation, which was 
a compact among the states.  Id. (June 16) at 193–94. 
 38 Slaveholding interests needed a national government to protect property, including 
slaves, and to force the return of escaped slaves.  See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
 39 A passage in the New Jersey Plan stated “that, if such requisitions be not complied with in 
the time specified therein, to direct the collection thereof in the non-complying states, 
and for that purpose to devise and pass acts directing and authorizing the same—
provided, that none of the powers hereby vested in the United States in Congress shall be 
exercised without the consent of at least ___ states.”  Madison’s Notes (June 15), supra 
note 17, at 192. 
 40 See id. (June 19) at  211–12 (postponing decision on the New Jersey Plan). 
 41 See id. (June 18) at 201 (noting that direct revenue would not be sufficient, and an at-
tempt to acquire the balance from requisitions would fail). 
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would be constituted on the basis of equality among states,42 with the 
Senators to be appointed by the state legislatures.43 
As to representation in the House, the item on the table from the 
modified Virginia Plan still left open the issue of whether representa-
tion was to be by wealth or population.44  The notion of representa-
tion according to wealth inevitably conjured up the notion that rep-
resentation should be linked to taxation, or vice versa.45  The wealth 
standard for representation was favored by the South, because slaves 
were wealth.  The alternative possibility of linking representation to 
population raised the issue of how slaves should be counted.46  How-
ever, on July 11, motions to count slaves in any future census to be 
taken to adjust representation were defeated.47  At that point, the is-
sues of wealth versus numbers and the role of slaves in each were up 
in the air. 
This logjam was broken on July 12 by a move that formally linked 
representation and the taxing power.48  Gouverneur Morris of Penn-
sylvania49 opened with a motion “to add to the [Virginia Plan] clause 
empowering the Legislature to vary the representation according to 
the principles of wealth and number of inhabitants, a proviso ‘that 
taxation shall be in proportion to representation.’”50  At this point, 
the Morris proposal only amounted to placing all taxes under the 
same principle of apportionment as governed representation, but the 
roles of population and wealth in both were still unresolved.  George 
Mason of Virginia, a states’ rights advocate, “admitted the justice of 
the principle [of linking taxation and representation], but was afraid 
embarrassments might be occasioned to the legislature by it.  It might 
 
 42 See id. (June 25, July 7) at 240, 285–86 (recording discussion of Senate representation).  
The issue was not finally put to rest until July 16.  See id. (July 16) at 316–17 (recording 
the passage of a resolution providing for the states to have an equal vote in the second 
branch of the legislature). 
 43 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
 44 Madison’s Notes (July 9), supra note 17, at 288–89. 
 45 John Rutledge moved that representation be apportioned according to the actual tax 
yield from the various states.  Id. (July 5) at 279.  Although the motion was defeated, fur-
ther discussion of the difficulty of valuing wealth under the Confederation requisition sys-
tem again linked the topics of representation and taxation.  See id. (July 6) at 281. 
 46 See id. (noting the difficulty of valuing the contribution of non-commercial states); id. (Ju-
ly 9) at 289 (arguing that slaves should be counted as property for apportionment); id. 
(July 11) at 296–302 (recounting argument over the “three-fifths” clause).  For another 
account of the run-up to July 12, 1787, see Johnson, Foul-Up, supra note 7, at 92–101. 
 47 Madison’s Notes (July 11), supra note 17, at 295–301. 
 48 See id. (July 12) at 302–06, reprinted in Appendix A. 
 49 Not to be confused with Robert Morris, also of Pennsylvania. 
 50 Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, at 302, reprinted in Appendix A. 
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drive the legislature to the plan of requisitions.”51  Mason’s remark 
indicated an awareness that apportionment of certain non-requisition 
taxes would be impractical, so that apportionment of all federal taxes 
could be accomplished only through a requisition system; yet, a com-
pulsory requisition system would bring the federal government into 
potential armed conflict with state governments.52  Morris picked up 
Mason’s challenge by offering an acknowledgement: 
that some objections lay against his motion, but supposed they would be 
removed by restraining the rule to direct taxation.  With regard to indirect 
taxes on exports and imports, and on consumption, the rule would be in-
applicable.  Notwithstanding what had been said to the contrary, he was 
persuaded that the imports and consumption were pretty nearly equal 
throughout the Union.53 
The statement that non-direct taxes would likely fall proportion-
ally among the states slipped by unchallenged.  Insofar as taxes on 
imports (imposts) were levied at the point of import—with some 
states having few, if any, deep-water ports—and insofar as excises on 
particular items (like salt and distilled spirits) were levied at the point 
of production, the non-direct taxes would be laid (in the formal 
sense) non-proportionally among the states.  Thus, the reference to 
equality (meaning “proportionality”) must have been based on the 
notion that such taxes would be passed on to ultimate consumers, 
and that consumption would be roughly proportionate to popula-
tion.54  However, even assuming that such taxes would be wholly 
passed on, Morris’s prediction of de facto apportionment would oc-
cur only if consumption were taxed generally, but in fact the duties, 
imposts, and excises of the period were only imposed selectively (and 
at varying rates).  In any event, the amended Morris resolution (“pro-
vided always that direct taxation ought to be proportioned to repre-
sentation”) passed.55 
The remainder of the July 12 session dealt with the formula for 
apportioning direct taxes and representatives.  It was urged that pop-
ulation (including slaves) was a reasonable proxy for wealth.56  James 
 
 51 Id. 
 52 This danger had already been stressed by Governor Randolph.  See id. (June 16) at 197–98 
(recounting Randolph’s argument that Congress was a body too inadequate to take on 
such powers, given the amount of distrust rooted in the public of a federal government). 
 53 Id. (July 12) at 302, reprinted in Appendix A. 
 54 See id. (July 11) at 299 (explaining how freedom of internal commerce would tend to 
equalize wealth and industry). 
 55 Id. (July 12) at 302, reprinted in Appendix A. 
 56 The shift from real estate values to population as the basis of apportionment of requisi-
tions had almost been adopted in the Confederation period, after it had become appar-
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Wilson suggested that the North’s objection to including slaves in re-
presentation would be ameliorated if the same rule governed taxa-
tion.57  Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts pointed out that this change 
would be cosmetic, because “the states were not to be taxed as 
states,”58 presumably because the federal government could now lay 
taxes on foreign trade and consumption without apportionment and 
lay apportioned taxes on individuals, obviating the need for requisi-
tions.  At the end of the July 12 session, a resolution was passed that 
stated:  “provided always that representation [in the House] ought to 
be proportioned to direct taxation,”59 which in turn would be propor-
tioned on the basis of numbers (with slaves counting as three-fifths), 
with the population being determined by a federal census.60 
On July 26 the agreed-upon portions of the Constitution, as well 
as other yet-to-be-decided matters, were submitted to the Committee 
on Detail, which reported back on August 6 with several additional 
provisions relating to taxation.61  Since the tide had shifted from a na-
tionalist government having general powers to a government possess-
ing only enumerated powers, it was necessary to provide expressly 
that the new government would have the plenary power to lay and 
collect taxes.62  Also added was a clause requiring capitation taxes to 
be apportioned according to the census.63  This provision, discussed 
later,64 appears initially to have been intended as a kind of insurance 
against the possibility of a federal slave tax.  A proposal to limit the 
power of direct taxation to instances of failed requisitions was round-
 
ent that a system based on real estate appraisals controlled by the states did not work.  An 
anti-abuse amendment was proposed to the Articles to base apportionment on the popu-
lation, counting slaves as three-fifths.  This amendment was supported by twelve of the 
states, it being generally thought that population was a reasonable index of aggregate 
state wealth, but the amendment failed for lack of the required unanimity.  See Letter 
from Edmund Randolph to the Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates (Oct. 10, 
1787), in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 482, 484; Johnson, Foul-Up, supra note 7, at 
33–35. 
 57 Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, at 304, reprinted in Appendix A. 
 58 Id. at 305. 
 59 Id. at 302-05.  
 60 The reference to “wealth” in the first sentence of the Virginia Plan clause empowering 
the legislature to vary the representation according to the principles of wealth and num-
ber of inhabitants was taken out the next day.  Id. (July 13) at 309. 
 61 The Committee on Detail had (inadvertently?) dropped the link between representation 
and direct taxes, but that problem was immediately fixed by amending the draft of the 
Representation Clause so as to refer to the direct-taxation apportionment rule, located in 
a different clause.  See id. (Aug. 8) at 391. 
 62 The Convention approved this provision without debate.  See id. (Aug. 16) at 434. 
 63 Id. (Aug. 6) at 378–79. 
 64 See infra text accompanying notes 285–303. 
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ly defeated on August 21, while the provision barring a federal tax on 
exports was approved.65  A proposal concerning the ports, which pro-
vided that “[a]ll duties, imposts, and excises, prohibitions or re-
straints, laid or made by the legislature of the United States, shall be 
uniform and equal throughout the United States,”66 was referred to 
an ad hoc committee, which fashioned the present version of the Un-
iformity Clause, approved on August 25. 
On September 12, the Committee on Style and Arrangement pre-
sented a final draft of the Constitution which merged the drafts of 
separate direct-tax and representation provisions into the Represen-
tation Clause, because both contained the same rule of apportion-
ment.67  The separate provision requiring apportionment of capita-
tion taxes was expanded by adding the reference to direct taxes.68  
Finally, the uniformity requirement for duties, imposts, and excises 
was merged with the clause empowering Congress to lay and collect 
taxes.69 
Although the foregoing account is meant to be as objective as pos-
sible, I will offer a tentative interpretation.  What started off as a na-
tionalist project to overcome the “wicked states”70 was compromised 
by efforts from states righters, small states, and slave-importing 
states.71  In the area of taxation, this tension played out over the issue 
of apportionment of taxes.  The events of July 12 resulted from a con-
fluence of three trends:  (1) the inertia of apportionment as the de-
fault rule for allocating taxes under the Confederation and the Vir-
ginia Plan, (2) a realization that requisitions could create conflict 
between the federal government and the states, and (3) a growing 
awareness that apportionment would not work for certain non-
 
 65 Madison’s Notes (Aug. 21), supra note 17, at 453, 456. 
 66 See id. (Aug. 25) at 479. 
 67 Id. (Sept. 12) at 536.  For a discussion of what preceded this move, see infra notes 292, 
294, 300 and accompanying text. 
 68 This change is discussed in the text accompanying infra notes 300–02. 
 69 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 70 See JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 154–55 (noting that the Anti-Federalists were particularly 
opposed to a direct tax). 
 71 Small states, slave-holding states, and states as states prevailed in the following respects, 
apart from taxation, relative to the Virginia Plan:  (1) deleting the power to negate state 
laws, (2) limiting federal powers to those enumerated, (3) constituting the Senate on an 
equal-representation basis, (4) electing senators by state legislatures, (5) including slaves 
in the representation formula, (6) prohibiting a ban on the import of slaves until 1808, 
(7) limiting any import tax on slaves to $10 per slave, (8) providing for the election of the 
President, (9) requiring all states to return fugitive slaves, and (10) providing for amend-
ing the Constitution. 
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requisition taxes.  Thus, apportionment was not invented on July 12 (or 
during the Convention), and the concept of “direct tax” was pulled out of a 
hat to limit, in the interests of practicality, the scope of the apportionment re-
quirement.  At no point was apportionment, as a political principle, seriously 
questioned on the merits.  The principle of apportionment was not generated by 
the institution of slavery.  Instead, slaves, as both wealth and persons, had to 
be accommodated into any apportionment formula based on wealth or popula-
tion. 
Politically, apportionment of taxes was embraced by states-rights 
Federalists because it has the effect of treating the peoples of states as 
independent tax-paying communities.  For slaveholding interests, ap-
portionment of representation and taxation (counting slaves as three-
fifths) was a good deal because representation was a more important 
issue than taxation.  Apportionment was tolerated by the nationalists 
because the federal government ended up with a taxing power im-
mune from state interference, and direct taxation was expected to be 
the rare federal practice rather than the norm; in addition, appor-
tionment—as an acknowledgement of the role of states—would serve 
the cause of ratification. 
II.  “DIRECT TAX” CANNOT BE BROADLY CONSTRUED 
The text and history demonstrate that the apportionment re-
quirement deserves to be taken seriously, but they do not (so far) in-
dicate the scope of its application, which depends on the meaning of 
“direct tax.”  Here, it is argued that “direct tax” is not to be construed 
broadly to encompass virtually every federal tax other than imposts.  
Actually, it cannot seriously be claimed that “direct tax” refers to any 
tax other than a property tax.  An expansive view of apportionment is 
either not supported by, or is contrary to, the full range of ap-
proaches to constitutional interpretation:  textualism, Framers’ in-
tent, contemporaneous understanding, doctrine, functionalism, and 
policy.  Therefore, it is not necessary to pick and choose among in-
terpretative approaches. 
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A.  The Constitutional Text 
The text of the Constitution states that duties, imposts, and ex-
cises are subject to the uniformity requirement.72  The uniformity re-
quirement is incompatible with apportionment, because apportion-
ment, in the case of any tax other than a requisition or universal head 
tax, must necessarily impose different tax rates with respect to differ-
ent states.  A tax in which the rate structures change at state lines 
cannot be uniform among the states.73  The only logical conclusion to 
be drawn is that duties, imposts, and excises cannot be subject to the 
apportionment requirement. 
This difficulty can be overcome only if (1) the uniformity re-
quirement tolerates different rates based on geography74 or (2) the 
apportionment requirement trumps the uniformity requirement in 
case of overlap.75  Neither of these propositions can be supported by 
logic or the text itself.  Nobody in the aftermath of the 1787 Conven-
tion thought that apportionment applied to external taxes (imposts).  
Since duties, for example stamp taxes, and excises are subject to the 
same rule of uniformity under the text of the Constitution as imposts, 
it would be illogical to suppose that duties and excises could have 
been intended (or thought) to be subject to the different rule of ap-
portionment.76 
 
 72 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 73 This interpretation of “uniformity,” discussed in text accompanying supra note 11, was 
not made up of whole cloth by the courts.  The Convention history clearly shows that the 
uniformity requirement arose over a concern that imposts not vary from port to port.  See 
Madison’s Notes (Aug. 28), supra note 17, at 483–84 (reporting a motion explicitly pro-
hibiting that preference be given “to the ports of one state over those of another”). 
 74 James Madison alone appears to have viewed apportionment and uniformity as being ca-
pable of harmonization:  if a uniform tax on an article, such as tobacco, operated un-
evenly on the states, then the Constitution would require that other articles also be taxed 
(uniformly), so that the whole package would satisfy the apportionment requirement.  See 
Virginia Debates (James Madison, June 12, 1788), supra note 10, at 306–07, reprinted in 
Appendix C (“[T]here is a proportion to be laid on each state, according to its popula-
tion. . . . This is a constitutional scale, which is an insuperable bar against dispropor-
tion . . . .”).  Others contemplated that this scenario of an apportioned tax on bundled 
subjects would be only a maxim of practical politics:  apportioned bundled taxes would 
be politically more palatable than single-item uniform taxes that would operate unevenly.  
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 213–20, reprinted in 
Appendix B; Virginia Debates (Governor Randolph, June 7, 1788), supra note 10, at 121–
22, reprinted in Appendix C (stating that a tax must be laid on the most productive article 
in each state). 
 75 The possible overlap issue is discussed in the text accompanying infra note 424. 
 76 Apart from confusion as to what fell into the categories of “duty” or “excise,” and apart 
from those who thought that apportionment was a more equitable principle than the uni-
formity principle, it is not clear that any of the Framers actually thought that a single-
 
 
Apr. 2009] FEDERAL TAXES SUBJECT TO APPORTIONMENT RULE 857 
 
Both uniformity and apportionment serve the same constitutional 
value of preventing geographical discrimination, but do so by differ-
ent means.  Uniformity prohibits geographical discrimination by rea-
son of the location of the subject of taxation within one state as op-
posed to being within another state.  Apportionment prohibits 
discrimination against states as political communities.  Since the sub-
ject-oriented rule is inconsistent with the community-oriented rule, 
the two rules must apply to different taxes. 
B.  The Legislative History 
Apportionment of taxes to political subdivisions of a superior gov-
ernment was an institution that existed in various times in England, 
the continent, and American colonies prior to the 1787 Convention.77  
Apportioned requisitions were the sole revenue source of the Con-
federation.  The 1787 Convention, which was formally charged with 
revising the Articles of Confederation, conducted its proceedings un-
der the rubric of considering and revising the Virginia Plan, which 
assumed, in its reference to “quotas of contributions,” the continua-
tion of an apportionment system.  To be sure, it is unclear if “quotas 
 
subject duty or excise had to be apportioned.  The July 12 colloquy clearly excepts taxes 
on consumption—duties and excises—from apportionment on the grounds that appor-
tionment of them is impractical.  See Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, at 302–06, 
reprinted in Appendix A.  Although Madison might appear to have been somewhat con-
fused on this point, see supra note 74, he did not object to the non-apportionment of the 
whiskey tax being considered in 1791.  See infra note 109.  When the carriage tax was de-
bated in 1794 in the House of Representatives, Madison thought it was a property tax sub-
ject to apportionment, but Fisher Ames explained that it was an excise as a tax on use.  
Madison voted against the tax in any event, but it could have been on the ground that the 
tax was against Virginia interests.  See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (1794).  Madison did not 
raise the same point in connection with other excises and stamp duties considered at the 
same time.  In light of the foregoing, it is puzzling that Calvin Johnson insists that “direct 
tax” in the Constitution was understood to mean all internal taxes.  See Johnson, Foul-Up, 
supra note 7, at 47–66. 
 77 As to the colonies, see EINHORN, supra note 27, at 65 (discussing Massachusetts), and id. 
at 92 (discussing Pennsylvania).  See also ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND 
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 363 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., Univ. of Chicago 
Press 1952) (1776) (describing the English land tax as a fixed levy on districts based on a 
one-time valuation); id. at 376 (describing the French taille as of 1775 as one apportioned 
among provinces).  A fourteenth-century English tax on tangible personal property was 
apportioned among districts.  See WILLIAM KENNEDY, ENGLISH TAXATION 1640–1799:   AN 
ESSAY ON POLICY AND OPINION 16–18 (1913).  Taxes enacted in 1642, 1643, and 1649 were 
also apportioned among districts.  See id. at 39–40.  The land tax of 1689 abandoned dis-
trict quotas, but rates still varied among districts, and district quotas were revived in 1692.  
See id. at 44–45.  This is the tax mentioned by Smith, and it appears that this tax lasted 
through the eighteenth century. 
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of contributions” was meant to refer not only to requisitions, but also 
to non-requisition taxes.  Nevertheless, it is clear that apportionment 
of taxes among the states (or the collective populations of states) was 
assumed to be a significant feature of the landscape.  The New Jersey 
Plan provided for only unapportioned imposts and apportioned req-
uisitions.78  Thus, apportionment was the dominant background 
color.  On July 12, apportionment was formally approved as the norm 
for all federal levies, but almost immediately was then restricted to di-
rect taxes (and, presumably, requisitions).  This move can be viewed 
either as an “extension” of apportionment relative to a requisition-
only system, or as a “cut-back” of apportionment relative to taxes in 
general. 
In any event, in the July 12 colloquy it was explained that the term 
“direct tax” (subject to apportionment) was exclusive of taxes on in-
ternational trade (external taxes) and internal taxes on “consump-
tion.”79  As a matter of legislative intent, it cannot be contended that 
“direct tax” as used in the Constitution means “all taxes” or “all internal 
taxes” (i.e., excluding only taxes on international trade).  The July 12 
motion that the Convention delegations finally voted on was clearly 
explained to them by the proponents as being intended to exclude at 
least imposts and taxes on consumption, subsequently denoted as 
“duties” (stamp taxes) and “excises.”80 
C.  Apportionment Is Impossible for Taxes on Transactions 
The mechanics of apportionment, described earlier, are simply 
incompatible with a tax on transactions, such as imposts, stamp du-
ties, and sales taxes.81  A transactional tax requires application of a 
known tax rate to the tax base, which, in a transaction, exists at a giv-
en point in time.82  The tax rate under an apportioned tax requires 
that the aggregate tax base for a given state be known.  However, the 
 
 78 See supra text accompanying note 39. 
 79 Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, at 302–06, reprinted in Appendix A. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Remarks by George Mason of Virginia and Rufus King of Massachusetts appear to recog-
nize this point.  See id. 
 82 To a very modest extent, this problem can be finessed by the mechanism of the “bonded 
warehouse,” whereby a taxable item is stored in a warehouse, with the unpaid tax becom-
ing due when the item is removed.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1615 (8th ed. 2004).  
However, bonding did not exist during the Framing period, and it would delay reckoning 
of the tax only so long as the manufacturer, merchant, importer, etc. retained custody of 
the item.  Bonding is now standard practice in the case of excise taxes on the production 
of distilled spirits. 
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aggregate tax base for a state in the case of a transactional tax cannot 
be known until the end of some period of time (say, a year), at which 
point the sum of the relevant transactions within the state can be ag-
gregated.  By the time the tax rate can be ascertained, the taxable 
transaction will have become a thing of the past.  Hence, the tax 
would not be extractable from the transaction itself or its proceeds, 
which is the whole point of a transaction-type tax.83 
The foregoing analysis obviously does not apply to non-
transaction taxes, such as poll (head) taxes84 and property taxes, both 
of which were then common at the state level and were undoubtedly 
understood as being direct taxes.85  In addition, it would not apply to 
a personal tax on the aggregate transactions attributable to a person 
that occur over a specified time period (say, a year), such as income 
taxes, wage taxes, and personal consumption taxes.  These taxes are 
mechanically capable of apportionment because rates can be set after 
all the relevant facts for the taxable year are in.  However, it does not 
follow that such taxes are direct taxes in the legal sense, as it could be 
claimed that aggregation does not overcome the fact that such taxes 
are basically imposed with respect to transactions.  Aggregation does 
not alter the subject of the tax nor, ultimately, who pays it. 
In any event, the impossibility of apportioning a transactional tax 
is compelling proof that internal stamp taxes and other purely trans-
actional internal taxes could not be considered direct taxes.  To im-
 
 83 Transaction-type taxes were the easiest of all taxes to lay and collect until modern times.  
See SMITH, supra note 77, at 383 (“The impossibility of taxing the people, in proportion to 
their revenue, by any capitation, seems to have given occasion to the invention of taxes 
upon consumable commodities.  The state not knowing how to tax, directly and propor-
tionably, the revenue of its subjects, endeavours to tax it indirectly by taxing their ex-
pense, which, it is supposed, will in most cases be nearly in proportion to their revenue.”); 
see also James Madison, et al., Address to the States, By the United States in Congress As-
sembled:  To Accompany the Act of April 18, 1783 (Apr. 26), in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, su-
pra note 10, at 96–97 (advocating that the Confederation be allowed to levy import duties 
on the ground that taxes on consumption, especially imported consumer items, are the 
“least burdensome, because they are least felt, and are borne too by those who are both 
willing and able to pay them”). 
 84 Although the meaning of the term “poll tax” after the Framing period eventually evolved 
towards that of a fee for the privilege of voting, during the Framing period, it simply 
meant a head tax or capitation tax.  See EINHORN, supra note 27, at 30, 74. 
 85 Statements by some key players in the Framing period are consistent with this view.  See 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 215, reprinted in Appen-
dix B (explaining that taxes classified as “internal” may be described as direct or indi-
rect); Virginia Debates (John Marshall, June 10, 1788), supra note 10, at 229, reprinted in 
Appendix C (stating that there are few “objects of direct taxes,” including lands, slaves, 
and stock). 
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pose an apportionment requirement on such taxes would have been 
embarrassing indeed! 
D.  The Impracticality of Delegation in a Federal System 
Apportionment to “lower” political units was a feature of property 
and capitation tax administration in England (and perhaps the con-
tinent), some colonies, and the Confederation.86  Apportionment 
makes some practical sense as a delegation of authority to local units 
as collection agents in cases where the local units have a superior ca-
pability of ascertaining the relevant facts than the central govern-
ment.  Apportionment (delegation) also makes sense under a con-
federation-type scenario, where the central government is merely an 
agent of sovereign governments.  Delegation as a collection mecha-
nism might have had initial appeal in 1787 for a fledgling federal gov-
ernment with no tax-collection bureaucracy. 
However, the principle of delegation to local authorities makes lit-
tle sense in the United States where both the federal government and 
the state governments are sovereign because delegation could create 
conflict between the federal governments and the states.  This poten-
tial for conflict was recognized in the case of requisitions on state 
governments, but the problems of non-requisition apportionment 
appear to have been under-appreciated.  In that setting, delegation 
would entail either the commandeering of local officials by the fed-
eral government (which would also raise the potential for conflict 
with the states) or the hiring of local officials as part-time federal tax 
collectors, in which case the same people would be serving two mas-
ters.  If the federal government would instead be seen as having to re-
sort to hiring local persons who were not state or local government 
officials, then a duplicative bureaucracy would be created, but, at the 
same time, apportionment (state quotas) would be pointless as part 
of the collection machinery. 
E.  Contemporary Understanding 
An advocate of a broad meaning of “direct tax” might argue either 
that the meaning is (1) clear on its face or (2) ambiguous but with a 
meaning that emerges from contemporary understanding.  Both of 
these attempts fizzle. 
 
 86 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
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1.  Does “Direct Tax” Have a Clear Meaning as Text? 
Initially, the term “direct tax” is incomplete, as it raises the ques-
tion, “Directly on what?”  It is not a term used in common, everyday 
speech.  The term appears to have no legal relevance in the United 
States apart from the issue considered herein.  The closest thing to a 
colloquial meaning of “direct tax” is that of a tax imposed directly on 
taxpayers, rather than intermediaries.87  However, in order to avoid 
the useless proposition that a “direct tax” is a “tax on the payer of the 
tax,” it must be the case that “taxpayers” in the definition must refer 
to those who bear the ultimate burden of the tax, rather than those 
who actually pay it.  This meaning accords with the only plausible lit-
eral meaning of “direct tax” as a tax paid by the same taxpayer as 
bears the burden of the tax.  Thus, an “indirect tax” would be a tax 
paid by X that is actually suffered by Y, i.e., a tax that is “shifted” from 
one taxpayer to another, as where a sales tax that is “paid” by a mer-
chant is “passed on” to the ultimate consumer by means of a pro tanto 
price increase.  This meaning is constitutionally plausible, because 
the “indirect tax” categories of duties, imposts, and excises were (and 
are) often viewed as being taxes that are shifted.88 
However, the notion of a shifted tax relies upon the discipline of 
economics,89 and the Supreme Court, in both its textualist and origi-
nalist modes, tends to avoid ascribing term-of-art meanings to consti-
tutional text on the theory that the Constitution and its Amendments 
were ratified by the people and speak to the people.  Persons of ordi-
nary comprehension90 would be more likely to grasp “direct tax” as 
 
 87 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1496 (8th ed. 2004) (“A direct tax is presumed to be borne 
by the person upon whom it is assessed, and not ‘passed on’ to some other person.”). 
 88 The notion that import duties and taxes on consumption are “passed on” was part of the 
intellectual climate of the Framing period, leaving traces in the July 12 colloquy.  See 
OLIVER WOLCOTT, JR., DIRECT TAXES, H.R. DOC. NO. 4-100, 2d Sess. (1796), in 5 
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:  CLASS III FINANCE 414–41 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair 
Clarke eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1832) [hereinafter AMERICAN STATE PAPERS], 
available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwsplink.html (providing an over-
view of the taxation systems in various states); accord James Madison, Embargoes (May 6), in 
4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 433 (recording Mr. Sedgwick’s remarks that charac-
terized luxury taxes as indirect because they “created an indirect charge on others besides 
the owners”); see also supra text accompanying notes 52–53. 
 89 A formalistic notion of “shifted”—that is, the amount of the tax being added on to the 
selling price—does not work, as imposts and some excises are not added to selling prices. 
 90 See Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 515 (1921) (discussing the 
“common understanding” of the term “income”); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206–
07 (1920) (construing the Sixteenth Amendment according to common usage); Gibbons 
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188–92 (1824) (construing “commerce” similarly). 
 
862 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 11:4 
 
referring to certain subject matters rather than in empirical cause 
and effect terms.  Furthermore, legal categories can only function 
properly if their meaning is reasonably clear and stable.  A definition 
of “direct tax” in terms of subject-matter categories would be far more 
workable than one based on empirical economics, where new re-
search can show that accepted notions of how the world works can be 
incorrect. 
On the merits, the “non-shifted” meaning of “direct tax” sinks into 
quicksand, because even “add-on” taxes might not be shifted but ra-
ther absorbed by the seller,91 and, at the other end of the spectrum, 
taxes “directly” on persons, property, or income might be shifted if it 
is (realistically) assumed that markets are imperfect.92  Indeed, a 
comprehensive Treasury Department study of taxes undertaken 
shortly after ratification of the Constitution concluded that head tax-
es would increase the price of labor, taxes on investment would in-
crease the cost of capital, and taxes on factors of production might be 
passed on in either direction.93  Of course, the degree (if any) of shift-
ing is not knowable with any certainty.  No legal (much less constitu-
tional) rule can rest on so insecure a foundation.  Indeed, the pro-
ponents of a broad construction of “direct tax” are well-advised to 
abandon the “shifting” test, because it undermines their position:  
since virtually any tax might be shifted, all taxes must be indirect! 
Another problem with the “non-shifted” meaning of direct tax is 
that it does not relate to any constitutional concerns, especially of the 
kind to which the concept of apportionment pertains, namely, fed-
eral-state power allocations.94 
In light of the foregoing, it is not surprising that the Supreme 
Court, after once flirting with the “no-shifting” definition of direct 
 
 91 See The Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania, on the Adoption of the 
Federal Constitution (James Wilson, Dec. 11, 1787) [hereinafter Pennsylvania Debates], 
in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 519 (expressing doubt as to whether import du-
ties were typically borne by the consumers).  The burden of excise taxes, in theory, de-
pends on supply and demand curves.  See Raymond J. Ring, Jr., Consumers’ Share and Pro-
ducers’ Share of the General Sales Tax, 52 NAT’L TAX J. 79 (1999) (reporting estimates of the 
percentage of the general sales tax that is levied on residents’ consumption spending). 
 92 See George R. Zodrow, The Property Tax as a Capital Tax:  A Room with Three Views, 54 NAT’L 
TAX J. 139 (2001) (stating the current view that property taxes are borne by all invest-
ments); WILLIAM M. GENTRY, A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE ON THE INCIDENCE OF THE 
CORPORATE INCOME TAX (U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury 2007), http://www.treas.gov/
offices/tax-policy/library/ota101.pdf (finding that the corporate income tax is passed on 
in part to labor). 
 93 WOLCOTT, supra note 88, at 438–39. 
 94 This point is considered infra in the text accompanying notes 393–401. 
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tax,95 has explicitly rejected it.96  At best, it can only be concluded that 
a tax paid by an intermediary is a per se indirect tax, but it cannot be 
concluded on the basis of the “non-shifted” notion that a tax on a 
non-intermediary is per se a direct tax in the legal sense. 
Another possible meaning for direct tax might be a tax on the 
thing that is the real object of a tax, as opposed to a tax on one thing 
as a way of taxing another thing that is hard to reach directly.  This 
appears to be the meaning of direct tax that can be gleaned from the 
writings of Adam Smith, the leading authority on taxation during the 
period as a result of the publication in 1776 of Wealth of Nations.  
Smith’s sporadic use of the notion of “direct” was as an adverb (“di-
rectly”), not as an adjective or part of a compound noun.97  Thus, 
stamp duties on parchment and registration of deeds are “indirect” 
taxes on transferred property,98 and excise taxes on consumable 
commodities, as taxes on expense, are “indirect” taxes on personal 
revenue.99  This usage is not very helpful even as a description, be-
cause it again appears to be mired in the tangle of incidence analysis.  
Thus, a capitation tax on the lower ranks of people is described by 
Smith as a direct tax on the wages of labor,100 although it would seem 
to be indirect in the same way that an excise tax on consumption is 
an indirect tax on income.  To Smith, the concept of direct tax can-
not have been important:  (1) the term is not defined, (2) the term is 
used only occasionally, and (3) the term is not given any normative 
significance.101  It appears that Smith’s use of “direct” was not invoked 
in the Convention or ratification debates on the taxing power.  Al-
though Smith was occasionally invoked on other issues, it is hard to 
gauge his influence even among educated elites, and his influence on 
the rest of the population would have been negligible. 
 
 95 See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I), 158 U.S. 429 (1895) (holding that an 
unapportioned tax on the rents or income of real estate is a direct tax and unconstitu-
tional). 
 96 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 82 (1900); see Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 515, 520 
(1899) (emphasizing the importance of considering the “practical nature” of the tax ra-
ther than a theoretical examination of the tax). 
 97 See SMITH, supra note 77, at 381, 383. 
 98 See id. at 379 (discussing stamp duties on deeds as taxing property “indirectly”). 
 99 See id. at 383 (discussing taxes on consumable commodities). 
100 See id. (discussing capitation taxes). 
101 Smith’s normative framework was fourfold:  (1) equity, (2) certainty (as opposed to leav-
ing matters to administrative discretion), (3) convenience, and (4) administrative effi-
ciency.  See id. at 361–62.  Smith spent a good deal of time analyzing incidence with re-
spect to various kinds of taxes, but incidence was not what distinguished direct taxes from 
indirect taxes. 
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In sum, the meaning of “direct tax” is not clear on its face.  There-
fore, other interpretive methods are required to discern its meaning. 
2.  Contemporary Usage 
A common technique for interpreting ambiguous text is to under-
take a historical inquiry into how the term was understood at the time 
of enactment.102  Because “direct tax” possesses only an “inside the 
Constitution” meaning,103 its construction cannot avoid reference to 
historical sources emanating from the Framing/ratification period. 
But historicism has its problems.  The principal one is that it is 
susceptible to the charge of cherry-picking,104 a “sin” of which the 
main (if lonely) proponents of an expansive scope for the appor-
tionment requirement (the Pollock majorities and Erik Jensen) are 
the more guilty.105  Statements positing a broad scope for apportion-
 
102 The original-understanding version of originalism looks to the audience receiving the 
text, as opposed to statements of those creating the text.  See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & 
Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and Supermajoritarianism:  Defending the Nexus, 101 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1919, 1928–30 (2007) (describing how “Original Methods Originalism” looks 
to the “consensus about the consitutional provisions at the time of their enactment”); An-
tonin Scalia, Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 857–60 (1989) (examin-
ing the meaning of “the executive power” in Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution using 
originalism).  Since the authors of The Federalist Papers and principal players in the ratifi-
cation debates included Framers, the distinction between subjective and objective origi-
nalism is somewhat attenuated in this case. 
103 Since “direct tax” lacks any clear contemporary legal usage, it is not claimed herein that 
the meaning of this term has evolved over time either on account of the evolution of lan-
guage or of social practices that inform language. 
104 The view that historical investigation can be objective has long been under attack.  See H. 
Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 698 (1987) (“[T]he belief that 
history deals with objective ‘facts’ is itself a hotly disputed issue among contemporary his-
torians.”).  See generally Andrew B. Coan, Text as Truce:  A Peace Proposal for the Supreme 
Court’s Costly War over the Eleventh Amendment, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2511 (2006) (arguing 
against competing, politically-motivated, originalist interpretations of the Eleventh 
Amendment). 
105 The majority opinion in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock II), 158 U.S. 601 
(1895), is especially guilty of cherry-picking.  It downgrades the Hylton case on the basis 
that it was badly reported.  Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 626.  Yet, it cites Hamilton’s private view 
as expressed in a compilation of letters published in 1851, Madison stating his opinion 
that the carriage tax was subject to apportionment, see supra note 76, a statement by the 
Anti-Federalist Gallatin (made twenty years after the fact) effectively equating “direct tax” 
with any tax used by the states, and usage in England but not the more limited Continen-
tal usages.  Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 623–30; see EINHORN, supra note 27, at 273.  None of 
these sources arise from the Convention or ratification debates.  Similarly, Jensen down-
grades the Hylton opinion on the grounds, inter alia, that the Supreme Court lacked ju-
risdiction and that the judges were Federalists (even though Paterson authored the New 
Jersey plan), but he fails to note Madison’s (post-1789) anti-Federalist politics.  Jensen, 
Consumption Taxes, supra note 5, at 2351.  Johnson suffers from the opposite tendency of 
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ment made well after ratification by supporters of Jefferson (includ-
ing Madison) cannot be used as evidence of original understand-
ing,106 as an anti-tax posture helped define the Jeffersonian Republi-
can party,107 and a pro-apportionment stance aligned that party with 
states-rights sentiments,108 as well as provided additional political cov-
er for opposing federal excise taxes.109  Although the anti-tax rhetoric 
of the Republicans was genuine, the accompanying pro-
apportionment rhetoric should be taken with a grain of salt because 
their words were contradicted by their deeds.  No apportioned fed-
 
citing sources indiscriminately, his point being that a term that can mean almost anything 
must mean nothing.  See Johnson, Foul-Up, supra note 7, at 46–56.  Ackerman’s view is that 
modern history trumps older history.  See Ackerman, supra note 6, at 51 (advising that 
older teachings “should be dispatched into the dustbin of constitutional history”). 
106 See JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 5–8, 130–38 (arguing that the Federalists, as the winners of 
the major constitutional struggle over taxes, are the more reliable sources).  The Repub-
lican Party that became dominant after Jefferson acceded to the presidency in 1801 in-
cluded—if it was not limited to—those who opposed ratification of the Constitution.  On 
the other hand, winning the struggle over the power to lay direct taxes does not tell us 
much about the scope of the apportionment requirement, because the apportionment 
requirement might have been part of the price to be paid for obtaining the power. 
107 Madison and Jefferson began to gravitate away from Hamilton as early as 1791.  Hamilton 
favored commercial interests while Jefferson and Madison favored landowning and agri-
cultural interests.  The Republicans opposed naval construction, a standing army, and in-
ternal improvements, and any other program that would occasion the imposition of sig-
nificant federal taxes.  For a brief discussion, see Norman Schofield, Madison and the 
Founding of the Two-Party System, in JAMES MADISON:  THE PRACTICE OF REPUBLICAN 
GOVERNMENT 302, 322–24 (Samuel Kernell ed., 2005) [hereinafter JAMES MADISON].  
Immediate points of difference were the Bank of the United States and the federal as-
sumption of state debts incurred in the Revolutionary War. 
108 Madison, contrary to his earlier position in the Convention, warmly supported the doc-
trine of enumerated powers as early as 1792, as it offered a principle with which to op-
pose Hamilton’s nationalistic program.  James Madison, Cod Fishery Bill (James Madison, 
Feb. 7, 1792), in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 427–28. 
109 Madison’s position with respect to apportionment is not entirely clear.  Despite a sugges-
tion that uniformity and apportionment might have been compatible under some cir-
cumstances, see supra note 74 and accompanying text, Madison elsewhere appears to have 
recognized that uniformity is basically incompatible with apportionment, while preferring 
apportionment as the higher principle.  See Virginia Debates (James Madison, June 15, 
1788), supra note 10, at 458–59, reprinted in Appendix C.  In the House, Madison appears 
to prefer apportioned taxes to single-item excises, seemingly as a policy matter, but ac-
cepted the non-apportioned excise on whiskey.  See Gazette of the United States, 8 Janu-
ary 1791, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 MARCH 1789–3 MARCH 2791, at 229–30 (William Charles 
diGiacomantonio et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS]; see also supra 
note 76 and accompanying text, which notes Madison’s position on the carriage tax that 
was upheld in Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).  It would appear that 
Madison’s increasing embrace of apportionment during the Federalist period was simply 
an aspect of the overall Republican agenda.  See infra note 110. 
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eral tax was seriously advanced by them except a tax on land.110  After 
they took power in the election of 1800, they essentially allowed all 
taxes other than imposts to lapse, but in connection with the War of 
1812, the Madison administration basically caused Congress to renew 
the Federalist tax program of the 1790s, as augmented by additional 
excises, with again only a real estate tax being apportioned.111  Even 
an annual “duty” on household goods, furniture, and personal effects 
by reason of ownership was not apportioned.112 
An originalist approach to constitutional interpretation has diffi-
culty accommodating social phenomena that did not exist during the 
Framing period and its immediate aftermath.  Here, those phenom-
ena would be annual personal taxes on income, aggregate consump-
tion, or aggregate wealth, which did not then meaningfully exist,113 
although they were talked about to some extent.114  Insofar as the ori-
ginalist position leads to the conclusion that the term “direct tax” 
could only encompass taxes that people in the relevant period had 
experienced, then it would appear to be limited to the kinds of prop-
erty and capitation taxes that people were then familiar with.  How-
ever, perhaps the more widely-followed view is that of Chief Justice 
Marshall, to the effect that terms in the Constitution are broad 
enough to admit of applications not specifically contemplated by the 
Framers.115  Even so, it does not follow that the term “direct tax” in-
 
110 The chief financial spokesman of the Republicans in Congress during the second half of 
the decade of the 1790s, Albert Gallatin, actively pushed an apportioned land tax as a 
ploy to alienate northern farmers, who would be subject to higher rates than southern 
landowners.  However, the apportioned tax enacted in 1798 on slaves, homes, and land 
was designed along lines favorable to the Federalist Party.  See EINHORN, supra note 27, at 
189–94. 
111 The early history of apportioned taxes is given at supra Part I.C. 
112 Act of Jan. 18, 1815, ch. 23, 3 Stat. 186, 186–87, repealed by Act of Apr. 9, 1816, ch. 41, 3 
Stat. 264, 264. 
113 The income tax first appeared in England in 1798 as a temporary measure to help fi-
nance continental wars.  A short history of taxation from feudal times through the first 
English income tax is found in EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX:  A STUDY OF THE 
HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 41–114 
(1911). 
114 Adam Smith classified a comprehensive personal income or wealth tax as a “capitation 
tax” but assumed that it was not practical because the taxing authorities could not obtain 
the necessary information without intolerable invasions of privacy.  SMITH, supra note 77, 
at 382. 
115 See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 644 (1819) (“It 
is not enough to say, that this particular case was not in the mind of the Convention, 
when the article was framed, nor of the American people, when it was adopted.  It is nec-
essary to go further, and to say that, had this particular case been suggested, the language 
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cludes personal income, consumption, and perhaps wealth taxes, es-
pecially since the competing term—“excises”—is similarly open-
textured.  Where two categories are in competition with respect to 
“new facts,” the matter is likely to be settled by analogy.  Once “shift-
ing” is eliminated as the distinguishing characteristic of “direct tax,” 
personal income and consumption taxes, being a function of transac-
tional outcomes, more closely resemble excises than property or capi-
tation taxes.116  Another possibility is that both terms cover the same 
tax.  In that case, it has to be decided whether apportionment or uni-
formity is the better operative rule. 
3.  The Illusion of the Pseudo-Requisition 
The attempt to find the Rosetta Stone that will unlock the code to 
the meaning of “direct tax” is fundamentally misguided.117  The pre-
sent issue is not about divining the meaning of a stand-alone term, 
like “cruel and unusual punishment” or “high crimes and misde-
meanors.”  Direct taxes are subject to the apportionment require-
ment, whereas non-direct taxes are subject to the incompatible uni-
formity requirement.  Therefore, the taxing provisions are a package, 
and Framing-period statements that show a basic misunderstanding 
of the package are not helpful.118  Furthermore, courts, in attributing 
 
would have been so varied, as to exclude it, or it would have been made a special excep-
tion.”). 
116 Courts have never adopted the view that personal income and consumption taxes are per 
se direct taxes on account of being imposed on individuals.  See infra note 163 and ac-
companying text. 
117 Originalism can tempt judges to subordinate precedent to the judge’s own view of the 
original sources, at least where the precedent does not itself have an originalist flavor.  In 
the present case, however, the precedents from Hylton forward are themselves steeped in 
historicism:  the Justices in Hylton (decided in 1796) were Framers, and later Supreme 
Court cases relied on Hylton and early practice by Congress and the Executive.  See gener-
ally John McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Interpretative Principles as the Core of 
Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371 (2007) (developing a theory for the compatibility 
of precedent and originalism).  Thus, a judicial construction of “direct tax” based on a 
court’s reading of historical materials at variance with doctrine would be arrogant in-
deed!  Additionally, judges, even with staff assistance, lack the time to do comprehensive 
original historical research. 
118 Some statements are simply opaque.  See The Debates in the Convention of the State of 
New York, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Chancellor Livingston, June 17, 
1788) [hereinafter New York Debates], in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 341 
(“[D]irect taxes; that is, taxes on land, and specific duties.”).  Others appear to assume 
that apportionment applies to all taxes, or to all internal taxes.  See The Debates in the 
Convention of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution (Mr. Dawes, Jan. 9, 1788) [hereinafter Massachusetts Debates], in 2 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES, supra note 10, at 59–60; Letter from Roger Sherman & Oliver Ellsworth to the 
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rationality to the package, would, and as it turned out, did, construe 
it in instrumental terms rather than in linguistic terms.119 
Rampant confusion over the package appears to have been com-
mon during the Framing/ratification period, as evidenced by state-
ments to the effect that the federal government would impose “gen-
eral” apportioned taxes without any universal subject matter.  Rather, 
it was supposed that the federal government would tax subject mat-
ters that varied from state to state according to existing state laws and 
practices (or federally-determined subject matters that would be tai-
lored to the economic characteristics of various states).120  Such a sys-
tem is referred to herein as a “pseudo-requisition”:  almost everything 
about it smells like a requisition, except that it would be collected by 
federal officials from persons rather than from states and that the 
federal government would ultimately control the determination of 
the subject matters to be specified in each state.  The pseudo-
requisition is illogical insofar as it incorporates duties and excises, be-
cause the uniformity of such taxes required by the Constitution 
would be defeated twice over, first by employing such modes of taxa-
tion in some states but not others, and second by apportionment (re-
sulting in non-uniform rates).121 
It is also significant that the pseudo-requisition idea was casually 
thrown out without any consistency among speakers and without spe-
cifics.  The only way that a pseudo-requisition that contained duties, 
 
Governor of Connecticut (Sept. 26, 1787), in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 491–
92; New York Debates (John Jay, June 17, 1788), supra, at 380–81. 
119 Thus the Supreme Court, contrary to the constitutional text, has extended the uniformity 
requirement beyond duties, imposts, and excises to “taxes” and even to direct taxes that 
do not have to be apportioned on account of the Sixteenth Amendment, resulting in a 
situation wherein all federal taxes must be either apportioned or made uniform.  Brusha-
ber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916). 
120 Such a scenario was raised by Oliver Ellsworth in the July 12 Convention colloquy:  “[any] 
sum allotted to a state [under a direct tax that was not a requisition] may be levied with-
out difficulty according to the plan used by the state in raising its own supplies.”  Madi-
son’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, at 305, reprinted in Appendix A.  It was also a theme 
often trotted out by the pro-ratification faction in the Virginia Ratifying Convention.  See 
materials infra Appendix C.  John Jay, who was not at the 1787 Convention, also might 
have held this view.  Hamilton, in Federalist No. 36, stated that “[t]he method of laying 
and collecting this species of taxes in each State can, in all its parts, be adopted and em-
ployed by the federal government,” but he seemed to be referring to real estate taxes in-
volving appraisals.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 216, 
reprinted in Appendix B. 
121 This legal issue was never decided, as no such tax was ever enacted by the federal gov-
ernment.  The tax was seen as impractical by all the Justices writing opinions in the 1796 
case of Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796), as well as by WOLCOTT, supra 
note 88. 
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imposts, and/or excises could satisfy both the apportionment and un-
iformity requirements would be as a tax on multiple subject matters 
(each subject being taxed at a uniform rate in all states) that some-
how produces aggregate state yields approximating the respective 
state quotas.  Designing such a system would be quite a feat of tax en-
gineering, because the subjects and rates for transactional taxes 
would have to be set in advance on the basis of yield estimates.  The 
estimates would often be substantially off-target, raising the problem 
of what to do about unfulfilled state quotas and yields in excess of 
state quotas.  More generally, it is not clear how the federal govern-
ment could adopt state laws, practices, and perhaps collection devices 
without becoming entangled with state institutions and politics.  Fi-
nally, the incorporation of indirect (passed-on) taxes into the pseudo-
requisition would undermine the purpose of apportionment to allo-
cate the tax burden proportionately among political communities.122 
The pseudo-requisition concept ends up being essentially one 
where “direct tax” means “a tax that is in fact apportioned,” an inter-
pretation proposed by Johnson.123  The resulting constitutional rule 
would then be the nonsensical “apportioned taxes shall be appor-
tioned according to population.”124  It would have been easy for the 
Framers to use language conforming to the Johnson interpretation, 
but they did not, and instead the text states that “direct taxes” and 
“capitation taxes” are the taxes that are required to be apportioned 
according to population, whereas imposts, duties, and excises are sub-
ject to the uniformity requirement.  The consequence of the Johnson 
view is the untenable position that Congress could avoid apportion-
ment of capitation taxes and real estate taxes simply by deciding not 
to apportion them.125  That interpretation would amount to a delega-
 
122 See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1842–43 (1791) (statements of Rep. Jackson) (complaining that a 
distilled spirits tax imposed on Northern producers would be borne mainly by Southern 
consumers). 
123 See Calvin H. Johnson, The Four Good Dissenters in Pollock, 32  J. SUP. CT. HIST. 162, 168 
(2007) (“The inclusion of excise and duties in ‘direct tax’ and the later exclusion of ex-
cises and duties from ‘direct taxes’ show that apportionability was a necessary element of 
a direct tax under the original meaning.”). 
124 The idea of a pseudo-requisition would have made some sense going into the 1787 Con-
vention, when the objective was to enable the federal government to bypass state govern-
ments, and apportionment might have been assumed to be required for all federal taxes, 
in which case there would have been no conflicting uniformity requirement. 
125 Capitation taxes must be apportioned pursuant to Article I, Section 9, Clause 4, where 
“capitation tax” is understood to be a subcategory of “direct tax.”  If “direct tax” means 
nothing other than requisitions, capitation taxes, and other apportioned taxes, it would 
be easy enough to so state.  But it is clear from the historical record that everybody 
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tion to Congress of the power to determine what “direct tax” means, 
but such a delegation would invert the hierarchy of the Constitution 
being supreme law.  Moreover, because apportioned taxes fall inequi-
tably on persons, are cumbersome to administer, and entail delays in 
collection,126 they would rarely, if ever, be laid, and the apportion-
ment requirement would have amounted to a deception. 
In contrast, apportionment of poll taxes and property taxes can be 
implemented on an ex-post basis:  the tax rates would be determined 
after the state-by-state inventory (and valuation, if relevant) of per-
sons or property, and the appropriate tax bills would then be pre-
sented to the taxpayers. 
4.  Federalist No. 36 
Perhaps the most often-used window into original understanding 
is The Federalist.127  The one essay that bears specifically on the distinc-
tion between direct and indirect taxation is Federalist No. 36, au-
thored by Hamilton, and set forth as Appendix B of this Article.  
Hamilton specifically refers only to taxes on real estate in connection 
 
thought that at least real estate taxes were direct taxes.  Johnson’s position is that Con-
gress would not apportion a tax unless the apportionment was fair and reasonable, so that 
any tax that Congress in fact apportioned would satisfy this standard.  This interpretation 
is attacked at infra notes 336–42.  Since Congress enacted apportioned real estate taxes 
on three occasions, the Johnson position must be that real estate taxes were direct taxes 
up through the Civil War, but at some point thereafter they ceased to be direct taxes.  At 
a more abstract level, the proposition that apportioned taxes are direct taxes does not 
imply that all non-apportioned taxes pass constitutional muster, because Congress might 
simply decide that it is inconvenient to apportion a tax of the type that could be reasona-
bly apportioned.  See Johnson, supra note 123, at 164. 
126 An apportioned tax has to be administered on a state-by-state basis, even though it might 
be more convenient and efficient to administer the tax on a district (local) basis, as is 
possible with uniform taxes. 
127 The Federalist is a collection of pro-ratification essays written by Hamilton, Madison, and 
Jay to influence public opinion in the New York ratification effort.  Whether statements 
from the ratification debates, including The Federalist itself, should be “admitted” is not 
without controversy.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Fed-
eralist but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301 (1998) (question-
ing textualists’ reliance on The Federalist but not on legislative history in constitutional de-
cisions); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337 (1998) (suggesting that nondelegation concerns 
do not preclude interpretive use of The Federalist).  A defense of using The Federalist as leg-
islative history is found in Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 
1425, 1498 (1987).  For a view that rejects the use of The Federalist as legislative history, but 
accepts it as representing the consensus understanding of the ratifiers, see Dan T. 
Coenen, A Rhetoric for Ratification:  The Argument of The Federalist and Its Impact on Consti-
tutional Interpretation, 56 DUKE L.J. 469, 538–42 (2006). 
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with his discussion of direct taxes.128  Hamilton’s larger objective is to 
rebut the claim of the Anti-Federalists that all internal taxes are best 
left to the states, which have knowledge of local conditions.129  He ar-
gues that the selection of subjects for duties and excises by federal offi-
cials requires only a general knowledge of the economy of the state.130  
In the case of direct taxes on real estate, the administration can be car-
ried out by using the systems in place in the various states for laying 
and collecting real estate taxes, and any appraisers that are necessary 
can be hired locally.131 
Hamilton was not alone in equating “direct tax” with real estate 
tax.132  Nevertheless, this was not the only view expressed during the 
ratification period.  The conclusion that best matches the historical 
data is that there was no clear consensus view of “direct tax,” except 
that said term definitely included “real estate taxes” as well as requisi-
tions and head taxes.  Views differed on the issue of what (if any-
thing) might be included other than real estate taxes.133  This uncer-
tainty is not surprising, as no definition of direct tax emerged from 
the 1787 Convention, and the link (if any) between the idea of ap-
portionment and the concept of “direct tax” is not apparent on its 
face. 
5.  Early Practice 
Another source sometimes consulted as evidence of original un-
derstanding is the early (non-judicial) practice of the federal gov-
ernment.134  The earliest federal tax was on imports,135 and no faction 
 
128 THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 213–20, reprinted in Ap-
pendix B. 
129 Id. at 214. 
130 Id. at 216–17. 
131 Id. at 217. 
132 See Virginia Debates (John Marshall, June 10, 1788), supra note 10, at 229–31, reprinted in 
Appendix C (identifying that the objects of direct taxes include domestic property); see al-
so Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). 
133 See New York Debates (Chancellor Livingston, June 17, 1788), supra note 118, at 341 
(identifying direct taxes as “taxes on land, and specific duties”); Massachusetts Debates 
(Mr. Dawes, Jan. 18, 1788, Jan. 21, 1788), supra note 118, at 42, 57 (identifying direct tax-
es as all taxes, including those on lands, exclusive of imposts and excises); id. (Mr. King, 
Jan. 21, 1788) at 57 (“The first revenue will be raised from the impost . . . the next from 
the excise; and if these are not sufficient, direct taxes must be laid.”). 
134 The early history of federal taxation is described in Henry Carter Adams, Taxation in the 
United States, 1789–1816, in 2 JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND 
POLITICAL SCIENCE:  INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMICS pts. V–VI (New York, Johnson Reprint 
Corp. 1973) (1884).  The “early practice” interpretive approach was followed in Myers v. 
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thought that imposts had to be apportioned.  Non-apportioned ton-
nage duties on ships were also an early revenue source.136  A tonnage 
duty, which must be paid to release the ship from port, looks like a 
tax on tangible personal property or the use thereof. 
The whiskey tax of 1792137 was not apportioned.  That tax reached 
not only the production of distilled spirits, but also the stills them-
selves according to their capacity.  A tax on the consumer goods out-
put of a business falls within conventional definitions of “excise,” but 
a tax on an asset used in the production process can also be charac-
terized as a tax on capital investment.  In contrast to ships, stills could 
perhaps be attributed to states for purposes of apportionment.  Nev-
ertheless, the tax on stills was not apportioned, perhaps on the theory 
that the cost of stills would be passed on to consumers, but that the-
ory would also apply to real estate used in a business.  In any event, 
the whiskey tax was not seriously enforced, and it appears not to have 
been challenged in court for lack of apportionment. 
The carriage tax of 1794,138 which also straddled the categories of 
excise tax and tangible personal property tax, was likewise not appor-
tioned.  This tax was challenged on the basis of non-apportionment, 
but was upheld by the Supreme Court in the March, 1796 case of Hyl-
ton v. United States,139 which will be discussed shortly. 
Shortly after the Hylton decision, the House Ways and Means 
Committee, fearing that indirect taxes would be insufficient for fu-
ture needs, asked Treasury Secretary Oliver Wolcott to prepare a re-
port on direct taxes.140  The Wolcott Report,141 issued in December of 
1796, offered three possible approaches to apportioned taxation:  (1) 
a requisition on the states coupled with a pseudo-requisition back-up 
for delinquent states,142 (2) an apportioned pseudo-requisition, and 
 
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926), and cases cited therein, and in at least one Supreme 
Court case construing “direct tax.”  Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869). 
135 The first such Act—the second law passed by Congress—was the Act of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, 
1 Stat. 24, repealed by Act of Aug. 10, 1790, ch. 39, 1 Stat. 180.  Customs duty rates varied 
from item to item. 
136 See, e.g., Act of July 20, 1789, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 27 (imposing duties on ships and vessels). 
137 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 32, 1 Stat. 267. 
138 Act of June 5, 1794, 1 Stat. 373, ch. 45, repealed by the Act of Apr. 6, 1802, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 
148. 
139 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). 
140 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 793 (1796). 
141 WOLCOTT, supra note 88. 
142 A pseudo-requisition is described in the Wolcott Report as an apportioned federal tax 
“upon the same objects of taxation, and pursuant to the rules of collection by which taxes 
are collected in the States, respectively.”  WOLCOTT, supra note 88, at 436. 
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(3) apportioned subject-specific taxes.  Wolcott rejected the first two 
possibilities on grounds of equity, economic efficiency, and practical-
ity.143  Although the Report offers no comprehensive definition of “di-
rect tax” and does not purport to be a legal opinion, it states that “[a] 
direct tax in the sense of the constitution, must necessarily include a 
tax on lands.”144  Otherwise, there are some surprises.  Taxes on 
homes are stated to be taxes on expenses (and, therefore, indirect 
taxes), and taxes on the profits of professions, merchants, and manu-
facture are said to be “presumed” not to be of the type required to be 
apportioned.  The status, if any, of taxes on invested capital is un-
clear.145  The Report is non-committal on the issue of whether such 
unpopular taxes as capitation taxes and taxes on the stock and pro-
duce of farms need to be apportioned. 
The Wolcott Report ended up recommending an apportioned tax 
on slaves, homes, and lands.  It is curious that the (progressive-rate) 
tax on homes, which the Wolcott Report opined to be not subject to 
apportionment, ended up being a component of an apportioned tax, 
but apparently there was no move to have the tax on homes invali-
dated on the grounds that it violated the uniformity requirement.  
Another possible hypothesis is that the tax on homes, as a tax on a 
kind of real estate, was a direct tax. 
There was much subsequent debate in Congress over the general 
issue of whether direct (i.e., apportioned) taxes should be resorted 
to, or whether indirect taxation should be expanded.146  Meanwhile, 
 
143 Wolcott recognized that apportioned taxes were inequitable from a national perspective, 
and sought a route that would both minimize the inequity and create as few economic 
distortions as possible, while still being capable of administration.  The first option, requi-
sition coupled with pseudo-requisition, was considered to be unreliable and capable of 
creating state-federal conflicts.  As to pseudo-requisitions, Wolcott had included a de-
tailed survey of state tax systems in his Report, and what he saw was chaos, inequity within 
states, and rampant economic distortions.  Even taxes on lands were imposed according 
to varying principles:  by acre, by category, by quality, and by value.  These objections 
outweighed, in Wolcott’s view, the tailoring of the pseudo-requisition approach to “local 
conditions.”  See generally WOLCOTT, supra note 88. 
144 See id. at 439. 
145 See id. at 440 (homes); id. at 439 (profits of profession and business); id. at 439 (invested 
capital, referred to as “stock employed in trade and manufactures, and on moneys loaned 
on interest”).  The passage referring to invested capital starts off with the phrase, “[i]t is 
believed that direct taxes on these objects,” but this phrase does not necessarily mean that 
such taxes are legally subject to apportionment, and later on it is said that such taxes may 
end up being taxes on consumption by reason of being passed on.  See id. 
146 The debate in the House is recorded in 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1850–72, 1874–1913, 
1915–42 (1797).  On the direct tax side, it was claimed that an increase in indirect taxa-
tion would be fruitless, because it would drive people to smuggling or evasion.  Also, indi-
rect tax revenue would dry up in time of war.  Moreover, land (agriculture) was not bear-
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the import of the Hylton decision was sinking in.  The plan advanced 
by the Wolcott Report eventually bore fruit in the apportioned real 
property tax of 1798,147 reaching lands, slaves, and dwelling houses.148 
The Republicans under Jefferson took control in 1801 and re-
pealed (or declined to renew) all of the Federalist-period internal 
taxes, including the apportioned tax.149  However, when the Republi-
cans finally had to impose internal taxes to finance the War of 1812, 
the only tax that was apportioned was again a real estate tax.150  This 
tax, unlike the tax of 1798, allowed a state to satisfy its quota out of its 
own treasury in lieu of direct enforcement by the federal government 
against the state’s citizens or property.151  As previously mentioned,152 
and undoubtedly with Hylton in mind, an 1815 tax on household 
goods, furniture, and personal effects was not apportioned. 
On the question of whether taxes on a person’s annual aggregate 
income were considered to be direct taxes, the evidence, although 
scanty, is that they were not.  An income tax, to the extent that any-
body was even conscious of such a thing,153 was thought in the Fram-
ing period to be impractical because of accounting and collection 
problems.154  Nevertheless, some U.S. states had taxes on professions, 
merchants, and producers of goods, sometimes called “faculty” taxes, 
but the Wolcott Report of 1796 opined that such taxes (which were 
not directly implicated by the Hylton decision) were not subject to the 
 
ing its fair share.  On the other, there was worry that a land tax would be apportioned 
unequally within a state (as would occur under a per-acre tax); the alternative of resorting 
to appraisals would be expensive and crude.  The debaters assumed that window taxes 
and hearth taxes (taxes on homes) were indirect.  Fairness (ability to pay) claims were 
made on both sides. 
147 Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 75, 1 Stat. 597; see also Patrick J. Furlong, The Origins of the House 
Committee of Ways and Means, 25 WM. & MARY Q. 587, 593–94 (1968) (noting that an ap-
portioned land tax proposed by Madison was defeated in the House in 1794). 
148 Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 75, § 2, 1 Stat. 597.  For a discussion of federal tax politics of the 
time, see EINHORN, supra note 27, at 188–94. 
149 Act of Apr. 6, 1802, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 148. 
150 Act of July 22, 1813, ch. 16, 3 Stat. 22, repealed by Act of Jan. 9, 1815, 3 Stat. 164, ch. 21, § 2; 
Act of Aug. 2, 1813, ch. 37, 3 Stat. 53. 
151 Act of Aug. 2, 1813, ch. 37, § 7, 3 Stat. 53, 71.  This feature was anticipated by Madison in 
Federalist No. 45.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison). 
152 See supra note 112.  Here, the Treasury and Congress would have assumed that the 1796 
Hylton case, discussed in the text immediately below, and which held that a tax on car-
riages was not a direct tax, controlled. 
153 Justice Paterson mentioned taxes on income in Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 
180 (1796):  “Indirect taxes are circuitous modes of reaching the revenue of individuals, 
who generally live according to their income.” 
154 See supra text accompanying note 83, which quotes SMITH, supra note 77, at 383. 
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apportionment requirement.155  In 1815, Republican Treasury Secre-
tary Alexander Dallas submitted a proposal for an income tax to 
Congress that was never acted upon.156  Significantly, the proposed 
income tax was not to be apportioned. 
To conclude, the apportionment requirement was narrowly con-
strued by Congress and the Executive, with help from the Supreme 
Court, from the very beginning.  It cannot be seriously maintained 
that this narrow-construction consensus was partisan, as it has contin-
ued through the present day.  Except for another apportioned real 
estate tax laid to help finance the Civil War,157 no other apportioned 
tax has ever been enacted by Congress.  The fact is that no party or 
faction wanted to be responsible for a tax that came to be universally 
viewed as inequitable,158 but that also proved to be cumbersome and 
inefficient.159 
To conclude this section, the original-understanding approach re-
veals no consensus other than that real estate taxes were considered 
to be the core, and possibly the exclusive, embodiment of “direct tax” 
(excluding requisitions and capitation taxes). 
F.  Supreme Court Construction of “Direct Tax” 
This Part discusses the doctrinal evolution of “direct tax” in the 
Supreme Court. 
1.  “Direct Tax” Goes to Court in 1796:  The Hylton Case 
The first case addressing the scope of the apportionment re-
quirement, decided in 1796, was Hylton v. United States,160 which in-
volved a non-apportioned annual tax161 on carriages owned for per-
sonal or commercial use.  The tax was a fixed dollar amount per 
 
155 WOLCOTT, supra note 88, at 439.  The quote by Adam Smith in supra note 83 suggests that 
excise taxes and income taxes are closely related. 
156 See DEP’T OF TREASURY, STATE OF THE TREASURY, H.R. DOC. NO. 4-438, 3d Sess. (1796), in  
2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 88, at 885–87; Tax History Museum, 1777–1815:  
The Revolutionary War to the War of 1812, http://www.tax.org/Museum/1777-1815.htm 
(last visited March 26, 2009) (“Dallas assumed that such an income tax constituted an in-
direct tax, and would not require apportionment.”). 
157 Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, 12 Stat. 292. 
158 The Hylton case had the effect of publicizing the inequitable effect of apportioned taxes, 
and the Republicans in the 1790s attempted to saddle the Federalists with an apportioned 
land tax that would alienate northern farmers.  See EINHORN, supra note 27, at 189–94. 
159 See Adams, supra note 134, at 67–68 (noting delayed collections and low net yield). 
160 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). 
161 Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 45, 1 Stat. 373, repealed by Act of May 28, 1796, ch. 47, 1 Stat. 478. 
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carriage.  The judgment was unanimous that the tax was not required 
to be apportioned.162  Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth, having just taken 
office that morning, did not participate.163  Justice William Cushing, 
being ill for the oral arguments, voted, but did not write an opinion.  
Justice James Wilson, who had voted to uphold the tax in the pro-
ceeding below,164 wrote only to join the judgment of the Court.  That 
left Justices Samuel Chase, William Paterson, and James Iredell to 
write separate opinions, as was then the custom.  Three of the Justices 
were prominent Framers,165 and four of them played significant roles 
in the ratification effort.166 
One Justice, Chase, expressed some deference to the Congress on 
the ground that it must have considered the constitutional issue.167  
Although the Court had not yet promulgated the doctrine of judicial 
 
162 The taxpayer conceded that the uniformity requirement was satisfied.  Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) at 171, 172. 
163 Id. at 172 n.*. 
164 The proceeding below, of which no report exists, was divided.  Id. at 172. 
165 Paterson, of New Jersey, had presented the New Jersey Plan to the 1787 Convention.  
Ellsworth, of Connecticut, who is often credited with the great compromise involving the 
composition of the House and Senate, floated the idea of a pseudo-requisition during the 
July 12 debate.  Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, at 302–06, reprinted in Appendix 
A.  Wilson, of Pennsylvania, stated in the July 12 debate that apportionment would not 
work unless it was confined to direct taxes.  Wilson was a member of the “Committee of 
Five” (the Committee on Detail) that played a crucial role in drafting the Constitution.  
See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
166 Wilson presented the case for ratification at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention.  See 
Pennsylvania Debates, supra note 91, at 418–517, 518–29.  Ellsworth (of Connecticut), 
Cushing (of Massachusetts), and Iredell (of North Carolina) favored ratification in their 
respective state conventions.  See Fragment of the Debates in the Convention of the State 
of Connecticut, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution [hereinafter Connecticut 
Debates], in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 185–97 (Oliver Ellsworth, Jan. 4, 1788) 
(speaking in support of ratification); Massachusetts Debates, supra note 118, at 180 
(“Hon. William Cushing, Yea.”); The Debates in the Convention of the State of North 
Carolina, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution [hereinafter North Carolina De-
bates], in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at v–vi (listing numerous statements of Ire-
dell).  Chase was a delegate from Maryland to the Continental Congress of 1775–77, but 
does not appear to have played a major role in 1787–89.  See Address to the People of 
Maryland, 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 547–56. 
167 Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 173 (opinion of Chase, J.).  Chase was factually correct on this 
point.  See supra text accompanying note 76.  Chase’s opinion here can be said to be an 
early example of the judiciary looking to the actions of the post-ratification Congress as 
being evidence of the contemporaneous understanding of constitutional text.  See also 
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926) (“This Court has repeatedly laid down the 
principle that a contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when the 
founders of our Government and framers of our Constitution were actively participating 
in public affairs, acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the construction to be given 
its provisions.”). 
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review,168 there appears to be little foundation for the claim that the 
Court would then have balked at overturning an unconstitutional sta-
tute.169 
All three judges agreed on the following points:  (1) apportion-
ment and uniformity were incompatible principles, and only one of 
them could govern any tax;170 (2) a tax could be a direct tax only if it 
were reasonably capable of apportionment (thereby ruling out taxes 
with subjects that might be uncommon or non-existent in one or 
more states);171 (3) it was unlikely that apportionment was required 
for anything other than real estate taxes, capitation taxes, and requi-
sitions;172 and (4) the pseudo-requisition idea made no sense.173  Jus-
 
168 Chase’s opinion pointed out that, by holding the tax to be constitutional, it was not nec-
essary to face the as-yet undecided issue of whether the federal courts had the power to 
hold an act of Congress unconstitutional.  Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 175 (opinion of 
Chase, J.). 
169 None of the other Justices commented on this aspect of the case, but Justice Iredell was 
an advocate of judicial review.  See William R. Casto, James Iredell and the American Origins of 
Judicial Review, 27 CONN. L. REV. 329, 339–48 (1995) (explaining that Iredell, like many of 
his contemporaries, accepted the Court’s power of judicial review and based it upon the 
sovereignty of the people, although he believed that judicial review should only be used if 
a statute was “unconstitutional beyond dispute”). 
170 See Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 174 (opinion of Chase, J.) (explaining that duties, imposts, 
and excises are governed by uniformity and that capitation and other direct taxes are go-
verned by apportionment); id. at 176 (opinion of Paterson, J.) (discussing whether cer-
tain types of taxes should be laid uniformly or apportionately); id. at 181 (opinion of Ire-
dell, J.) (noting that certain taxes must be apportioned and certain taxes must be 
uniform). 
171 See id. at 174 (opinion of Chase, J.) (explaining that it would be unreasonable to say that 
Congress intended a tax to be laid by apportionment if it would “create great inequality 
and injustice”); id. at 181 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“As all direct taxes must be apportioned, 
it is evident that the Constitution contemplated none as direct but such as could be appor-
tioned.”).  Chase gives an example in which “[t]he owners of carriages in one state would 
pay ten times the tax of owners in the other.”  Id. at 174 (opinion of Chase, J.).  Paterson 
was more circumspect on this point, stating that apportionment may “perhaps” be “prop-
er” not only for capitation and land taxes but also for taxes on subjects which, “in the ag-
gregate or mass, . . . generally pervade all the states in the Union.”  Id. at 177 (opinion of 
Paterson, J.).  But Paterson thought this was an issue of difficulty, and declined to give an 
opinion on whether any tax other than a land or capitation tax could be a direct tax.  Id.  
(“Whether direct taxes, in the sense of the Constitution, comprehend any other tax than 
a capitation tax, and tax on land, is a questionable point.”). 
   This holding of the Court raised the possibility that a tax on slaves, which were scarce 
in the northern states, might avoid the requirement of apportionment.  However, in my 
view, the Supreme Court would have treated the slave tax as a “capitation tax” subject to 
apportionment. 
172 All three judges expressed this view as explicit dictum.  Chase, while stating “I do not give 
a judicial opinion” on the issue of what is a direct tax, opined that even personal property 
taxes were excluded.  Id. at 175.  Paterson stated: 
[B]oth in theory and practice, a tax on land is deemed to be a direct tax. . . . It is 
not necessary to determine, whether a tax on the product of land be a direct or 
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tice Paterson went on to attack the apportionment requirement on 
the merits: 
I never entertained a doubt, that the principal, I will not say, the only, ob-
jects, that the framers of the Constitution contemplated as falling within 
the rule of apportionment, were a capitation tax and a tax on land.  Lo-
cal considerations, and the particular circumstances, and relative situa-
tion of the states, naturally lead to this view of the subject.  The provision 
was made in favor of the southern States. . . . Congress . . . might tax 
slaves . . . and land in every part of the Union after the same rate or 
measure:  so much a head in the first instance, and so much an acre in 
the second.  To guard them against imposition in these particulars, was 
the reason of introducing the clause to the Constitution . . . . 
. . . [The apportionment principle] is radically wrong; it cannot be 
supported by any solid reasoning. . . .  
. . . [N]umbers do not afford a just estimate or rule of wealth. 
The counsel . . . have further urged, that an equal participation of 
the expense or burden by the several states in the Union, was the primary 
object . . . ; and that this object will be effected by the principle of appor-
tionment, which is an operation upon states, and not on individu-
als . . . . This brings it to the old system of requisi-
tions. . . . [I]ndividuals . . . are the objects of taxation, without reference 
to states . . . . The fiscal power is exerted certainly, equally, and effectually 
on individuals; it cannot be exerted on states.174 
If the carriage tax was not a direct tax, what was it?  Iredell offered 
no opinion, and Chase equivocated, calling it variously a “duty,” a tax 
on “expense,” or an indirect tax that was not a duty, impost, or ex-
 
indirect tax.  Perhaps, the immediate product of land, in its original and crude 
state, ought to be considered as the land itself . . . . Whether direct taxes, in the 
sense of the Constitution, comprehend any other tax than a capitation tax, and tax 
on land, is a questionable point. 
  Id. at 176–77.  Iredell stated: 
There is no necessity, or propriety, in determining what is or is not, a direct, 
or indirect, tax in all cases. 
Some difficulties may occur which we do not at present foresee.  Perhaps a di-
rect tax in the sense of the Constitution, can mean nothing but a tax on some-
thing inseparably annexed to the soil:  Something capable of apportionment un-
der all such circumstances. 
A land or a poll tax may be considered of this description. 
. . . . 
Either of these is capable of apportionment. 
In regard to other articles, there may possibly be considerable doubt. 
  Id. at 183 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
173 See id. at 174–75 (opinion of Chase, J.) (“a tax on carriages cannot be laid by the rule of 
apportionment, without very great inequality”); id. at 179–80 (opinion of Paterson, J.) 
(“The thing would be absurd . . . .”); id. at 182 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“This mode is too 
manifestly absurd . . . .”). 
174 Id. at 177–78 (opinion of Paterson, J.). 
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cise.175  Paterson opined that “[a]ll taxes on expences or consumption 
are indirect taxes,” and that “[a] tax on carriages is of this kind,” cit-
ing a passage from Adam Smith.176 
2.  Doctrinal Development Through Pollock I 
After Hylton, the direct-tax issue was not considered by the courts, 
as the federal government relied mostly on imposts.  The Civil War 
spawned various taxes that were challenged in court as being direct 
taxes.  In Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule, a non-apportioned tax on in-
surance company gross premiums was upheld on the authority of Hyl-
ton, with the Court noting the irrational consequences of apportion-
ment that would occur if insurance companies were not dispersed 
among the states.177  Veazie Bank v. Fenno upheld a non-apportioned 
tax on notes of state banks issued for circulation as currency.178  Here, 
the Court noted that attempts to locate the meaning of “direct tax” in 
the writings of political economists were futile, and that the best 
source was early practice plus Hylton.179  The Court concluded that 
taxes on personal property, financial instruments, and occupations 
were not considered to be subject to the apportionment requirement, 
whereas taxes on slaves were either capitation taxes or taxes on real 
estate.180  A non-apportioned tax on the inheritance of land was up-
held as a duty or excise in Scholey v. Rew.181  Finally, an individual in-
come tax enacted in 1861 and lasting until 1872 was upheld in 
 
175 See id. at 175 (opinion of Chase, J.) (considering both the fact that the annual tax on car-
riages is “within the power granted to Congress to lay duties,” and also the fact that the tax 
on carriages is a tax on expense and thus indirect). 
176 See id. at 180–81 (opinion of Paterson, J.).  Justice Paterson quotes Smith as follows:    
Consumable commodities, whether necessaries or luxuries, may be taxed in two 
different ways; the consumer may either pay an annual sum on account of his us-
ing or consuming goods of a certain kind, or the goods may be taxed while they 
remain in the hands of the dealer, and before they are delivered to the consumer.  
The consumable goods, which last a considerable time before they are consumed 
altogether, are most properly taxed in the one way; those of which the consump-
tion is immediate, or more speedy, in the other:  the coach tax and plate tax are 
examples of the former method of imposing; the greater part of the other duties 
of excise and customs of the latter. 
  Id. at 180–81 (citing SMITH, supra note 77, at 386). 
   Taxes on consumption were considered by Smith to be “indirect” taxes on income.  
For further comments on Smith’s literalist notion of direct tax, see supra notes 99–101, 
and accompanying text. 
177 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433 (1868). 
178 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869). 
179 Id. at 541–46. 
180 Id. at 548–49. 
181 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331 (1874). 
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Springer v. United States,182 where the Supreme Court opined that “di-
rect tax” referred only to capitation taxes and taxes on real estate.183 
An income tax was enacted in 1894, and this time the Supreme 
Court, in the first Pollock decision (Pollock I), held (in a 7-2 decision) 
that the portion of the 1894 income tax that treated rents as income 
was a direct tax and that such portion was invalid for want of appor-
tionment.184  After culling numerous quotes from the early history sly-
ly intimating that an income tax may be a direct tax as such, the ma-
jority opinion abruptly aborts that tack and goes off on a different 
one:  from the non-controversial premise that a tax on real estate was 
a direct tax, the majority concocted the novel rationale that a tax on 
rents from real estate was “in substance” a tax on the real estate itself 
and, therefore, also a direct tax.185  It appears that the government ac-
tually conceded that a tax on rents could be a tax on the underlying 
real estate.  It might have been better to argue, on the basis of Scholey 
v. Rew, that if the receipt of real estate itself by inheritance was an in-
direct tax, surely, a tax on rents would also be non-direct.  Springer was 
distinguished by Pollock I on the ground that the taxpayer there had 
no income from property.186  Apart from the tax on rents, the 1894 
tax passed muster.187 
Even apart from the Sixteenth Amendment (providing that a tax 
on incomes is not subject to apportionment), Pollock I is no longer of 
any significance on the income tax issue, as its rationale has been 
 
182 102 U.S. 586 (1880). 
183 The Court here gave great weight to early practice and interpretation.  It mentioned a 
casual statement by Hamilton in a paper he prepared for the Hylton litigation that a tax 
on a person’s entire estate—real and/or personal—might be subject to apportionment, 
but the Court said that an income tax was distinguishable.  Id. at 597–98. 
184 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I), 157 U.S. 429 (1895). 
185 The Court stated: 
An annual tax upon the annual value or annual user of real estate appears to us 
the same in substance as an annual tax on the real estate, which would be paid out 
of the rent or income.  This law taxes the income received from land and the 
growth or produce of the land. 
  Id. at 581.  The Court then characterized this rationale as one of elevating substance over 
form.  Id. 
186 See id. at 578–79 (explaining that the income was derived from the taxpayer’s job as an 
attorney and from interest on U.S. government bonds). 
187 Id. at 586.  If taxes on wages (as well as incomes from professions and gross receipts of 
business) are conceded to be “excises,” then a tax on investment receipts would also ap-
pear to be an excise.  But if a tax on rents is also a direct tax, then there would be overlap 
between the two categories.  However, the Constitution provides no tie-breaker.  In Hyl-
ton, if there was indeed a tie in that case, it was broken by a realization that the appor-
tionment principle suffered from numerous defects.  The different outcome in Pollock I 
results from an unexplained move to treating apportionment as the dominant value. 
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clearly repudiated by subsequent cases.  In Stanton v. Baltic Mining 
Co., the reasoning of Pollock was flatly rejected in general terms.188  In 
New York ex rel. Cohen v. Graves, the Supreme Court held that New 
York could tax a New York resident on rents from New Jersey prop-
erty, although New York could not impose a property tax on New Jer-
sey real estate.189  In other words, a tax on rents is not a tax on the 
underlying property.  Reinforcing that conclusion is South Carolina v. 
Baker, where the Court overruled that portion of Pollock I that held 
that a tax on state bond interest was a tax on the state itself, in viola-
tion of the Tenth Amendment.190  Pollock I has also been rendered ob-
solete on the income tax issue by numerous post-Pollock cases that 
have established that a tax on gross receipts is an indirect (i.e., ex-
cise) tax, not subject to apportionment.191  Since (apart from timing 
issues) an income tax is a tax on receipts, repeal of the Sixteenth 
Amendment (which removed the apportionment requirement from 
income taxes) would not invalidate an income tax.192 
The post-Pollock excise tax cases effectively hold that characteriza-
tion of a tax as an excise removes it from the “direct tax” category.  
The implicit attitude underlying these holdings is that apportion-
ment is a weak constitutional value.193 
 
188 240 U.S. 103, 112–13 (1916).  The court stated: 
[T]he provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment conferred no new power of taxa-
tion but simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary power of income 
taxation possessed by Congress from the beginning from being taken out of the 
category of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged and being placed in 
the category of direct taxation subject to apportionment by a consideration of the 
sources from which the income was derived, that is by testing the tax not by what it 
was—a tax on income, but by a mistaken theory deduced from the origin or 
source of the income taxed. 
  Id. 
189 300 U.S. 308, 314 (1937). 
190 485 U.S. 505 (1988). 
191 There are several major post-Pollock cases.  See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 
(1911) (holding that a corporation income tax was not a direct tax but an excise); 
Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397 (1904) (upholding a gross receipts 
tax); Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 616–22 (1902) (containing perhaps the most elabo-
rate discussion of “excise”); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900) (upholding the valid-
ity of the non-apportioned federal inheritance tax of 1898 as an indirect tax on the trans-
mission of property); Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509 (1899) (upholding stamp taxes on 
activities of a commodities exchange). 
192 See, e.g., Murphy v. IRS, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Penn Mut. Indem. Co. v. Comm’r, 
277 F.2d 16, 19–20 (3d Cir. 1960). 
193 In Bromley v. McCaughn, the Court upheld the federal gift tax, noting: 
While taxes levied upon or collected from persons because of their general owner-
ship of property may be taken to be direct . . . this Court has consistently held, al-
most from the foundation of the government, that a tax imposed upon a particu-
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3.  Pollock II Expands “Direct Tax” to a Tax on Personal Property 
What’s left of Pollock I on the direct tax issue is nothing more than 
an affirmation of the accepted rule that a tax on real estate is a direct 
tax subject to apportionment.  On rehearing, a bare 5-4 majority of 
the Supreme Court held in Pollock II that a tax on personal property 
was a direct tax.194  That holding laid the basis for the further holding 
that income from personal property was a direct tax that had to be 
apportioned.195  The second holding concerning tax on investment 
income has been overturned both by the Sixteenth Amendment and 
by the post-Pollock excise cases referenced previously.  Nevertheless, 
the first holding, to the effect that a tax on personal property is a di-
rect tax, broke new ground, and has not been expressly overruled.196 
But, since the federal government has not laid a tax on personal 
property, it has not been tested either. 
In Part V it is argued that Pollock II should be reversed on the per-
sonal property tax issue, at least insofar as intangibles are concerned. 
* * * 
To summarize this Part, the apportionment requirement cannot 
be broadly construed for numerous reasons:  (1) apportionment is 
incompatible with uniformity, and “direct tax” must therefore be ex-
clusive of the specific exceptions for imposts, duties, and excises; (2) 
“direct tax” had no clear meaning apart from taxes on real estate and 
capitation taxes; (3) apportionment cannot work for taxes on transac-
tions; (4) apportionment, in a federal system, only makes practical 
sense for requisitions; (5) apportionment is inequitable at the indi-
vidual level; and (6) doctrine and early practice, recognizing the 
problems of apportionment, gave it a narrow scope. 
 
lar use of property or the exercise of a single power over property incidental to 
ownership, is an excise which need not be apportioned . . . . 
  280 U.S. 124, 136 (1929) (citation omitted). 
194 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock II), 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
195 Id.  Faced with a tax that was unconstitutional insofar as it encompassed virtually all in-
vestment income, the Court held that the entire 1894 income tax was fatally infected, giv-
en that the whole point of the income tax was to reach income from property.  See gener-
ally Jensen, Incomes, supra note 5, at 1091–107 (providing a detailed history of the 1894 
income tax and presenting the arguments that were put forward in favor of and against 
the tax). 
196 See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219 (1920) (holding that a tax on a pro rata stock 
dividend was an unapportioned direct tax on intangible property that was not an income 
tax). 
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III.  RATIONALES AND PURPOSES OF APPORTIONMENT 
A provision in the Constitution might be approached by discern-
ing its rationales and purposes.  In this case, the issue would be what 
the Framers were attempting to accomplish through the apportion-
ment requirement for direct taxes.197  Apportionment was part of the 
larger compromise over the relationships among the federal govern-
ment, the states, and the people.  As such, apportionment can be 
viewed from the angles of politics, ideology, and instrumental pur-
poses.  Economic and tax policies were not factors, however. 
A.  The Politics of Apportionment 
The salient background feature of the constitutional project relat-
ing to the federal taxing power was the failure of the Confederation 
system, due largely to the exclusive reliance on voluntary requisitions.  
Although the initial impetus at the Convention was the pro-
nationalist Virginia plan, the deck was somewhat stacked against any 
total triumph by the nationalist faction.  First, there was no significant 
constituency for obliterating the states entirely or for the federal gov-
ernment to assert a taxing power that would preempt that of the 
states.  In addition, the state-government orientation at the beginning 
was overwhelming:  (1) the delegations to the 1787 Convention were 
selected by the state governments,198 (2) the delegations in the Con-
vention each had one vote,199 (3) the “charge” to the Convention was 
to improve the Confederation system, and (4) the Convention prod-
uct would have to be agreed to by the several states.200  This system 
gave blocs of states (first small states and later slave-importing states) 
virtual veto power:  the threat to pick up their marbles and go 
 
197 A classic example of the functional approach is Justice Holmes’s dissent in Eisner v. Ma-
comber, where he states that the purpose of the Sixteenth Amendment was “to get rid of 
nice questions” relating to apportionment.  Id. at 219–20 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
198 The delegates were mostly picked by the legislatures of the various states.  See Credentials 
of Members of the Federal Convention, in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 126–39 
(setting forth the delegates’ credentials).  Rhode Island did not appoint a delegation. 
199 If a delegation from a state was evenly split, the state’s vote was recorded as “divided.”  See, 
e.g., Report of Proceedings, in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 119–20.  The pro-
posed constitution contains a “signature clause,” which recites that it was “Done in Con-
vention, by the unanimous consent of the states present,” followed by the individual sig-
natures grouped by states.  Madison’s Notes (Sept. 17), supra note 17, at 558–65. 
200 See Report of Proceedings, supra note 199, at 119–20 (calling for a “convention of delegates” 
appointed by the states to assemble in Philadelphia, revise the Articles of Confederation, 
and then confirm the changes); Madison’s Notes (May 29), supra note 17, at 127 (calling 
for the Articles of Confederation to be “corrected and enlarged”). 
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home.201  In contrast, the nationalist state delegations were willing to 
compromise because they badly wanted a united national govern-
ment.  The final product retained a strong “compact-of-states” flavor 
that was weakened (if not interred) by the Civil War and its endless 
aftermath.202 
Those who sought a balance between the federal government and 
the states (the “moderates”) were put somewhat in a bind when it 
came to taxes.  In principle, the pure state-power (and Anti-
Federalist) position is to favor the Confederation principle of volun-
tary requisitions,203 but that was a proven path to impotence.  A man-
datory requisition system would continue to give the states the ulti-
 
201 See Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, at 302–03, reprinted in Appendix A (re-
cording Mr. Davie’s statement that North Carolina “would never confederate” on the ba-
sis of any rule that did not count slaves as three-fifths for representation purposes); id. at 
213 (noting Luther Martin of Maryland’s statement that “he could never accede” to a 
plan not based on equal representation of states).  Martin eventually left the Convention, 
as did Yates and Lansing of New York (which was aligned with the small states and whose 
governor, George Clinton, was Anti-Federalist).  See Letter from Luther Martin to State of 
Maryland Legislature (Jan. 27, 1788), in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 344–45, 
358.  Davie also left the Convention, but probably for personal or business reasons, as he 
supported ratification. See North Carolina Debates (July 31, 1788), supra note 166, at 236. 
202 States, in their role as states, were given a prominent constitutive role in the federal gov-
ernment:  (1) members of the House were to be elected by citizens of states, (2) members 
of the Senate were to be elected by state legislatures, (3) the President was to be elected 
by electors appointed by state legislatures or—if no majority vote materialized—by the 
state delegations in the House, each delegation having one vote, (4) the Constitution was 
to be ratified by the people of the states by convention, and (5) amendments would re-
quire approval by three-fourths of the state legislatures or by convention.  There was even 
strong sentiment for placing the election of House members under the control of the 
state legislatures, but a motion to that effect narrowly failed.  Madison’s Notes (June 21), 
supra note 17, at 223–24.  The phrase “We the people of the United States” in the Pream-
ble is ambiguous because it could refer to all the people of the nation or to the collective 
peoples of the various states.  Even the official name of the nation, “United States of 
America,” is ambiguous in a way that is similar to the uniting of two individuals in a mar-
riage that can be severed by divorce.  It is not necessary here to take sides on the debate 
whether an initial nationalist impetus at the 1789 Convention was sabotaged by state and 
regional interests or whether the nationalist Virginia Plan was offered as an opening bid 
with the expectation that it would be compromised by states-rights interests.  See LANCE 
BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY:  JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC (1995) (suggesting, with support from Federalist Nos. 45, 46, and 47, 
that Madison had states-rights inclinations all along); Rick K. Wilson, Madison at the First 
Congress:  Institutional Design and Lessons from the Continental Congress, 1780–1783, in JAMES 
MADISON, supra note 107, at 243, 261 (suggesting that Madison was a “less than enthusias-
tic” nationalist).  A third view is that Madison was a “selective” (economic) nationalist.  See 
David Brian Robertson, Constituting a National Interest:  Madison Against the States’ Auton-
omy, in JAMES MADISON, supra note 107, at 184. 
203 See Virginia Debates (Mr. Henry, June 7, 1788), supra note 10, at 148–49, 166–68 (arguing 
that voluntary requisitions prevent the “arbitrary deprivation of . . . property” and “dan-
ger of the abuse of implied power”). 
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mate power over tax system design and on-the-ground enforcement.  
Yet it was recognized that a mandatory requisition system would un-
dermine the states in the long run because of the potential for out-
right (armed) conflict204 between the federal government and the 
state governments, in which the states would probably lose.  Since 
control by the states through either voluntary or mandatory requisi-
tions was not acceptable, a system had to be devised that would give 
the federal government control without wholly eliminating the states 
from the picture.  Both the uniformity and apportionment principles 
give due recognition to the states, the first by prohibiting explicit dis-
crimination against states as tax-base locations, and the second by view-
ing the collective citizens of states as “corporate” taxpayers.205 
Despite these concessions to state interests, the nationalist faction 
prevailed to the extent that the federal government was empowered 
to lay any kind of tax whatsoever on persons and things without hav-
ing to rely on state governments—although requisitions continued to 
be a possible option. 
What the political-compromise story does not resolve is the pre-
cise scope of the apportionment requirement.  Nevertheless, the ex-
press exceptions for duties, imposts, and excises was clearly under-
stood to mean that the taxes most likely to be used by the federal 
government (on account of their inherent ease and convenience of 
collection) could be imposed without apportionment so long as they 
were uniform.206  Therefore, the compromise regarding the role of 
the states in the federal taxing power is one in which the nationalists 
got most of what they wanted, while allowing the states-rights advo-
 
204 See, e.g., Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, at 302, reprinted in Appendix A (recall-
ing Mr. Mason’s argument that the addition of a provision making taxation proportional 
to representation “might drive the legislature to the plan of requisitions”); Virginia De-
bates (Governor Randolph, June 7, 1788), supra note 10, at 121–22 (stating that requisi-
tions could lead to “the dissolution of the Union”). 
205 See Madison’s Notes (June 19), supra note 17, at 206 (arguing that a federal—as opposed 
to national—plan was one in which the federal power was exercised “on the people collec-
tively, on the states”).  In Federalist No. 46, Madison posits that state sovereignty resides in 
the people of the states, not state governments.  Thus, the people of the states simultane-
ously operate with two agents.  Apportionment had sometimes been used within states ac-
cording to the same principle.  See EINHORN, supra note 27, at 53–78 (describing Massa-
chusetts taxes apportioned among towns, which had elected governments; 
apportionment was politically negotiated and not according to any fixed formula). 
206 For an exposition of the ease and revenue-yielding potential of indirect taxes, see Con-
necticut Debates (Oliver Ellsworth, Jan. 7, 1788), supra note 166, at 190, 192–94. 
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cates to save face.  Nevertheless, saving face can be important politi-
cally.207 
B.  The (Defective) Ideology of Apportionment 
The link between representation and taxation was a core theme of 
British political history long before the Enlightenment period,208 and 
that link was enhanced further under Enlightenment political theory, 
which is based on the notion of contract or constructive consent.  
Taxation is legitimized by representation.  Indeed, it can be said that 
taxation creates the need for representation, through which consent 
is obtained.  Otherwise, taxation would be robbery under the threat 
of force.  British taxation in the colonies without colonial representa-
tion in Parliament was a fuel that stoked the Revolution.209  This link 
between taxation and representation was so ingrained that its expres-
sion in the Constitution was inevitable.210 
Under the Confederation system, the constituents of the federal 
government, as well as its taxpayers, were clearly the state govern-
ments as such.  The Constitution of 1787 had to deal with conflicting 
views of the future status for the “sovereign” states.  This issue was 
“solved” by giving the states a range of roles to be exercised simulta-
neously.  Thus, on the operations (spending) side, the federal gov-
ernment would act independently rather than through the states, but 
on the constitutive side (such as the Senate, the electoral college, and 
requisitions) the state governments would be the primary agents.  To 
bridge the gap between the people of the nation and the govern-
ments of states, the Convention offered up the romantic notion that 
agency (often) resided in the peoples of the states, as collective bod-
ies.211  The apportionment idea exactly reflects this “collectivity” no-
tion of sovereignty:  in the case of (non-requisition) apportioned tax-
 
207 The apportionment requirement saves face for those appearing to balance state and fed-
eral interests, but really accomplishes little for the states other than discouraging the fed-
eral government from laying real estate taxes. 
208 Historically, from the thirteenth century, the King’s Council and its successor, the British 
Parliament, originated as a body to obtain the consent of the community of the realm to 
be taxed.  See John Gillingham, The Early Middle Ages (1066–1290), in THE OXFORD 
ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF BRITAIN 104, 148–49 (Kenneth O. Morgan ed., 1984). 
209 See EINHORN, supra note 27, at 18–19. 
210 See Madison’s Notes (Aug. 7, 13), supra note 17, at 386, 416 (quoting Mr. Ellsworth insist-
ing that “[t]axation and representation ought to go together,” and Mr. Gerry stating that 
“[t]axation and representation are strongly associated in the minds of the people”). 
211 See U.S. CONST. pmbl., art. V, art. VII (identifying the constituents, the amenders, and the 
ratifiers). 
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es and the House of Representatives the collective people of the state 
interact directly with the federal government.212 
Combining the link between taxation and representation with the 
notion that the constituents/taxpayers of the federal government are 
the collective peoples of the various states yields the principle of ap-
portionment among states according to a common formula, because 
burdens should be proportional to benefits (power).  That taxation 
and representation should be apportioned under the same formula 
was so self-evident that it was accepted with whole-hearted approval 
and without debate upon Gouverneur Morris’s initial motion on July 
12.213  The only debate was over the details of the formula, not the 
principle of apportionment and not with the idea that the same for-
mula should govern both. 
In addition, apportionment was probably thought by many to be 
fair compared to selective excises subject to the rule of uniformity.  In 
a world without general (i.e., broad-based) excise (sales) taxes, and 
conceding that there was no objection to sumptuary taxes (like the 
tax on carriages), uniform excise taxes on region-specific items would 
result in geographical discrimination.  Thus, if cardamom is con-
sumed disproportionately by Georgians, a uniform tax thereon would 
be seen as punishing Georgians as a collectivity.  Apportionment of a 
cardamom tax would moderate the discriminatory effect from a state 
perspective.  This analysis is, of course, wholly superficial if the tax is 
 
212 See Madison’s Notes (June 6), supra note 17, at 161 (discussing the benefits of directly 
electing the House of Representatives); Virginia Debates (Mr. Madison, June 15, 1787), 
supra note 10, at 458–59, reprinted in Appendix C (referring to equity of burdens imposed 
on state communities by reason of apportionment); text accompanying note 204.  The 
Constitution does not require districts; thus, all representatives of a state could be, and 
sometimes were, elected at large.  JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:  POLITICS AND IDEAS 
IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 224 (1996).  Districts could not spill over state 
lines.  It was expected that House Members from a given state would share a commonality 
of interest based on state culture and interests and vote as a bloc for state interests.  See 
Madison’s Notes (June 19, 25), supra note 17, at 211, 238–39 (suggesting that the states 
were culturally dissimilar). 
213 Morris’s motion was to amend the modified Virginia Plan (providing that representation 
was to be based on the principles of wealth and numbers) by adding a proviso that “taxa-
tion shall be in proportion to representation.”  Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, 
at 302, reprinted in Appendix A.  Various personalities across the political spectrum 
agreed:  George Mason (states-rights advocate), General Pinckney (champion of the sla-
veholding deep-South aristocracy), and James Wilson (ardent nationalist).  See id. at 302–
03.  The original Morris motion was amended so that only direct taxes were to be in pro-
portion to representation, with further amendments relating to counting slaves as three-
fifths and the census, and as so amended the motion passed 6-2 (with two states divided).  
Id. at 305–06.  It was only on July 13 that “wealth” was deleted from the formula.  Madi-
son’s Notes (July 13), supra note 17, at 309. 
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on individual consumers, because the few Rhode Islanders who pur-
chase cardamom would be taxed at very high rates.  But appeals to 
the notion of discrimination against states could still play well in the 
Framing/ratification period.214 
The cardamom tax example exposes the weakness of requiring an 
apportionment of taxes to be paid by individual taxpayers.  The “gen-
eral” linkage between taxation and representation only makes sense 
in the case of requisitions, where the state governments, as agents of 
the corporate body, can spread out the tax within that body on a fair 
(or unfair) basis.  In the case of non-requisition apportioned taxes, 
the corporate sovereign loses control of such allocation, and the tax 
rates on affected individuals can be much higher or lower than simi-
larly-situated individuals in other states.  The strong post-convention 
push to allow non-requisition direct taxes to be imposed only if a 
state failed to meet its requisition quota215 can be seen (if taken at 
face value) as a last ditch effort to allow (if not to require) states to 
assert corporate control.216  The pseudo-requisition notion is an even 
more watered-down mechanism for ceding corporate control to the 
states, at least to the extent that the apportioned tax would incorpo-
rate state tax rules.  But neither option came to pass, in large part 
(and ironically) precisely because the agency of the states was seen as 
undermining equity at the individual taxpayer level in relation to per-
sonal ability to pay,217 the dominant tax fairness norm of the late eigh-
teenth century.218  The emerging perception that tax fairness is prop-
 
214 See infra text accompanying note 223. 
215 See infra text accompanying note 215. 
216 In the ratifying conventions, especially Virginia’s, the power of direct taxation was 
stressed in the arguments of the Anti-Federalists.  That this was a cover for general antipa-
thy to the Constitution is suggested by the fact that this power sailed through the Conven-
tion with virtually no opposition.  Anything resembling a requisition system had virtually 
no support in the Convention.  See Madison’s Notes (Aug. 21), supra note 17, at 453 (re-
counting how a requisition proposal was defeated by a vote of 1-8-1).  After ratification, it 
was proposed as part of the proposed Bill of Rights that direct taxes be permitted only if 
states were allowed to satisfy the state quota, but the proposal was soundly defeated in the 
House by a vote of 9-39.  See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 773–78 (1787). 
217 The Wolcott Report of 1796, rejected requisitions and pseudo-requisitions because the tax 
systems of states were internally inequitable and inequitable in relation to each other.  See 
WOLCOTT, supra note 88, at 436–41.  Capitation (poll) taxes were rather widespread in 
the colonies and states.  See EINHORN, supra note 27, at 55, 80–81, 98, 107. 
218 Smith and Montesquieu favored the ability-to-pay principle of apportioning the tax bur-
den within a polity.  See SMITH, supra note 77, at 361; CHARLES DE SECONDAT 
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 216–17 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., 
1989) (1748); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 
219, reprinted in Appendix B (noting that he would “lament to see [poll taxes] introduced 
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erly determined on an individual, rather than collective, basis un-
dermined the ideological basis of tax apportionment among states.219  
It was inevitable that representation (of states) and taxation (of indi-
viduals) would be divorced, and the brief marriage would fail to pro-
duce any viable progeny.  The notion that citizens of states constitute 
a collective body turns out to be a myth when it comes to taxation. 
The method of apportionment, according to population, is a rea-
sonable standard for apportioning representation among corporate 
bodies, but it is not a plausible standard for apportioning taxes among 
corporate bodies (other than, perhaps, economic units, such as fami-
lies).  Nobody would seriously entertain the notion that the tax bur-
den on business corporations be apportioned according to the num-
ber of shareholders or number of outstanding shares.  Yet 
apportionment by population is the same mechanism applied to 
states.  In the Confederation period, the relative ability to pay of 
states was conceived of in wealth terms, but apportionment according 
to wealth proved to be impractical, and apportionment of taxes by 
population came about only because of a confluence of these four fac-
tors:  (1) the decision that representation and taxes were to be appor-
tioned under the same formula, (2) the priority of the representation 
issue—where population was the natural index—over that of direct 
taxes (which would rarely be used), (3) the relative ease of taking a 
census (as opposed to appraisals), and (4) claims that the population 
of states was a plausible index of the wealth of states.220  To the extent 
that this last claim was inaccurate,221 inequity among the states and 
their peoples would inevitably follow. 
 
into practice under the national government”).  See generally SELIGMAN, supra note 113, at 
4 (claiming an evolutionary trend in history towards the notion of ability to pay). 
219 See Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 178–80 (1796) (opinion of Paterson, J.) 
(arguing that apportioned taxes were unfair because they lead to different tax rates be-
tween similarly situated individuals).  The Wolcott Report rejected the pseudo-requisition 
in large part on account of the unfairness of state systems.  WOLCOTT, supra note 88. 
220 See Madison’s Notes (July 11), supra note 17, at 299–300 (explaining why population was a 
good enough proxy for wealth in a nation where labor and capital could move freely); id. 
at 309 (July 13) (quoting a statement by Wilson that representation by population, or the 
“rule of numbers,” “does not differ much from the combined rule of numbers and 
wealth”). 
221 There were doubters.  See Madison’s Notes, supra note 17, at 201 (noting that Hamilton 
argued that any apportionment formula will produce inequities); id. at 297 (July 11) (re-
calling Gouverneur Morris’s argument that “the number of inhabitants was not a proper 
standard of wealth”). 
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C.  Instrumental Aims of Apportionment 
This Section considers some claimed instrumental aims (effects) 
that might have been served by a requirement that direct taxes be 
apportioned among the states according to population.  In many cas-
es, the historical evidence that these effects were actually intended by 
the Framers is spotty.222  It is probably fair to say that apportionment 
was primarily based on (motivated by) political compromise and an 
ideological principle (the linking of taxation with representation) 
that emerged in the early-to-mid eighteenth century, and that the 
ramifications of apportionment clearly emerged only after July 12, 
1787.  Moreover, apportionment of taxes could, at best, serve rela-
tively minor purposes, as it was confined to taxes that were not ex-
pected to be used by the federal government except in case of emer-
gency.  Nevertheless, the various possible effects are worth 
examining. 
1.  A Prophylactic Against Regional Oppression 
The theory has been advanced that the apportionment and uni-
formity rules were designed to prevent some states from using a ma-
jority in Congress to oppress other states.223  This theory has been giv-
en a strong regional flavor:  the opinion of Justice Paterson (a major 
player at the 1787 Convention) in the Hylton case states that the ap-
portionment requirement was meant to placate the South.224  How-
 
222 Of course, the claim that the effects of apportionment must have been intended can be 
true only if the Framers had a crystal ball.  It would be more accurate to say that some of 
the effects might have been intended. See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co. (Pollock 
I), 157 U.S. 429, 582–83 (1895) (stating that the inequalities of a system of taxation based 
on apportionment “must . . . have been contemplated”). 
223 See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 89 (1900) (stating that the purpose of the appor-
tionment requirement was to prevent the states from being called upon to bear more 
than their fair share of the tax burden). 
224 See Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 171, 177 (opinion of Paterson, J.) (noting that the appor-
tionment requirement “was made in favor of the southern States,” because, for example, 
if Congress passed a tax on slaves, who were found in large numbers in the South but not 
in the North, the southern States “would have been wholly at the mercy of the other 
states”).  In 1787, the North—even excluding Delaware and Maryland—would have nar-
rowly controlled both the House and the Senate, as it included seven of the original thir-
teen states, and a clear majority of the population.  See Madison’s Notes (Aug. 21), supra 
note 17, at 456 (recording George Mason’s observation that the North, with interests dif-
ferent from those of the South, would have had control in both branches of the legisla-
ture).  Going forward, the balance would be affected by the admission of new states, 
which itself was to be up to Congress.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.  The first three states ad-
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ever, it could be claimed with equal plausibility that apportionment 
would protect small states from large states.  Indeed, it would con-
ceivably protect any minority state grouping from any majority state 
grouping.  However, apportionment can only prevent discrimination 
against states as collective bodies, as opposed to discrimination 
against economic classes, economic interest groups, industries, and 
so on.  Also, apportionment can operate only on direct taxes, which 
were not expected to be used except in a national emergency.  At the 
same time, non-apportioned uniform excises (such as a tax on cotton 
or tobacco production) could adversely impact a particular region.225  
Thus, the “regional oppression” rationale is too general to fit the nar-
row reach of the apportionment requirement,226 and is elsewhere 
served by such “process” features as a bicameral legislature, the com-
position of the Senate, and other aspects of the checks-and-balances 
system. 
The question should be framed as, “What specific (Southern) in-
terests would be served by an apportionment requirement confined 
 
mitted were Vermont (1791), Kentucky (1792), and Tennessee (1796), which created an 
even North-South balance that lasted until about 1820. 
225 That the uniformity requirement is a feeble protection against geographical discrimina-
tion was recognized by William Grayson at the Virginia Ratifying Convention.  Virginia 
Debates (Mr. Grayson, June 12, 1788), supra note 10, at 285.  Madison noted that the im-
post would burden the South more than the North because the South did little manufac-
turing.  Id. (Mr. Madison, June 11, 1788) at 252.  Insofar as excises were taxes on manu-
facture, they were sometimes perceived as disproportionately burdening the North.  See 
id. (Mr. George Nicholas, June 10, 1788) at 243 (stating that an excise tax on manufac-
tures would not heavily burden Virginia because of the few manufactures in that state). 
226 Geographical equity is too amorphous to be a workable legal standard in the abstract.  
Thus, a federal tax that by its terms is imposed on only the production of smoke-cured 
hams would not violate the uniformity requirement, even if this activity occurs only in 
Virginia.  Yet it is not clear that such a tax would result in discrimination against Virginia 
as a state.  If smoke-cured hams are consumed over a wide geographical area, the burden 
of the tax may be diffused.  Even if it does operate to discriminate against Virginia, it 
would be improper to invalidate a tax on a narrowly-defined subject without considering 
the entire array of existing federal taxes.  See, e.g., McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 64 
(1904) (holding that Congress had the power to impose a tax on oleomargarine even 
though it was an “oppressive” tax); State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 612 (1875) 
(stating that equality of taxation is unattainable, given the number and variety of possible 
subjects); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 548 (1869) (stating that oppressive 
taxation of a particular thing is not unconstitutional if there is a plausible basis for the 
tax, which in this case was regulation of the currency).  On the other hand, even the 
broadest-based taxes might discriminate on a geographical basis.  Thus, income per cap-
ita could be three times as high in Connecticut as in Mississippi.  In that case, geographi-
cal discrimination would be justified on the basis of the independent norm of ability to 
pay. 
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to direct taxes?”  Two such interests were identified early on.227  One 
was to prevent an oppressive federal tax on slaves,228 which would be 
viewed either as a tax on real property (and therefore as a direct tax) 
or as a capitation tax.  The Capitation Tax Clause, which emerged 
later in the Convention, was clearly part of a package aimed to pre-
vent oppressive taxation of slaves.229  Apportionment of direct taxes 
and capitation taxes would have required quotas for all states in pro-
portion to population.  Under a pseudo-requisition scenario, the 
Northern states would have had to fulfill their quotas from a tax on 
one or more subjects common in these states, thereby neutralizing 
the impact of a slave tax.  Under a slave-only-tax scenario, the full qu-
ota would have had to be borne by the handful of slave owners in 
Northern states, who would have strenuously opposed the tax.  
(However, it is equally plausible that the North would have been will-
ing to enact such a tax either in spite of minor local opposition or in 
the knowledge that its quotas would go unsatisfied precisely because 
of the scarcity of the taxed item.)230  Despite the fact that apportion-
ment was not an airtight guarantee against a slave tax, it seemed to 
have worked well enough:  slaves were taxed only as part of a general 
apportioned federal real estate tax.  Without the apportionment re-
quirement, a selective tax on slaves would have been quite feasible. 
The other alleged Southern concern was to prevent a fixed-sum-
per-acre federal land tax.231  In the case of a state with a large area 
combined with a small population, a non-apportioned per-acre tax 
would fall heavily on the few.  With apportionment, the state quota 
for such a state would be so low that it could easily be satisfied by the 
few.  But again apportionment was not an airtight prophylactic 
against a per-acre tax, because an apportioned federal land tax could 
be laid on a per-acre basis within the states.  Ironically, per-acre land 
 
227 These concerns were identified by Justice Paterson in Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 at 177 
(opinion of Paterson, J.). 
228 See Madison’s Notes (Aug. 21, 22), supra note 17, at 457–61 (recording a proposed “pro-
hibition or tax on the import of slaves” and the ensuing discussion of the attendees).  The 
deep South did not attempt to immunize slaves from taxation entirely, but only a tax that 
would have caused the institution of slavery to wither. 
229 See infra text accompanying notes 287–99. 
230 If only a handful of slave-owners lived in New York, they might have no political clout, 
especially if slavery were locally unpopular.  If there were no slaves in New York, New York 
would not be able to satisfy its quota. 
231 At the Virginia Ratifying Convention, George Mason cited a letter from Robert Morris to 
Congress suggesting that a per-acre land tax, a notion that Mason abhorred, was allowed 
under the proposed constitution.  Virginia Debates (Mr. George Mason, June 11, 1788), 
supra note 10, at 264–65. 
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taxes were the norm in the Southern states and were a device to shift 
tax burdens from highly-cultivated lands near the coast to lands on 
the frontier.232 
In any event, note that both of these two “Southern” concerns 
were limited to taxes on real property—defined to include slaves.  
Apportionment would have hurt the South if “direct tax” were broadly 
construed to extend beyond real estate.  Apportionment according to 
population requires that poorer per-capita (i.e., Southern) states be discrimi-
nated against.233  This effect would have been compounded by the fact 
that slaves counted as three-fifths, resulting in an increase in the quo-
tas of the slave states without any accompanying increase in any likely 
tax base (except a property tax in which slaves were counted).  In 
sum, the regional-oppression rationale for apportionment actually fa-
vors a narrow concept of “direct tax” that is limited to taxes on real es-
tate, plus capitation taxes and requisitions. 
2.  Preserving the Taxing Jurisdiction of the States 
It is also claimed that the apportionment requirement operated to 
preserve the taxing jurisdiction of states against encroachment by the 
federal government.234  However, no such theory was advanced in the 
Convention itself.  The only motion made to limit the federal taxing 
power during the Convention was made by Luther Martin to the ef-
fect that the only allowable federal direct taxes would be requisitions, 
on the grounds that other direct taxes would be unpopular and that 
 
232 See EINHORN, supra note 27, at 40–41, 81, 93 (discussing the Virginia, North Carolina, and 
South Carolina tax systems).  George Mason was correct in thinking (or assuming) that 
the apportionment requirement would not bar such a tax.  See supra text accompanying 
note 231. 
233 See Table 1 supra p. 5. 
234 The majority opinions in both Pollock decisions claimed that the apportionment require-
ment was the result of a compromise in which the states surrendered their respective 
power to lay duties on imports or exports in return for allowing the federal government 
to “conditionally” lay direct taxes.  See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I), 
157 U.S. 429, 583 (1895) (noting that approval of the rule of apportionment helped cre-
ate the dual form of the United States government and helped ensure the ratification of 
the Constitution by the states); Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co. (Pollock II), 158 
U.S. 601, 620–21 (1895) (holding that the states granted apportionment as the way for 
the federal government to use direct taxation).  However, there is no evidence that any 
interest bargained for the apportionment requirement at the Convention.  Moreover, the 
formation of a national government necessarily implied that the states would no longer 
possess external powers.  Under the Constitution, the states lost not only the power to lay 
external taxes, but also the power to make treaties, maintain troops in peacetime, wage 
war, or grant letters of marqué and reprisal.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
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“states would be the best judges of the mode.”  This motion elicited 
no debate and was defeated overwhelmingly.235 
In the ratification period the Anti-Federalists attacked the federal 
power to lay non-requisition direct taxes on the grounds that it 
usurped state power.  The Federalists responded by insisting that no 
revenue source (apart from export taxes) should be denied the fed-
eral government in case of emergency.  Hamilton, in Federalists 30 to 
36, pointed out that state and federal taxing powers are concurrent,236 
and argued that tax-subject duplication would be self-defeating, ei-
ther by rendering the underlying activity unprofitable or else by trig-
gering evasion and cheating.237  A move to condition ratification on 
an amendment that would have allowed apportioned taxes to be laid 
on individuals only if a state failed to meet its requisition quota failed, 
and the same proposal failed in the First Congress as a proposed con-
stitutional amendment.238  Thus, the Federalist position on the scope 
of the taxing power triumphed totally.  Since the Constitution ex-
pressly gave the federal government the full taxing power, there is no 
room for any claim of implied limitations based on reserved state 
powers.239 
 
235 Only 1 and 1/2 delegations voted for it.  Madison’s Notes (Aug. 21), supra note 17, at 453. 
236 The Federalist No. 30 argues that the federal government should possess a taxing power 
that extends beyond imposts and requisitions, pointing to the failure of requisitions in 
the Confederation period.  The Federalist No. 31 (Alexander Hamilton) argues that a 
federal taxing power would not usurp that of the states, which have concurrent taxing ju-
risdiction.  The Federalist Nos. 32 and 33 demonstrate that the Constitution does not 
take away the state taxing power except for external taxes.  The Federalist No. 34 argues 
that the power of federal taxation should not be limited, because the future exigencies of 
the federal government cannot be limited.  The Federalist Nos. 35, 36 argue against limit-
ing the federal taxing power to imposts, which would fall unequally among the states, and 
also argue that the plenary taxing power will not be abused, because Congress will repre-
sent the interests of landholders and commerce.  THE FEDERALIST NOS. 30–36 (Alexander 
Hamilton). 
237 George Mason argued that the federal government had no particular interest in accom-
modating the states.  See supra text accompanying note 230.  The formal aspect of Hamil-
ton’s argument is not wholly convincing:  since federal indirect taxes must be uniform, a 
federal excise on, say, salt cannot have an exemption for Delaware-produced salt just be-
cause Delaware happens to also tax salt production. 
238 See Johnson, Apportionment, supra note 7, at 311–15; supra note 215 (describing the fate of 
the constitutional amendment). 
239 The Tenth Amendment states that powers not expressly granted to the federal govern-
ment are reserved to the states.  See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 424 
(1819) (noting the concurrent power of taxation, but holding invalid a state tax that in-
terfered with a non-tax federal power).  Contrary to the position taken in Jensen, Con-
sumption Taxes, supra note 5, at 2345–50, I would not consider possible limitations on the 
spending and regulatory power to be restrictions on the taxing power as such, since taxa-
tion is a means rather than an end. 
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The apportionment requirement was produced by a Convention 
in which the Anti-Federalists had little say.  In the ratification debates, 
the Anti-Federalists claimed no credit for extracting the apportion-
ment requirement as a concession for giving the federal government 
the full taxation power.  Anti-Federalists opposing ratification obvi-
ously did not view the apportionment requirement as a meaningful 
limitation on the direct-taxation power.240  More moderate Anti-
Federalists might have settled on a broad definition of direct tax241 
coupled with a requirement that direct taxes be in the form of requi-
sitions.  But, with the resounding failure of the requisition prong of 
their agenda, the other prong—a broad definition of “direct tax”—
became meaningless. 
It was only in the 1790s—as a result of the Hylton case, the Wolcott 
Report, and the experience with the 1798 apportioned real estate 
tax—that the apportionment requirement was widely revealed to be a 
mild impediment to the laying of direct taxes, other than taxes on 
slaves.242  There is no evidence to support the proposition that the 
apportionment requirement was consciously advanced as a general 
limitation on the federal taxing power or as a subtle mechanism for 
accommodating state tax systems.  It only turned out that way, and 
only with respect to real estate taxes.  The rhetoric of the Anti-
Federalists, who had no meaningful influence on the taxation claus-
es, cannot be attributed to the Framers. 
Even if apportionment could be viewed as having had a state-
power purpose, such purpose could relate only to the notion of du-
plication, and that suggests limitation to federal real estate taxes:  
 
240 Johnson, Apportionment, supra note 7, at 312; Johnson, supra note 123, at 164–65, 168.  For 
example, George Mason railed against the full taxing power, citing poll taxes and per-
acre land taxes, without conceding that the apportionment requirement imposed any li-
mitation.  Virginia Debates (Mr. George Mason, June 11, 1788), supra note 10, at 265. 
241 See Letter from Brutus V to the People of the State of New York (Nov. 27, 1787), reprinted 
in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION:  
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 422, 427 (John P. Kaminski 
& Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1983) (defining direct tax to include “poll taxes, land taxes, 
excises, duties on written instruments, on every thing we eat, drink, or wear”). 
242 See EINHORN, supra note 27, at 181–94 (stating that the implications of apportionment 
were revealed after ratification).  However, those who pushed for the Capitation Clause in 
the Convention must have understood that apportionment of a tax on slaves was a killer.  
But since it was widely thought that population and wealth were correlated, apportion-
ment would not have been seen as much of a problem for real estate taxes, as shown by 
the fact that apportioned real estate taxes were enacted three times in the early history of 
the republic. 
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since real estate was universally taxed by the states,243 any federal real 
estate tax would necessarily be duplicative.  Other kinds of taxes would 
be duplicative only haphazardly.  A person seriously concerned about 
the mere possible duplication of a federal tax with a state tax would—
as the Anti-Federalists did—oppose all federal internal taxing powers. 
3.  Protection for Accumulated Wealth 
The general presumption is that federal powers granted by the 
Constitution are to be broadly construed and limitations thereon are 
not to be implied.244  To flip this presumption, the Pollock majority 
opinions came up with an argument that the apportionment re-
quirement served important policy purposes.  One of these was to 
protect “accumulated property”—property being assumed to be the 
subject of any direct tax that was not a requisition or capitation tax.245 
Leaving aside an examination of the possible motives of a Gilded 
Age Supreme Court to protect wealth against the radical and populist 
movements of the time,246 there is no merit to the wealth-protection 
rationale,247 which is really a variation of the anti-discrimination ra-
tionale.248  Apportionment only imposes state quotas for direct taxes 
and is not a supermajority rule, a rule limiting the subjects of federal 
 
243 Every state had some form of real estate tax.  See WOLCOTT, supra note 88, at 418–37 (de-
scribing taxes in each state, and summarizing what states have taxes on land); Adams, su-
pra note 134, at 52.  An even more detailed look at some state tax systems (especially Vir-
ginia and Massachusetts) is found in EINHORN, supra note 27, at 29–109. 
244 See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816) (“[W]here a power is 
expressly given [by the Constitution] in general terms, it is not to be restrained to par-
ticular cases . . . .”). 
245 See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co. (Pollock I), 157 U.S. 429, 582–83 (1895) (in-
tending to protect “accumulated property”). 
246 See OWEN M. FISS, 8 TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910, at 48–49, 
92–93 (1993) (noting the crudeness of using the apportionment requirement as a wea-
pon against economic class politics). 
247 The protection-of-property rationale is extensively critiqued in Johnson, Foul-Up, supra 
note 7, at 28–34, and Johnson, Apportionment, supra note 7, at 337–38. 
248 The crucial passage from Pollock I is: 
Nothing can be clearer than that what the Constitution intended to guard against 
was the exercise by the general government of the power of directly taxing persons 
and property within any State through a majority made up from the other 
States. . . . [The] inequality [resulting from apportionment] must be held to have 
been contemplated, and was manifestly designed to operate to restrain the exer-
cise of the power of direct taxation to extraordinary emergencies, and to prevent 
an attack upon accumulated property by mere force of numbers. 
   157 U.S. at 582–83.  This argument misfires.  It is the uniformity principle that prevents 
discrimination against persons and property because of what state they are located in.  
The apportionment principle enables discrimination against persons and property in 
poorer states. 
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taxation, or a rule preventing progressive rates.249  The federal gov-
ernment could not only tax the wealth of individuals but it could also 
target such wealth within each state.250  The Supreme Court would 
have stated the matter more accurately if it had stated that the pur-
pose of the apportionment requirement was to allow a majority of 
rich states to shift the tax burden to the poor states! 
There was no particular concern in the Framing period with an 
“attack” on accumulated property by way of taxation or otherwise.  
Property was then taxed in all of the states.251  The Framers universally 
deplored taxing the poor and small farmers disproportionately.252  
The prevailing tax fairness norm was ability to pay.253  Sumptuary 
taxes, like the carriage tax, including most imposts, were broadly fa-
vored.  Consumption taxes generally were thought of as an indirect 
way of reaching income.254  Head taxes were widely disfavored.255  
Wealth was dropped from the apportionment formula not because 
the Framers did not want to tax wealth but only because the Conven-
 
249 The 1798 apportioned real estate tax imposed a progressive rate schedule on homes. 
250 The implication in Pollock I that taxes are inherently oppressive with respect to property is 
a veiled reference to the famous phrase from McCulloch v. Maryland:  “[T]he power to tax 
involves the power to destroy.”  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).  The holding in that 
case is that a state has no power at all to tax an instrumentality of the federal government 
(the Bank of the United States), because the natural constraint against oppressive taxation 
(that the legislature that enacts the tax requires the consent of the taxpayers) is absent 
when one government taxes another.  Id. at 428–36. 
251 The Pollock II majority conceded as much.  See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co. 
(Pollock II) 158 U.S. 601, 621 (1895) (noting the founders expected that states would fund 
their operations by taxing accumulated property).  The Wolcott Report is cited in Pollock 
I, 157 U.S. at 559. 
252 See FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in Appendix B (expressing the 
view that the burden of taxation should accord with the general maxim of ability to pay, 
and should not be thrown upon the poor); see also New York Debates (Mr. Hamilton, 
June 28, 1788), supra note 118, at 360, 365; sources cited supra note 232. 
253 See supra text accompanying note 217. 
254 See supra text accompanying note 84. 
255 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in Appendix B (expressing 
distaste for poll taxes); Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, at 305, reprinted in Ap-
pendix A (recounting Ellsworth’s prediction that there would be no federal poll tax); 
Massachusetts Debates (Hon. Judge Dana, Jan. 17, 1788), supra note 118, at 43 (“A capita-
tion tax is abhorrent to the feelings of human nature . . . .”); New York Debates (Mr. Wil-
liams, June 27, 1788), supra note 118, at 340 (“[A] poll tax upon the person is indicative 
of despotism . . . .”); Virginia Debates (Mr. George Mason, June 11, 1788), supra note 10, 
at 264–65 “[A] poll tax . . . is of all taxes the most grievous. . . . It is most oppres-
sive . . . .”).  
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tion was persuaded that population was a reasonable proxy for 
wealth,256 which then was mostly in the form of real property. 
In the Framing period, the poor were in no position to exploit the 
rich.  The members of the Senate were not popularly elected.  Appor-
tionment of representation in the House according to population 
had nothing to do with suffrage.  The states could—and, from the 
beginning, did—limit the franchise257 to white male property owners, 
and the move to broaden the franchise coincided with the Republi-
can ascendancy after 1801.258  At the time of the Framing, the expec-
tation was that property owners would control politics and, corre-
spondingly, would be the appropriate class to bear the tax burden.259  
Concern with the political abuse of the rich by the poor emerged on-
ly in the late nineteenth century. 
It is true that direct (property) taxes were expected to be used by 
the federal government only as a last resort,260 but it was not the ap-
portionment requirement that created this expectation; rather it was 
the high transaction costs of collecting such taxes261 and the political 
risks deriving from the inconvenience and hardships occasioned by 
laying them.262  Apportionment was not invented in 1787 to erect an 
 
256 See Pennsylvania Debates (Mr. Wilson, Dec. 4, 1787), supra note 91, at 483 (noting that 
population is a good substitute for wealth in assessing taxes); supra note 59 and accompa-
nying text.  See generally Johnson, Foul-Up, supra note 7, at 30–34. 
257 The states, subject to certain constraints imposed by the Fifteenth Amendment and fed-
eral statute, prescribed the qualifications for voters, even in federal elections.  See U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
258 See Virginia Debates (Mr. Corbin, June 7, 1788), supra note 10, at 110–11 (stating that 
Virginia and most other states required the “possession of a freehold” to vote).  The Con-
vention of 1787 rejected a proposal that would have imposed a property requirement for 
the federal suffrage.  Massachusetts Debates (Mr. King, Jan. 17, 1788), supra note 118, at 
35–36.  It was only with the admission of new states to the Union that the suffrage was ex-
panded to all white males.  See Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Factor Endow-
ments, Inequality, and Paths of Development Among New World Economies, 3 Economia 41, 73–
74 (2002). 
259 Johnson, Foul-Up, supra note 7, at 29–39. 
260 See Virginia Debates (Mr. Corbin, June 7, 1788), supra note 10, at 109 (giving figures to 
the effect that the impost would exceed the basic requirements of the federal govern-
ment in peacetime). 
261 See Pennsylvania Debates (Mr. Wilson, Dec. 4, 1787), supra note 91, at 476 (stating that 
tax appraisers and collectors in Pennsylvania alone numbered in excess of one thou-
sand). 
262 Property taxes are inconvenient because they have to be paid in cash out of the taxpayer’s 
own pocket, rather than out of the proceeds of a transaction.  In the case of non-
productive property, property taxes can create liquidity problems.  See id. at 467 (explain-
ing that imposts are preferable to property taxes because “[t]he price of the commodity is 
blended with the tax”).  In addition, excises and imposts on particular items could be laid 
more efficiently by the federal government than the states, because state excise taxes and 
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obstacle to taxing property and the fruits thereof.  The Convention 
on July 12, 1787, restricted the pre-existing rule of apportionment so 
that it would apply to the taxes that were least likely to be used by the fed-
eral government for reasons unrelated to the operation of the apportionment 
requirement itself. 
4.  Did the Framers Want to Embed a Policy Preference for Indirect Taxes? 
Erik Jensen argues that the Framers had a policy preference for 
imposts and excises, so that the apportionment requirement was 
erected as an obstacle to the enactment of other kinds of taxes.263  
Once again it is necessary to point out that apportionment was the 
inherited norm based on a conception of a relationship of the states 
to the federal government that far transcended taxation, and that 
there is no evidence that the Framers thought that apportionment it-
self was a significant obstacle to the laying of direct taxes.  Appor-
tionment was eliminated for excises and imposts because it was seen 
to be impractical (or in some cases impossible),264 not because of any 
policy preference.  Indeed, non-sumptuary excises were disliked more 
than property taxes.265 
The policy preference is alleged to be based on the observation 
that many of the indirect taxes were imposed on luxuries (like car-
riages), so that the taxes could be avoided by taxpayers willing to 
modify their spending choices.266  For starters, avoidability cannot be 
 
imposts could be evaded by smuggling.  James Madison, Madison on the Tariff:  Letter I 
(Sept. 18, 1828), in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 604–05. 
263 See Jensen, Incomes, supra note 5, at 1075–79.  Jensen misreads Adam Smith to have had a 
policy preference for indirect taxes.  See Jensen, Consumption Taxes, supra note 5, at 2392.  
As previously mentioned, see supra text accompanying notes 97–101, Smith’s use of the di-
rect versus indirect terminology was descriptive, not normative.  In fact, Smith favored 
free trade, and therefore was suspicious of imposts, the anticipated core of federal fi-
nance in the United States.  See SMITH, supra note 77, at 287–88, 387–89 (discussing taxes 
upon consumable commodities). 
264 See supra text accompanying notes 81–83. 
265 Not all excises are transactional and easy to collect.  Excises could also be laid on inven-
tory and equipment, such as distilled liquors and stills.  The enforcement of excises of 
this type was seen as oppressive by reason of violating the privacy of the home.  Virginia 
Debates (Mr. George Mason, June 11, 1788), supra note 10, at 265.  (The actual laying of 
the so-called whiskey tax by the Federalist Congress turned out very badly for their politi-
cal fortunes.)  Yet unpopular excises were not subject to apportionment.  In contrast, real 
estate taxes could be assessed by inspection of the exterior (acreage, use, building foot-
print, number of windows or chimneys).  Moreover, a high proportion of real estate pro-
duced an economic yield that could provide funds to pay the tax. 
266 See Jensen, Consumption Taxes, supra note 5, at 2337, 2405 (discussing how indirect taxes 
give consumers a choice, and how they adjust their buying habits accordingly). 
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a viable legal litmus test, as all taxes on things or activities (including 
taxes on land) can be avoided by foregoing the subject of the tax.267  
On the merits, the point cannot be that a “good” tax is a tax that can 
be avoided because such a tax would be pointless.  Also, not all ex-
cises were on luxuries, and those that were not lay precisely on those 
items that were considered to be inelastic necessities,268 so as to mini-
mize avoidance.269  Rather, the point of the observation was that ex-
cise taxes on luxuries would be a popular tax, because it would be a 
tax on the few, and the few that purchased luxuries with knowledge 
of the tax would essentially be taxing themselves.270  It was not news 
even in 1787 that, in general, it is politically easier to enact a tax 
whose incidence is concealed than one whose incidence is salient.271 
The rationale offered by Jensen smacks of post-Federalist histori-
cal revisionism, reading the anti-federal-tax agenda of Jefferson and 
his successors272 back into the Framing period, where the anti-tax fac-
tion in fact lost out.  Jensen actually has it upside-down when he 
claims that the apportionment requirement was designed as an in-
centive for the federal government to use avoidable taxes.273  Instead, 
the Framers anticipated (correctly) that imposts, duties, and excises 
would be naturally favored because they are more convenient to both 
taxpayers and the government.274  There would be no point to impos-
 
267 See Lawrence Zelenak, Radical Tax Reform, the Constitution, and the Conscientious Legislator, 
99 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 839 (1999) (criticizing the concept of avoidability). 
268 Early excises were laid on distilled spirits, snuff, and refined sugar, as well as on auction 
sales on certain documents and licenses.  For a discussion of early federal excises, see Ad-
ams, supra note 134, at 45–90.  Adam Smith states that excises are usually on luxuries or 
such necessities as salt, soap, leather, and candles.  SMITH, supra note 77, at 383–85. 
269 See Kenneth L. Sokoloff & Eric M. Zolt, Inequality and Taxation:  Evidence from the Americas 
on How Inequality May Influence Tax Institutions, 59 TAX L. REV. 167, 186–191 (2006) (com-
paring Latin and North American taxation, noting their similar emphasis on inelastic 
taxes like tariffs). 
270 See Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 527, repealed by Act of Dec. 15, 1797, ch. 1, 1 Stat. 536 
(enacting stamp duties on documents and licenses); Act of June 9, 1794, ch. 65, 1 Stat. 
397, repealed by Act of Apr. 6, 1802, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 148 (enacting duties on property sold at 
auction); Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 45, 1 Stat. 373, repealed by Act of May 28, 1796, ch. 37, 1 
Stat. 478 (carriages); Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 51, 1 Stat. 384, repealed by Act of Apr. 6, 1802, 
ch. 19, 2 Stat. 148 (snuff and refined sugar); Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 32, 1 Stat. 267, re-
pealed by Act of Apr. 6, 1802, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 148 (distilled spirits). 
271 See Madison’s Notes (Jan. 27), supra note 17, at 32 (recounting James Wilson’s statement 
which contrasted the direct manner in which taxes were laid in the United States with the 
manner of other countries, where taxes were felt less).   
272 See supra text accompanying note 107. 
273 See Zelenak, supra note 267, at 838–40 (discussing the avoidability notion). 
274 See Connecticut Debates (Oliver Ellsworth, Jan. 7, 1788), supra note 166, at 191–94 (dis-
cussing how the easiest taxes to enforce are those that can be collected when money is 
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ing a constitutional barrier to the laying of taxes that Congress would 
put on the bottom shelf for political and administrative reasons.275 
5.  Apportionment as a “Talking Point” for Ratification 
The Framers’ version of federalism, i.e., that states (or the collec-
tive citizenries of states) were both the subjects of representation and 
the subjects of taxation, as manifested in the proposed constitution of 
1787, is theoretically incoherent,276 and makes sense only as a political 
document that was thought to be capable of being “sold” to at least 
nine state ratifying conventions,277 where the strongest opposition to 
the nationalist features of the Constitution would (and did) come 
from those desiring to preserve the power of state governments.278  In 
such a context, the apportionment and uniformity requirements 
served the instrumental purpose of pacifying the moderate Federal-
ists.  For one thing, apportionment achieved continuity with the Con-
federation system.  This continuity was of some concern to the legal-
 
spent); Virginia Debates (George Nicholas, June 16, 1788), supra note 10, at 99–100 (not-
ing the difficulties of creating and enforcing direct taxes). 
275 Gouverneur Morris, who opposed the apportionment requirement, strongly disliked real 
estate taxes as a policy matter, on the ground that taxes on unproductive property (which 
was abundant in the United States) were unfair, caused economic distortions, and elicited 
strong taxpayer resistance.  See Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Rufus King (June 4, 
1800), in 3 JARED SPARKS, THE LIFE OF GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, WITH SELECTIONS FROM 
HIS CORRESPONDENCE AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS 128 (Boston, Gray & Bowen 1832), 
available at http://books.google.com/books?id=AuQEAAAAYAAJ&printsec=titlepage&
source=gbs_summary_r&cad=0 (bemoaning the difficulty for owners of wild land, should 
they be taxed); Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Moss Kent (Jan. 10, 1815), SPARKS, su-
pra, at 327 (“[D]irect taxes fall heavily on great land-holders.”). 
276 The prominent political theorists of the era (Locke, Montesquieu, Kant) mostly dealt 
with the larger issue of whether taxation in a liberal state based on individual autonomy 
was justified at all.  Liberal theory locates sovereignty in the citizens, not political entities, 
and the idea of different levels of government creates a problem for the theory.  At least 
by implication, liberal theory undercuts states-rights theories, which are based on a no-
tion of community (or, in its most watered down version, agency).  See, e.g., 
MONTESQUIEU, supra note 218. 
277 The Framers “rigged” the ratification procedure by (1) submitting the Constitution to 
state ratifying conventions (representing the peoples of the states) rather than the state 
legislatures (whose members would have a vested interest in resisting federal power) and 
(2) imposing (with difficulty) an “up or down” outcome in each state that avoided the 
problem of conditional ratifications.  U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
278 It is worth noting that the opposition was neither regional nor attributable to the size of 
the state.  Georgia and South Carolina ratified early.  The hold-outs were North Carolina 
(1789) and Rhode Island (1790).  The problem states (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Virginia) might be characterized as having 
an attitude of relative self-sufficiency.  Five of the six had deepwater ports, and North 
Carolina was an insular state of small farmers. 
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ists, who insisted that the 1787 Convention only had the authority to 
“revise” the Articles of Confederation.279  Second, apportionment 
strongly appealed to the bedrock fairness principle of linking repre-
sentation and taxation.  Third, it acknowledged the states as constitu-
ent entities.280  Fourth, apportionment of direct and capitation taxes 
had some positive appeal to interests that opposed slave-only and per-
acre taxes. 
Not to be overlooked is the fact that the scope of “direct tax” was 
undefined and perhaps even obfuscated.  Four of the ratifying Con-
ventions—Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Virginia—
were very closely contested.281  The pro-ratification forces parried the 
opposition’s thrusts with the somewhat contradictory claims that:  (1) 
direct taxes (on land and slaves) would be rarely laid, and (2) pseu-
do-requisitions (involving combinations of excises) would be the 
usual mode of internal taxation on non-luxuries.  Thus, direct-tax 
apportionment was touted as a way of accomodating unpopular taxes 
with both anti-tax sentiment and a kind of equity among states.282  It is 
not necessary to decide whether the Framers’ coyness in defining “di-
rect tax” manifested confusion, cynicism, astute politics, or simply a 
 
279 Actually, the Annapolis resolution to call the Convention ambiguously stated that the 
Convention was “to devise such further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to 
render the constitution of the federal government adequate to the exigencies of the Un-
ion,” although it went on to suggest that such revisions would be adopted through exist-
ing Confederation procedures.  See Proceedings of Commissioners to Remedy Defects of 
the Federal Government (Sep. 14, 1786, Feb. 21, 1787), in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra 
note 10, at 118, 120.  The Virginia Resolution stated that “the Articles of Confederation 
ought to be so corrected and enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by their in-
stitution.”  Madison’s Notes (May 29), supra note 17, at 127.  However, Governor Ran-
dolph immediately substituted more nationalist language for this provision, which carried 
in the Committee of the Whole.  See id. (May 30) at 132–34. 
280 See Massachusetts Debates (Mr. King, Jan. 17, 1787), supra note 118, at 36; New York De-
bates (Alexander Hamilton, June 20, 1788), supra note 118, at 237, 365; Virginia Debates, 
supra note 10, at 41, 121–22, 243–44, 300–01 (discussing the apportionments of represen-
tation and taxation).  Additional materials from the Virginia Ratifying Convention are 
collected in infra Appendix C.  See also Madison’s Notes (Aug. 13), supra note 17, at 416 
(noting Eldridge Gerry’s argument that since the people strongly associated taxation with 
representation, all revenue bills should originate in the House of Representatives).  In 
contrast, the uniformity requirement was rarely mentioned in the ratification debates. 
281 The final votes:  Virginia (89-78), Massachusetts (187-168), New York (30-27), and New 
Hampshire (57-47). See 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 178–81; 2 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES, supra note 10, at 413; 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 654. 
282 Statements by some of the leading Virginia Federalists relating to pseudo-requisitions im-
ply (if they do not state) that apportionment would govern all internal taxes.  See infra 
Appendix C. 
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desire to postpone resolution of a non-urgent issue.283  The notion of 
“apportionment of direct taxes” was all things to all people. 
To sum up this part, the apportionment requirement is not with-
out rationales and purposes, but many of them seem to have been 
concocted after the fact, and none of them suggest that the scope of 
apportionment truly reaches beyond taxes on real estate, slaves, and 
states. 
IV.  IS APPORTIONMENT DEAD? 
Below are various (incorrect) theories holding that the appor-
tionment requirement should be treated as no longer having any 
force or effect whatsoever. 
A.  The Capitation Tax Clause Has Expired, and the Representation Clause 
Was Repealed by the Fourteenth Amendment 
The 1789 Representation Clause stated:   
Representives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several 
States which may be included within this Union, according to their re-
spective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole 
Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of 
Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Per-
sons.284   
(This sentence is followed by a requirement that a census, to deter-
mine numbers, shall be taken within three years of the meeting of the 
first Congress, and every ten years thereafter.)285  Section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (1868) states:  “Representatives shall be ap-
portioned among the several States according to their respective 
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, ex-
cluding Indians not taxed.”286  It can be argued that, because of the 
parallel language, this sentence replaces the entirety of the equiva-
lent sentence in the original Representation Clause, including the 
reference to direct taxes. 
 
283 Rakove cites the unanswered query by Rufus King as to the meaning of direct tax, see su-
pra text accompanying note 17, as evidence that the ambiguity of “direct tax” was deliber-
ate.  RAKOVE, supra note 212, at 179. 
284 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
285 Id. 
286  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
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1.  Has the Capitation Tax Clause Expired? 
The Fourteenth Amendment repeal theory would be insufficient 
to support the abolition of apportionment, as the Capitation Tax 
Clause (“No capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, except in 
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to 
be taken.”)287 would still be left standing even if the reference to di-
rect tax apportionment in the Representation Clause were deemed to 
have been repealed.  The apparent redundancy of the Capitation Tax 
Clause to the Representation Clause is puzzling and is a likely reason 
for the neglect of the Capitation Tax Clause in the literature.  An-
other reason is that the Convention narrative with respect to it is rela-
tively bare. 
The germ of the Capitation Tax Clause was a motion by Eldridge 
Gerry at the beginning of the July 13 session of the 1787 Convention 
to amend the Representation Clause so that, prior to the first census, 
direct taxes would be laid on the inhabitants of the states in propor-
tion to the allotment of representation fixed for the interim period.288  
The Gerry motion provoked a discussion in which the accuracy of the 
interim representation allocation was challenged, and the motion 
failed to pass on a tie vote.  Gerry then responded to the claim that 
his proposal might lead to a capitation tax289 (which was universally 
disfavored)290 by amending his own motion so that only a requisition 
on states could be laid according to the same rule during the interim 
period.291  This motion passed 5-4, with one state divided.292  The final 
resolution concerning the Representation Clause, passed on July 16 
(and submitted to the Committee of Detail on July 26),293 was rather 
 
287 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
288 Federal Convention, in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 203.  This allotment (New 
Hampshire, 3; Massachusetts, 8; Rhode Island, 1; Connecticut, 5; New York, 6; New Jersey, 
4; Pennsylvania, 8; Delaware, 1; Maryland, 6; Virginia, 10; North Carolina, 5; South Caro-
lina, 5; Georgia, 3) had been agreed to on July 10.  Id. at 197–99. 
289 A tax “on” persons just means a non-requisition.  See Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 
17, at 305, reprinted in Appendix A (recording Gerry’s statement that apportionment 
“could not be carried into execution, as the states were not to be taxed as states”). 
290 See id. (recounting Ellsworth’s response that there probably would be no federal head tax, 
but that such a tax could be apportioned, as could a pseudo-requisition). 
291 Id. (July 13) at 306–07. 
292 Id. 
293 Federal Convention, supra note 288, at 221–22.  That version of the Representation 
Clause began with the interim allocation of representation and then authorized the Con-
gress to thereafter apportion representation according to numbers, but that representa-
tion was to be “proportioned to direct taxation,” and to accomplish the latter a census was 
to be taken (presumably counting slaves as three-fifths), and the Congress was to propor-
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convoluted, but it did not explicitly incorporate the Gerry amend-
ment. 
The Committee on Detail issued its Report on August 6.294  The 
most conspicuous feature of the Report is its adoption of the notion 
that the federal government possessed only enumerated powers, in-
cluding “the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and ex-
cises.”295  The Report stripped the Representation Clause of any refer-
ence to direct taxes, and created a separate clause apportioning 
direct taxes according to population, with the population being de-
termined by a census (to be taken within six years), with slaves count-
ing as three-fifths.  The Report also contained a provision stating:  
“No capitation tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census 
hereinbefore directed to be taken.”296  There is little doubt that this 
clause referred to a possible tax on slaves,297 and it appears to have 
been non-controversial, as it was approved without discussion on Au-
 
tion “the direct taxation accordingly.”  Id.  Thus, there was no explicit language address-
ing the status of direct taxation prior to the census.  See Madison’s Notes (July 24), supra 
note 17, at 362 (noting Daniel Carroll’s statement that he reserved the right to oppose 
any “direct taxation on the states” prior to the census). 
294 Sometimes known as the “Committee of Five,” the members were Oliver Ellsworth 
(Conn.), Nathaniel Gorham (Mass.), Gov. Randolph (Va.), John Rutledge (S.C.), and 
James Wilson (Pa.).  See Madison’s Notes (July 24), supra note 17, at 363 (recording the 
appointment of the committee of detail).  The Committee was charged not only with 
considering the resolutions of the Convention to date, but also the New Jersey and 
Pinckney Plans.  See Madison’s Notes (Aug. 6), supra note 17, at 375–76.  However, the 
Capitation Tax Clause is not found in those two plans because neither of them allowed 
for any capitation tax.  See supra notes 34, 39 and accompanying text. 
295 This power (without the uniformity requirement) appeared in proposed Article VII, Sec-
tion 1, Clause 1.  Madison’s Notes (Aug. 6), supra note 17, at 376–82. 
296 See id. at 379.  The tax clauses were then in Article VII of the proposed draft:  the Direct 
Tax Clause was Section 3; the Clause Prohibiting Export Taxes and Import Taxes on 
Slaves was Section 4; and the Capitation Tax Clause was Section 5. 
297 That the Importation-of-Slaves Clause (now Article I, Section 9, clause 1) was viewed as a 
twin of the Capitation Tax clause is evidenced by the fact that, after a heated discussion of 
the possibility of an import tax on slaves, both clauses were referred to an ad hoc commit-
tee.  See Madison’s Notes (Aug. 22), supra note 17, at 457–461.  The report of this commit-
tee allowed slaves to be imported for a period and a modest duty to be imposed thereon.  
See id. (Aug. 24) at 470–71.  Another indication that the two clauses were a pair (that per-
tained to slavery) is the fact that Article V prohibits any constitutional amendment to 
both of these clauses prior to 1808.  U.S. CONST. art V.  This prohibition was added on 
September 10 as a friendly amendment to Madison’s motion on the process of constitu-
tional amendment.  The two clauses in question were referred to by the mover, Mr. Rut-
ledge, as “the articles relating to slaves.”  Madison’s Notes (Sept. 10), supra note 17, at 
532.  Einhorn claims that this clause was attributable to a statement by Gen. Pinckney not-
ing that he would vote against any constitution that did not have “some security to the 
Southern States against an emancipation of slaves.”  Id. (Gen. Pinckney, July 23, 1787) at 
357; EINHORN, supra note 27, at 175. 
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gust 25, after a long debate about the Importation-of-Slaves Clause.298  
Thus, one purpose of this clause was to assure that a slave tax, either 
as a property (direct) tax or as a capitation tax,299 was covered (with-
out any doubt) by the rule of apportionment.  A second purpose of 
the clause was to require that the rule of apportionment for capita-
tion (i.e., slave) taxes be according to the future census, and not ac-
cording to the specified interim allocation of representation or any 
attempt by Congress to estimate the population of the states.300  Thus, 
no capitation (slave) tax could be imposed prior to the census. 
The Capitation Tax Clause was amended in the waning days of the 
Convention to apply also to “other direct” taxes.301  The mover, 
George Read of Delaware, explained that the amendment’s purpose 
was to prevent the Confederation-period quotas from being altered 
by statute or made to conform to the pre-census allocation of repre-
sentation.302  The amendment elicited no response or debate.  Thus, 
 
298 Madison’s Notes (Aug. 25), supra note 17, at 478. 
299 Whether slaves were to be considered as persons or property was disputed.  See id. (July 9) 
at 289 (recording Patterson arguing that slaves were property, and therefore not entitled 
to representation); id. (Aug. 21) at 461 (recording Sherman’s opposition to a tax on im-
portation of slaves as implying that slaves were property). 
300 Accord SELIGMAN, supra note 113, at 554 (noting that Southerners feared that Congress 
would make an estimate of population to saddle the South with an undue share of taxa-
tion through a tax on slaves); Bullock, Part I, supra note 23, at 238–39 (same).  The Rep-
resentation Clause only said that direct taxation (and representation) was to be appor-
tioned “by numbers.”  Only representation was to be apportioned by the interim 
allocation described in supra note 289.  Thus, the mode of apportionment of direct taxes 
during the interim period was left unresolved.  The addition of the original version of the 
Capitation Clause settled that issue, but only for capitation taxes. 
301 See Madison’s Notes (Sept. 14), supra note 17, at 545.  This move was anticipated by the 
following:  as already noted, the Committee on Detail had split off the clause requiring 
apportionment of direct taxes from the Representation Clause.  See id. (Aug. 21) at 451–
53 (recounting the debate over Gerry’s proposal).  The Direct Tax Clause was taken up 
by the Convention on August 20, and it was then that Rufus King inquired about the 
meaning of direct taxation (and received no answer).  Id.  Immediately following, Gerry 
again proposed that from the time of the first meeting of Congress until the first census, 
direct taxes should be apportioned according to the number of representatives specified 
for the House prior to the census.  Id.  It was again doubted that this interim allocation 
accorded with population, and the motion again failed.  Id. at 453.  Failure of this motion 
left unresolved the apportionment scheme for pre-census direct taxes. 
302 In proposing this amendment, Read stated that he “was afraid that some liberty might 
otherwise be taken to saddle the states with a readjustment, by this rule, of past requisi-
tions of Congress.”  See id. (Sept. 14), supra note 17, at 545.  In the absence of the 
amendment, direct taxes (other than capitation taxes) might have been apportionable 
according to an estimate by Congress of state populations (“numbers”).  The Confederation-
period statutes imposing the requisitions were based on the 1775 estimation of state pop-
ulations, and apparently Read thought that those quotas could be changed by statute or 
by a new estimate of numbers.  See EINHORN, supra note 27, at 169.  (This fear seems mis-
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the final version of the Capitation Tax Clause turned the original 
Gerry amendment on its head by effectively prohibiting the laying of 
all direct taxes—including capitation taxes and requisitions—during 
the pre-census period.303 
On the basis of the foregoing, it must be the case that the Capita-
tion Tax Clause has “expired” because all of its purposes have been 
fulfilled.  First, its principal purpose with respect to a tax on slaves 
terminated with the abolition of slavery by the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.304  Second, the purpose relating to the laying of capitation and 
direct taxes prior to the census expired with the taking of the census 
(thereafter, apportionment of representatives and direct taxes is re-
quired by the Representation Clause to be according to the census).  
The third purpose of making sure that a capitation tax (especially a 
slave tax) was considered to be a form of direct tax was, at most, 
merely for emphasis, as capitation taxes were always considered to be 
direct taxes.305  The fourth purpose of precluding the re-adjustment 
of Confederation requisition quotas has long expired. 
 
placed in light of an earlier discussion on the inherent invalidity of retroactive legislation.  
See Madison’s Notes (Aug. 22), supra note 17, at 462–63 (recording James Wilson’s state-
ments and others)).  Ackerman views Read’s motion as protecting Delaware by making 
the apportionment principle retroactive.  Ackerman, supra note 6, at 13.  This reading is 
contradicted by Read’s statement that he was opposing “readjustments” of prior requisi-
tions.  Before Read’s amendment, the Capitation Tax Clause prevented only a capitation 
tax during the interim period.  After the Read amendment, no direct tax could be im-
posed during this period.  Thus, whatever the true aim of Read might have been, it surely 
expired after the census was taken. 
303 See Dunlap’s American Daily Advertiser, 14 January 1791, reprinted in 14 FIRST FEDERAL 
CONGRESS, supra note 109, at 237 (reporting House debate of January 6, 1791, in which 
Madison doubted that a direct tax can be laid prior to the first census). 
304 Einhorn (astonishingly) claims that this clause abolished the three-fifths rule for direct 
taxes (including capitation taxes).  EINHORN, supra note 27, at 169.  This appears incor-
rect on several grounds.  First, the clause itself refers to the “Census or enumeration here-
in before directed to be taken,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4, which is a cross-reference to 
the entire scheme of determining “numbers” (including the three-fifths rule).  Second, 
the Representation Clause containing the three-fifths rule for direct taxes was retained.  It 
is implausible to suppose that the Convention intended to have contradictory rules in the 
same document.  Third, the stated rationale for extending the capitation tax rule to di-
rect taxes only pertained to readjusting Confederation-period requisition quotas prior to 
the taking of the census.  Fourth, it is unlikely that a motion to undo an important deal 
would have provoked no discussion whatsoever.  In any event, this purpose (if it existed) 
also expired with the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
305 See Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, at 305, reprinted in Appendix A (recording 
Mr. Ellsworth’s assumption that poll taxes are direct taxes).  All three of the Justices writ-
ing in Hylton v. United States express the view that a capitation tax (being capable of ap-
portionment) is a “direct tax” without regard to the Capitation Tax Clause. 3  U.S. (3 
Dall.) 171 (1796). 
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2.  Did the Fourteenth Amendment Repeal the Original Representation 
Clause? 
Assuming that there is such a thing as a doctrine of “expiration” of 
a constitutional provision, the Capitation Tax Clause would now be 
considered to be “out of the way,” and, it would follow that any actual 
repeal of the Representation Clause by Section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment would have had the effect of wiping the Constitution 
clean of any tax apportionment requirement.  Unfortunately, this 
two-step argument appears to have never been made, and it is too late 
to make it now.  No branch of government has ever treated the ap-
portionment requirement as having expired or having been abol-
ished.  The Thirteenth Amendment effectively eliminated the three-
fifths rule, but that had the ironic effect of increasing the representa-
tion (upon re-admission to the Union) of former slave states.  The 
first sentence of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment merely 
codifies the effect of the Thirteenth Amendment upon the issue of 
representation in the House.  That sentence overrides the equivalent 
sentence in the Representation Clause only to the extent the two are 
inconsistent, namely, with respect to the three-fifths rule.  There is no 
inconsistency with respect to direct-tax apportionment itself, since 
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment makes no reference to di-
rect taxes.  The main purpose of Section 2 is found in the second sen-
tence, which conditions such (expanded) representation upon the 
states’ extending the franchise to ex-slaves, without taking control 
over the franchise away from the states.306 
The discussion in Congress of the proposed Section 2 negates any 
implication that the direct-tax apportionment requirement was being 
abolished.307  In 1909, the framers of the Sixteenth (income tax) 
 
306 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 141–42 (1866).  The initial version of this provi-
sion was moved by Representative Blaine on January 8, 1866.  Senator Sumner objected to 
its references to race.  Id. at 673.  Senator Fessenden complained that it intruded too 
much on the power of states over suffrage.  Id. at 703.  The Blaine version was not ac-
cepted by the Senate, and the current “compromise” version was crafted with an eye on 
the obtaining of ratification.  Id. at 2459–60. 
307 See id. at 961.  Senator Buckalew noted that the draft of section two of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not affect the rule of apportionment of direct taxes.  Senator Henderson 
expressed a preference for the apportionment of taxes by wealth, but viewed section two 
of the proposed amendment as continuing the old formula.  Id. at 3033.  Senator Doolit-
tle noted that amendments offered to section two would have apportioned direct taxes 
according to property rather than population.  Id. at 2942.  This would imply that appor-
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Amendment operated under the same assumption, and expressly de-
clined the opportunity to wholly repeal the apportionment require-
ment.308  Neither the executive nor the judiciary has ever questioned 
the continued existence of the apportionment rule for direct taxes.309 
B.  Did the Abolition of Slavery Operate as an Implied Repeal of the 
Apportionment Requirement? 
Bruce Ackerman has argued that the abolition of slavery in 1865 
by the Thirteenth Amendment should be viewed as an implied repeal 
of the apportionment requirement.310  Ackerman, along with Robin 
Einhorn and Calvin Johnson,311 assert that direct-tax apportionment 
was introduced on July 12 solely to resolve the dispute over the inclu-
sion of slaves in the representation formula.  Therefore, Ackerman 
argues, the abolition of slavery removed the sole purpose of the ap-
portionment rule.312 
 
tionment would otherwise continue to be in proportion to population.  Other discussion 
of section two is wholly devoid of references to direct-tax apportionment.  See id. at 2459, 
2462, 2464, 2467, 2468, 2502, 2511, 2530, 2535, 2538, 2539, 2542–43, 2766–67, 2700, 
2939, 2986–87, 3026 (Representatives Stevens, Garfield, Thayer, Boyer, Kelley, Raymond, 
Elliot, Randall, Eckley, Rogers, Farnsworth, and Bingham, and Senators Howard, Stewart, 
Hendricks, Sherman, and Johnson).  On this point, the legislative history speaks with one 
voice. 
308 See Ackerman, supra note 6, at 33–38. 
309 Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 18 (1916) (noting that the purpose of Six-
teenth Amendment was to abolish the apportionment requirement for income taxes).  
The most recent case of note was Murphy v. IRS, 493 F.3d 170, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2007), 
where the court held that treating emotional harm awards as gross income was valid as an 
indirect tax, even if such awards were not “income.” 
310 See Ackerman, supra note 6.  This argument was made earlier in Bullock, Part I, supra note 
23, but only for the purpose of discrediting the rationales offered up by the majority opi-
nions in Pollock. 
311 EINHORN, supra note 27, at 164–66 (seconding the historical claim without drawing any 
legal conclusion); Johnson, supra note 123, at 168.  Einhorn argues that the uniformity 
requirements in state constitutions originated in a desire to avoid a tax on slaves, and 
hints that the uniformity principle in the federal Constitution has a similar purpose.  
EINHORN, supra note 27, at 202–04.  But the link cannot be made, because the federal un-
iformity requirement does not apply to taxes and slaves and does not bar different rates 
for different subjects.  Instead, it only barred different rates for different ports.  Indeed, 
import duties from the beginning of the Republic have been rife with this kind of subject-
matter discrimination. 
312 Ackerman, supra note 6.  The argument that the purpose of the apportionment require-
ment related to slavery does not necessarily lead to the conclusion of implied repeal. 
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Courts are very reluctant to entertain implied-repeal arguments,313 
especially where (as here) the later enactment dealt with a different 
subject matter.  In the federal-taxing-power area, the Sixteenth 
Amendment, which did deal with an issue arising under the appor-
tionment rule, has never been held to abolish the rule itself.314  Here, 
all the objections to the actual-repeal argument, discussed supra, can 
be raised again.  Even if the implied-repeal argument were allowed, it 
would be persuasive only if slavery were the sole motivation for adopt-
ing the apportionment requirement.  But (to sing the refrain) appor-
tionment was not conjured up on July 12, 1787;315 it was there all 
along.316  It is true that, prior to July 12, the Virginia Plan had been 
amended so as to eliminate the reference to “quotas of contribution,” 
but that move was made only because it was thought that actual tax 
revenues were too uncertain and variable standard for fixing repre-
sentation.317  The plausible candidates for apportioning representa-
 
313 See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2532–33 
(2007).  Courts would be less likely to apply such a doctrine to the Constitution, which is 
supposed to be “permanent” until amended by the stipulated procedure therein. 
314 See supra notes 306 and 308 and accompanying text. 
315 See EINHORN, supra note 27, at 165–66.  Einhorn’s version of the story is that everybody 
thought that the new government would subsist only on imposts, so that apportioned tax-
es would not be necessary.  Thus, apportionment of direct taxes is viewed as being a new 
feature introduced on July 12.  Id.  However, at no point was the ambition to empower 
the federal government to only lay imposts.  The tax power was always intended to be 
plenary, first implicitly under the Virginia Plan, and later explicitly under the report of 
the Committee on Detail.  There was no serious debate in the Convention over the scope 
of the taxing power.  See Madison’s Notes (Aug. 21), supra note 17, at 453 (indicating that 
Luther Martin’s motion to restrict direct taxation only to requisitions was not debated 
and was defeated, with only one state in favor and one state divided).  In the ratifying 
conventions, the proponents of ratification were unyielding on this point.  See, e.g., 
FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 213–20, reprinted in Appendix 
B. 
316 See supra text accompanying note 71.  The only alternative to formula apportionment 
would have been a rule providing that states, as equals, should pay equal taxes, a notion 
that apparently had one or two adherents.  See Letter of Luther Martin to the State of 
Maryland Legislature (Jan. 27, 1787), in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 344, 365. 
317 The Virginia Plan had proposed that representation be proportioned to the “quotas of 
contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem 
best in different cases.”  See Madison’s Notes (May 29), supra note 17, at 127.  Rufus King, 
of Massachusetts, stated that the revenue (i.e., from imposts and excises) might not be 
traceable to particular states and, even if it could be, it would not be proportional to 
population or wealth.  Madison agreed.  There seemed then to be an emerging consensus 
that representation be equitably proportioned, but George Read, favoring a one 
state/one vote rule, threatened a walk-out of the Delaware delegation, at which point the 
issue was postponed.  See id. (May 30) at 134–35.  The issue was later re-opened, King re-
peated his earlier point, and a vague equitable-ratio motion then passed.  See id. (June 11) 
at 178–81.  The equitable-ratio principle (shorn of any reference to taxes) was revisited in 
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tion, wealth and population, happened to be the twin candidates for 
apportionment of taxes under the Confederation system.318  The ini-
tial Morris motion of July 12 only stated that taxation should be ap-
portioned according to representation (to be determined by the leg-
islature according to wealth and numbers), which reversed the 
Virginia Plan provision that representation should accord with tax 
contributions.  The Morris motion was immediately amended so as to 
apply only to “direct taxes,” because it was understood that imposts, 
duties, and excises were not really capable of geographical appor-
tionment.  There was no motion, on July 12 or thereafter, to remove 
the apportionment rule altogether.319 
The Morris motion left open the issue of whether representation 
(and direct taxes) were to be apportioned according to wealth or 
population.  Since slaves would automatically have been included in 
assessments of wealth, it is understandable that, once population was 
decided upon as the apportionment principle, the South would insist 
that slaves be included in the enumeration, especially as the enu-
meration was being advanced as a proxy for wealth.  Moreover, count-
ing slaves as three-fifths for taxation purposes had already been 
agreed on in principle as early as 1783, and the same rule had been 
agreed to for representation purposes as early as June 11, 1787.320  
The move before July 12 of counting slaves only for representation pur-
poses had irked the North, but counting slaves for both purposes was 
enough to get the North to sign onto the final deal concerning rep-
 
July, and a committee presented (on July 9) an interim allocation coupled with a grant of 
power to the legislature to apportion representation according to wealth and numbers.  
Objections were made to the interim allocation, the indecision over wealth versus num-
bers, and leaving it up to the legislature.  A mandatory allocation according to the census 
was advanced on July 7, and it was at this point that the controversy arose over counting 
slaves, and that in turn raised the wealth versus numbers issue).  See id. (July 9–11) at 287–
302. 
318 The Confederation rule referred to wealth, but apportionment according to population 
was the more favored option (agreed to by eleven states), and failed of adoption only be-
cause of the unanimity rule for amending the Articles of Confederation.  Johnson, Appor-
tionment, supra note 7, at 302–03. 
319 An argument to the contrary is dealt with in infra text accompanying note 321.  Eldridge 
Gerry did note that “the principle of it [apportionment] could not be carried into execu-
tion, as the states were not to be taxed as states.”  Oliver Ellsworth followed by stating that 
poll-taxes could be apportioned, although there probably would be none, and that oth-
erwise state quotas would be levied “according to the plan used by the state in raising its 
own supplies.”  See Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, at 305, reprinted in Appendix 
A. 
320 Madison’s Notes (June 11), supra note 17, at 181. 
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resentation.321  In sum, the events of July 12 and the succeeding days 
only forged together various fragments that were already at hand; 
neither apportionment of taxes nor counting slaves as three-fifths 
were at all new. 
Supporters of the thesis that apportionment was introduced on Ju-
ly 12 only to deal with the problem of slaves cite a statement by Gou-
verneur Morris on July 24 expressing the wish to strike out the clause 
proportioning direct taxation to representation on the ground that 
he had introduced the motion only for the purpose of overcoming 
the earlier dispute over representation.322  It is highly likely that Mor-
ris (a strong nationalist) personally did not favor apportionment (or, 
for that matter, any kind of deference to the states), but the fact is 
that Morris’s personal view did not prevail.  Indeed, the fact that 
Morris’s statement was neither supported nor debated in the Conven-
tion is far more significant than the fact that Morris made the state-
ment.  Morris’s wish as expressed on July 24 was likewise ignored by 
the Committee on Detail, which (having been constituted immedi-
ately following Morris’s remark) produced separate clauses appor-
tioning representation and taxes.323  In addition, the dispute over rep-
resentation was multifaceted, and (apart from slaves) implicated the 
issues of wealth versus population, the role of the legislature, the 
method of determining numbers, the interim (i.e., pre-census) allo-
cation, and the length of the interim period.  The Morris motion did 
not mention slaves.  It only reestablished the link between taxation 
and representation as a prod for moving the Convention towards re-
solving the representation issue. 
Morris was involved in another colloquy regarding direct taxes in 
the Convention on September 13.  An understanding of this colloquy 
requires some background.  On August 8, the Representation Clause 
as drafted by the Committee on Detail was amended so as to cross-
reference the apportionment formula contained in the separate di-
 
321 See Johnson, Foul-Up, supra note 7, at 89–92 (noting the awkwardness of treating slaves as 
“inhabitants” for tax purposes). 
322 See EINHORN, supra note 27, at 168–69 (arguing the same general idea).  The full entry in 
Madison’s Notes (July 24), supra note 17, at 362–63, is:  “Mr. Gouverneur Morris hoped 
the committee [on detail, about to be constituted] would strike out the whole of the 
clause proportioning direct taxation to representation.  He had only meant it as a bridge 
to assist us over a certain gulf:  having passed the gulf, the bridge may be removed.  He 
thought the principle laid down with so much strictness liable to strong objections.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
323 See infra text accompanying notes 294 and 300. 
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rect-tax clause.324  The entire draft constitution was eventually sent to 
the Committee on Style, which presented a near-final version on Sep-
tember 12.325  It was the Committee on Style that re-combined the re-
presentation and direct tax apportionment rules into what is now the 
Representation Clause.  (The Capitation Tax Clause remained sepa-
rate, and did not then refer to “other direct” taxes.)  On September 
13, a motion was made to drop the reference in the Representation 
Clause to direct taxes on the ground that the subject did not belong 
in a provision dealing with representation.326  Morris made a remark 
to the effect that the insertion was made to counter the impression 
that “negroes” were to be counted only for purposes of representa-
tion.327  Immediately the question was put, and the motion failed.328 
It might be claimed that Morris’s September 13 remark demon-
strates that the apportionment requirement for direct taxes was “in-
serted” only to deal with the slavery issue.  This reading is not only 
wrong on the merits, since Morris’s July 12 motion said nothing 
about the formula for apportionment, but it also ignores the Sep-
tember 13 context.  All of the important decisions had been made 
prior to referral to the Committee on Style.  The Convention pro-
ceedings on September 13 and the days following dealt only with 
style, and not substance (which had already been agreed on).  The 
September 13 motion was simply to move the apportionment rule for 
direct taxes out of the section dealing with representation, not to re-
move it altogether.  (The latter motion would have been out of or-
der.)329  Morris’s remarks are in explanation of the Committee on 
 
324 Madison’s Notes (Aug. 8), supra note 17, at 391. 
325 Id. (Sept. 12) at 536. 
326 See id. (Sept. 13) at 540 (“Mr. DICKINSON and Mr. WILSON moved to strike out ‘and 
direct taxes’ from article 1, sect. 2, as improperly placed in a clause relating merely to the 
constitution of the House of Representatives.”). 
327 See id. (“The insertion here was in consequence of what had passed on this point; in order 
to exclude the appearance of counting the negroes in the representation.  The including of 
them may now be referred to the object of direct taxes, and incidentally only to that of 
representation.”)  Although this statement is not a model of clarity, it would seem to refer 
to what had transpired on August 8.  See Madison’s Notes (Aug. 8), supra note 17, at 391.  
The original resolution (that originated on July 12) provided that representation should 
be proportioned to direct taxation, and the apportionment formula was located in the di-
rect tax clause.  The same organization appears in the Report of the Committee on De-
tail, as amended on August 8.  In both cases the aim (presumably) was to emphasize the 
burden (to the South) of counting slaves as three-fifths, rather than the benefits.  The 
Committee on Style basically combined what had theretofore been separate clauses. 
328 Madison’s Notes (Sept. 13), supra note 17, at 540. 
329 See id. (“The report from the committee of style and arrangement was taken up . . . to re-
ceive the final corrections and sanction of the Convention.”). 
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Style’s decision.  Morris was not only a member of this five-man 
committee, but was the principal author of its product, and would 
have defended its actions.330  Morris’s remarks were in opposition to the 
motion, as is demonstrated by the fact that Morris’s comment closed 
the debate, and the motion thereupon failed by a wide margin.  
Moreover, Morris’s comment here related only to the counting of 
slaves in the apportionment formula, not the principle of appor-
tionment itself as it applied to taxes.  If Morris opposed apportion-
ment of taxes in principle, at this point he was reconciled to defeat. 
C.  Is Apportionment Dead Because Its Premises Are Obsolete? 
The argument considered here is that the apportionment re-
quirement should be considered obsolete, except for requisitions, 
because its premises have been seriously eroded, if not completely 
washed away.  The premise is that states, either as governments or as 
collectivities of inhabitants, are the subjects both of representation in, 
and of taxation by, the federal government.  This premise was over-
sold from the beginning331 and subsequently diluted by the following:  
(1) the practice of electing U.S. representatives by districts; (2) the 
total abstinence from the laying of requisitions; (3) the abandonment 
of apportioned direct taxes after the Civil War (and rare prior use); 
(4) the view that the federal government is “of” the people of the na-
tion and not the states;332 (5) the outcome of the Civil War (denying 
the states the right to secede from the Union); (6) the Civil War 
amendments to the Constitution (abolishing slavery and limiting the 
power of states over the franchise); (7) the Sixteenth Amendment 
(removing income taxes from the apportionment requirement); (8) 
the Seventeenth Amendment (providing for direct election of U.S. 
senators); (9) the Nineteenth Amendment (prohibiting the federal 
government and the states from denying women the right to vote); 
(10) the Twenty-Fourth Amendment (denying the states the power to 
impose poll taxes as a condition for exercising the franchise); (11) 
 
330 The other members were Hamilton, Madison, Rufus King, and William Samuel Johnston.  
Journal of the Federal Convention, supra note 29, at 295; see also Letter from James Madi-
son to Mr. Sparks (Apr. 8, 1831), in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 507 (noting 
that Morris was the author of the final draft).  Morris participated in discussions of virtu-
ally every issue raised by the report from the committee of style. 
331 See Madison’s Notes (June 28), supra note 17, at 253 (recording Wilson’s argument ridi-
culing the notion of the representation of corporate bodies). 
332 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 402–05 (1819) (noting that the ratifi-
cation was by conventions, not by state legislatures). 
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the unanimous practice among states of choosing presidential elec-
tors by popular vote; (12) the unanimous practice among states of 
eliminating property ownership as a qualification for voting; and (13) 
the decision by the Supreme Court invalidating all fees and financial 
qualifications for state elections.333  About all that is left of the states 
in the manner of their representation (as states) in the federal gov-
ernment is:  (1) the (largely unexercised) power of state governments 
in the procedure for the election of the President;334 (2) the remain-
ing power of state governments over the federal franchise (which is 
basically the power to determine, within limits, the boundaries of 
House Districts or to abolish districting altogether);335 and (3) the 
practice whereby U.S. senators are elected by the voters of an entire 
state. 
It is conceivable that there may be some residual attachment to 
the view that the states are (to some extent) political constituents of 
the federal government, although it would be hard for a pollster to 
frame this question in a way that would eliminate partisan and inter-
est-group calculation.  At the same time, it is inconceivable that any-
body would think of states (or state populations as quasi-corporate 
bodies) as federal taxpayers.  Requisitions have been extinct for over 
200 years.  The notion of “no taxation without representation” does 
not require any intermediation by states on the taxation side of the 
equation.  It is hard to imagine that anyone would think that their 
federal tax rates should depend on their state of residence. 
Notwithstanding the aforesaid, it is hard to imagine that the 
courts would limit the apportionment requirement to requisitions 
and capitation taxes on the grounds that its underlying assumptions 
are now passé.  There is no doctrine stating that legislative or consti-
tutional text is void because it is based on obsolete or defective idea-
tional premises.336  Legal text survives flawed origins. 
 
333 See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding that a state’s condi-
tioning of the right to vote on the payment of a fee or tax violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
334 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
335 For restrictions on districting generally, see LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, 2 AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 13-7, -8, -9 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing restrictions on districting). 
336 Guido Calabresi has argued that courts should entertain the possibility that statutory text 
can become obsolete with the passage of time and changing conditions, but, to my know-
ledge, this invitation has not been accepted by the judiciary.  Even Calabresi does not ar-
gue that a doctrine of statutory obsolescence should be carried over to constitutional in-
terpretation.  GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).  Of 
course, this point would also apply to the argument concerning the “expiration” of the 
Capitation Tax clause.  See supra text accompanying notes 303–04. 
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D.  Is Apportionment Dead on the Ground that Nothing Is Reasonably 
Capable of Apportionment? 
Calvin Johnson argues that only requisitions and capitation taxes 
can be direct taxes, because they are the only taxes that are “reasona-
bly capable of apportionment”—which is the test allegedly set out in 
Hylton.337  According to Johnson, even an ad valorem real estate tax 
would flunk the “reasonably capable” test, because the tax rate would 
be different in different states (and the higher rates would apply to 
the poorer states).338 
Johnson’s position is not a correct distillation of the Hylton opin-
ions.  The Chase opinion cites a situation where the rates bear a ratio 
of ten to one.339  The Iredell opinion cites the situation where the sub-
ject of the tax might not exist at all in one or more states.340  The 
Paterson opinion, although expressing the view that apportionment 
only made conceptual sense for requisitions, conceded the possibility 
that any broad-based tax might be reasonably capable of apportion-
ment.341  All three opinions flatly stated that real estate taxes were di-
rect taxes, and all three views of apportionment would accommodate 
such taxes. 
If Hylton is interpreted to mean that any tax not reasonably capa-
ble of apportionment does not need to be apportioned, then it would 
have followed that a tax on slaves was not required to be apportioned 
because slaves were non-existent or scarce in Northern states.  But 
such an interpretation would have been contrary to the understand-
ing of everybody.  The “reasonably capable of apportionment” idea 
simply restates the reason for excluding the kinds of imposts, duties, 
and excises familiar to the Framers from the requirement of appor-
tionment.  It does not erase the terms “capitation tax” or “direct tax” 
from the Constitution. 
The phrase “reasonably capable of apportionment” is not the 
same as Johnson’s mutated version thereof, which essentially is a 
 
337 Johnson, Apportionment, supra note 7.  My view of Hylton, as an excise tax case, is set forth 
in infra Part V.E. 
338 See Johnson, Apportionment, supra note 7, at 309–14, 351 (“Hylton got it right:  a tax that 
cannot reasonably or naturally be apportioned is not a direct tax because apportionment 
is the defining characteristic of direct tax.”). 
339 Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 174 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.). 
340 Id. at 182 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
341 Id. at 177–80 (opinion of Paterson, J.); cf. Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433, 
439–40, 446 (1868) (upholding a tax on insurance company gross premiums and invok-
ing the Hylton test in a hypothetical that assumed that some states might have no resident 
insurance companies). 
 
Apr. 2009] FEDERAL TAXES SUBJECT TO APPORTIONMENT RULE 917 
 
principle of fair apportionment.  A tax is minimally “capable” of ap-
portionment if the subject(s) can be located in every state.  Any tax 
on the economic attributes of a person (e.g., a wealth tax or an in-
come tax) is “capable” of apportionment among the states in accor-
dance with population because the economic qualities that are at-
tributed to a person can be attributed to the state in which the 
person resides. 
Johnson unjustifiably views “reasonably” as requiring near-uniform 
rates across the nation.  That cannot be right, because “uniformity” is 
necessarily defeated by “apportionment according to population.”  
The kind of national consciousness that underlies the uniformity 
principle only originated during the Framing period.  As a political 
document, the aim was to achieve equity among the states (or the 
people, taken collectively, of the various states), and an apportioned 
tax would certainly have been seen as fair according to that perspec-
tive.  Moreover, taxation of the states was explicitly linked to repre-
sentation of states.  In sum, the norm of fairness among individuals 
across the nation cannot underlie the apportionment requirement, 
because apportionment is explicitly based on the different and in-
compatible concept of fairness among states (or state populations).342  
Apportionment was anything but a “mistake.”343  It was merely an er-
ror of judgment. 
V.  CONFINING APPORTIONMENT TO TAXES ON TANGIBLE PROPERTY 
The arguments made so far, although not sufficient to eliminate 
the apportionment requirement altogether, are arguments for con-
struing it narrowly.  This part argues, from various angles, that “direct 
tax” (apart from requisitions and capitation taxes) should be limited 
to taxes on real estate and tangible personal property.  Adoption of 
this position would mark a change in the current doctrinal under-
 
342 George Nicholas of Virginia clearly understood how the apportionment requirement op-
erated, but from his point of view the national-perspective inequity was a good thing be-
cause favorable to Virginia (a richer state).  Virginia Debates (Mr. Nicholas, June 10, 
1788), supra note 10, at 243, reprinted in Appendix C.  George Mason observed, id. (Mr. 
George Mason, June 15, 1788) at 457–58, that apportionment would result in inequity at 
the individual level if the specified subject of the tax were narrow. 
343 Curiously, a book on constitutional mistakes, with forty-one contributing authors, makes 
no suggestion that the apportionment requirement was a mistake.  CONSTITUTIONAL 
STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson, 
eds. 1998).  Perhaps this omission only reflects the myopia of constitutional scholars 
when it comes to taxes. 
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standing, which is that all property taxes are subject to apportion-
ment. 
A.  A Critique of Pollock II 
There is unanimous agreement in historical sources, legislative 
and executive practice, and judicial doctrine that “direct tax” encom-
passes taxes on real estate.  The only plausible instrumental motives 
for apportionment relate only to real estate (including slaves).  As to 
what, apart from real estate, might be subject to apportionment, 
there are only scattered statements and opinions, often based on con-
flicting principles, principles that cannot be dispositive, or no princi-
ples at all.344  The only exception is the five to four majority opinion 
in Pollock II, which held that a tax on personal property is subject to 
apportionment: 
Nor can we perceive any ground why the same reasoning [that treats 
a tax on income as a tax on the underlying property] does not apply to 
capital in personalty held for the purpose of income or ordinarily yield-
ing income, and to the income therefrom. . . . The Constitution does not 
say that no direct tax shall be laid by apportionment on any other prop-
erty than land; on the contrary, it forbids all unapportioned direct taxes; 
and we know of no warrant for excepting personal property from the ex-
ercise of the power, or any reason why an apportioned direct tax cannot 
be laid and assessed, as Mr. Gallatin said in his report when Secretary of 
the Treasury in 1812, “upon the same objects of taxation on which the 
direct taxes levied under the authority of the State are laid and assessed.” 
Personal property of some kind is of general distribution . . . . 
The Congress of the Confederation found the limitation of the 
sources of the contributions of the States to “land, and the buildings and 
improvements thereon,” . . . so objectionable that the article was 
amended April 28, 1783, so that the taxation should be apportioned in 
proportion to [population] . . . .345 
The reasons given in Pollock II for extending “direct tax” to a tax 
on intangible personal property are not persuasive, given a century of 
settled understanding that the term referred only to taxes on real es-
tate (and perhaps related tangible personal property).346  Because 
Hylton (1796) had upheld an unapportioned tax on tangible personal 
property as a non-direct tax, Pollock II would appear to have overruled 
 
344 It is hard to discern any principle of what should be apportioned from the WOLCOTT, 
supra note 88. 
345 158 U.S. 601, 628 (1895). 
346 See Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 541–44 (1868) (stating that “direct tax” 
does not include a tax on personal property). 
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Hylton.  But the majority opinion in Pollock II dismisses Hylton as being 
“badly reported” and distinguishes it as having only held that the car-
riage tax was an excise.347  Although a court is allowed to recharacter-
ize its prior decisions, it should be pointed out that none of the 
judges in Hylton unequivocally stated that the carriage tax was an ex-
cise.348 
For starters, framing the issue as being one of defining “direct tax” 
begs the question, because the issue of what taxes are subject to ap-
portionment cannot be answered without also asking the question of 
what taxes are exempt from apportionment, namely, imposts, duties, 
and excises, and possibly other indirect taxes.  At least Hylton was on 
the right track in posing the issue as one of apportionment.  Since 
the carriage tax in Hylton looks like a property tax in having been an 
annual tax (as opposed to a transactional tax), the Pollock II majority 
opinion should have explained why it was not a property tax.  If the 
carriage tax was a property tax, then the Pollock II majority needed to 
explain how a tax on intangible investment property was distinguish-
able from a tax on tangible business or personal-use  property, or, for 
that matter, how a tax on such property might differ from a real es-
tate tax.349 
The first portion of the quoted passage from Pollock II relies on 
the position advanced by Pollock I, namely, that a tax on income is a 
tax on the underlying property.350  One cannot deploy the “income” 
concept to determine what kind of property falls under the rubric of 
“direct tax,” a term that predated any income tax and pre-dated the 
widespread availability of income-producing intangible personal 
property.  Here, the Pollock II majority arbitrarily selects a feature of 
property that unites some real estate and some personal property, 
while ignoring features that differentiate them, such as mobility or 
use.  Decisively, this rationale for Pollock II has since been repudiated 
by the Supreme Court351 and leaves the status of non-income-
producing property in limbo. 
 
347 Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 623–27. 
348 Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). 
349 The Framers might have thought that real estate taxes were sui generis, as the Physiocrats 
and Locke—both influential in the eighteenth century—thought that all wealth derived 
from land and its fruits.  Ackerman, supra note 6, at 16–18. 
350 Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 628. 
351 See supra note 188 and accompanying text.  A related problem is that the carriage tax in 
Hylton was on carriages held either for personal use or for hire.  Although the taxpayer in 
Hylton owned only personal-use carriages, it is hard to imagine that the result would have 
been different if he had owned carriages for hire, because the unanimous rationale was 
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The second point made in the quoted passage is that the Framers 
could have specified a tax on “real estate,” but did not.  However, the 
Framers could equally have specified a tax on “property,” but did not.  
In either case, “direct tax” extends to the non-property modes of req-
uisitions and capitation taxes, and, as argued below, to taxes on tan-
gible personal property as well.  However, it appears that the distinc-
tions between tangible and intangible, and among business, 
investment, and personal-use property, were not current in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.352  Thus, the Framers 
lacked an appropriate vocabulary with which to encapsulate their in-
tention.  Any specific reference to “real estate,” “lands,” or “property” 
might, at worst, have been inaccurate expressions of intention, and, 
at best, would have raised further issues as to what was encompassed 
within such terms.353  Moreover, the Framers had a difficult enough 
time dealing with representation and taxation and would have had 
no appetite to haggle further over the precise meaning of terminol-
ogy that was inherently vague and not of pressing importance.354 
The Gallatin statement quoted by the Pollock II majority was made 
twenty-five years after the framing of the Constitution.  Gallatin did 
not attend the 1787 Convention, and his acceptance of the proposed 
constitution was lukewarm at best.355  He supported the Whisky Rebel-
lion of 1791 to 1794, which resisted collection of the 1791 excise tax 
on whisky.356  Eventually, Gallatin became Secretary of the Treasury 
from 1801 to 1814 under Jefferson (and later Madison), and in that 
capacity Gallatin opposed all internal taxes.  However, Gallatin can 
 
that apportionment would not make sense on account of concerns about geographical 
distribution.  Thus, the carriage tax (on income-producing tangible property) would ap-
pear, from the perspective of the Pollock II Justices, to be indistinguishable from a tax on 
intangible investment property. 
352 Adam Smith uses the term “stock” to include all property and money deployed in a profit-
seeking activity.  See SMITH, supra note 77, at 372–75.  The Wolcott Report basically follows 
Smith’s terminology.  See WOLCOTT, supra note 88, at 439. 
353 It would have been debatable whether a tax on homes, farm animals, unharvested crops, 
and/or farm implements would have been required to be apportioned.  A related issue 
would be whether state law definitions of “real property” would control. 
354 The term “direct tax” appeared spontaneously on July 12 as a floor amendment by Morris 
to his own motion.  Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, at 302, reprinted in Appendix 
A.  Rakove, on the basis of a failure to answer a query on this point, opines that the ambi-
guity was deliberate.  RAKOVE, supra note 212, at 179. 
355 Gallatin signed the Harrisburg petition of Sept. 3, 1788, that proposed numerous weaken-
ing amendments, including one that direct taxes could be used only as a back-up to an 
unfilled requisition quota.  Pennsylvania Debates (Sept. 3, 1788), supra note 91, at 545. 
356 EINHORN, supra note 27, at 188–94 (recounting Gallatin’s role in federal tax politics be-
fore becoming Treasury Secretary). 
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hardly be viewed as a spokesman for the Framers or the original un-
derstanding of “direct tax.”  Moreover, the term “direct tax” in the 
state context (denoting all internal taxes) cannot be defined in the 
constitutional sense (as being expressly exclusive of duties, imposts, 
and excises).  Tax modes that the states would use to fulfill requisi-
tion quotas do not become direct taxes if used by the federal gov-
ernment just because the requisitions themselves are direct taxes.  
The few casual statements made during the ratification period that 
might appear to lend support to Pollock II do not really do so.357 
The switch in the apportionment formula (noted in the second 
paragraph of the quoted passage)358 from land values to population 
was made only because population was viewed as a proxy for real es-
tate wealth, which had been the Confederation rule of apportion-
ment.359  The dissatisfaction with using property wealth as the index of 
apportionment stemmed solely from problems of administration.  
The switch to population (as a proxy for wealth) was an administra-
tive shortcut, but the principle was the same.  The Framers even had 
an economic theory for correlating real property wealth with popula-
tion, namely, that free migration would increase demand (and pric-
es) for low-value property.360  The theory does not work with respect 
to personal property because prices (values) are independent of ge-
ography.  Thus, there is no reason to think that the value of debt ob-
ligations, for example, would correlate with state populations.  The 
Pollock II majority feebly attempted to deal with that issue by the 
 
357 See Virginia Debates (Mr. Monroe, June 10, 1788), supra note 10, at 215–16 (suggesting 
that a tax on “all property” would be a direct tax).  Monroe was an Anti-Federalist, who 
opposed federal taxes other than imposts and requisitions.  A speech by Alexander Ham-
ilton at the New York Ratifying Convention begins with a statement that “a poll tax is a ty-
rannical tax,” continues with the observation that in time of war the government might 
need “to lay hold of every resource,” cited an example where “[t]he United Netherlands 
were obliged, on an emergency, to give up one twentieth of their property to the gov-
ernment,” and continued with sundry other observations about the exercise of a taxing 
power, including the constraints of apportionment and politics.  New York Debates (Mr. 
Hamilton, June 28, 1788), supra note 118, at 364–65.  This passage might be construed to 
imply that Hamilton thought that a comprehensive wealth tax was either a capitation tax 
or a direct tax, but it could also be interpreted as only offering an example (in addition 
to a poll tax) of an unpopular emergency tax that would be rescinded when the emer-
gency had ended.  In any event, a wealth tax would include real estate in the tax base, and 
therefore would be subject to apportionment. 
358 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co. (Pollock II), 158 U.S. 601, 628 (1895). 
359 Many Framers held the view that population was a reasonably accurate index of the pri-
vate wealth within a state, but this view was not undisputed.  See Johnson, Foul-Up, supra 
note 7, at 33–34. 
360 See Madison’s Notes (July 11), supra note 17, at 299–300 (explaining why population was a 
good enough proxy for wealth in a nation where labor and capital could move freely). 
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throwaway line at the end of the first quoted paragraph to the effect 
that personal property was of general distribution.361  This may be 
true, but the 1894 income tax only implicated income-producing per-
sonal property, which might not have been of general distribution in 
1895 (and probably was less so from 1787 to 1789).  But at least atten-
tion can now be focused on the crux of the matter, namely, the rela-
tion of property to geography (states). 
B.  “Direct Tax” as a Tax on the Thing Itself Because of Its Geographical 
Location 
Can “direct tax” be given a meaning, compatible with ordinary us-
age,362 that encompasses requisitions, head taxes, and taxes on real es-
tate, while excluding duties, imposts, and excises?  The key is to link 
“direct tax” to its legal consequences, namely, apportionment among the states.  
Apportionment among states requires that any item subject to the tax have a 
definite geographical location in a state, because the tax rate for a state is 
the state’s quota divided by the value (or quantity) of the subject of 
the tax within the state.  A definition that fits all of the necessary re-
quirements is this:  a direct tax is a tax directly on objects having geographi-
cal locations.  Capitation taxes, requisitions, and taxes on tangible 
property all satisfy this definition, because in all three cases, the sub-
jects are taxed because they are “there” (as opposed to because of 
what they do), and all are geographically located. 
It might be objected to that the proposed definition of direct tax 
is formalistic and without substance.  However, competing definitions 
of direct tax are either equally formalistic363 or unworkable.364  Indeed, 
formalism is necessary in distinguishing modes of taxation from one 
another, since the boundaries among them are blurry as a matter of 
substance.  The carriage tax in Hylton can be viewed as either an “ex-
cise” or a “personal property tax.”365  If “excise” refers to “personal 
use,” then taxes on homes, collectibles, pets, vehicles, and so on are 
 
361 Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 628. 
362 See cases cited supra note 90. 
363 Formalistic definitions include “internal taxes” and “tax on a person.” 
364 As previously mentioned in the text accompanying notes 88–96, “not able to be passed 
on” is unworkable.  “General distribution” is also unworkable, because there is no stan-
dard of how proportional to population the distribution must be. 
365 Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796); see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 672–73 
(4th ed. 1952) (citing old authority—including Blackstone—emphasizing the “personal 
use” aspect of excises); supra text accompanying notes 344–45. 
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excises.366  If “excise” refers to “any use,” then virtually all taxes are 
excises.  If an excise is defined by a subject having a finite duration, 
then it includes taxes on buildings, non-renewable natural resources, 
livestock, tools of the trade, and intellectual property.  The one essen-
tial characteristic of a property tax would appear to be periodicy (tax-
ing the same thing annually),367 but the carriage tax that was upheld 
in Hylton was a periodic tax.368  If one takes the position that the es-
sential characteristic of a property tax is valuation,369 then a low-rate 
tax on investment property is hard to distinguish from an income 
tax,370 because the market value of property can be described in terms 
of the present value of its future net yield.  Similarly, a tax on per-
sonal-use property can be described as an excise tax, because the 
market value of personal-use property is the present discounted value 
of future net use.371  The only difference between an income tax and a 
tax on aggregate personal consumption relates to differences in ac-
counting for capital expenditures and borrowing.372  The only differ-
ence between a classic excise, like a retail sales tax on personal con-
sumption items, and a consumption tax, or between a property tax 
and a wealth tax, is aggregation and the resulting possibility of a pro-
gressive rate structure.  Finally, the distinction between a tax on the 
property itself and a tax on the person who owns such property is 
 
366 The Wolcott Report treated a tax on homes as an excise, WOLCOTT, supra note 88, at 440, 
but the 1798 apportioned federal tax on real estate included a progressive tax on dwell-
ing houses.  Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 75, § 2, 1 Stat. 597, 598. 
367 Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.164-3(c) (2007) (defining “personal property tax” as a tax imposed 
annually). 
368 Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 175 (opinion of Chase, J.) (noting that the tax was imposed an-
nually). 
369 Cf. I.R.C. § 164(b)(1) (2000) (defining “personal property tax” as an ad valorem tax).  
Whether valuation is a legal litmus test is unclear because no non-apportioned federal ad 
valorem tax has been passed upon by the Supreme Court.  I propose that valuation be a 
litmus test only for tangible personal property.  See infra Part V.E. 
370 See SMITH, supra note 77, at 377 (stating that periodic property taxes are really taxes on 
income from property). 
371 Pollock I equated a tax on property income with a tax on the property itself, but not on the 
basis of present-value analysis as such.  Nevertheless, Pollock I may simply have applied a 
cruder (non-mathematical) version of present-value analysis, as the Court stated that 
property has no real value apart from its economic yield.  See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan 
and Trust Co. (Pollock I), 157 U.S. 429, 580–81 (1895).  The Court later had to recant the 
substance-over-form approach of Pollock.  See New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 
308, 314 (1937) (discussing the difference between property tax and tax on income from 
property). 
372 See Zelenak, supra note 267, at 845–55 (arguing that broad-based consumption taxes are 
modified income taxes). 
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meaningless in terms of substance, because in either case the owner 
has to pay the tax or lose the property.373 
Formalism has its upside in the present context, because it posits a 
relatively clear definition of “direct tax” that does not radically un-
dermine long-standing doctrine or practice and cannot be perverted 
by legislation. 
C.  Real Estate Taxes and Geography 
The “inherently attributable to states” test is clearly satisfied by 
real estate taxes, whether the tax base is determined by value or by 
some other quantitative measure, such as number of acres.  Land is 
immovable and “there” for all to see.  Slaves were legally considered 
to be real estate by reason of being “attached to the land.”  Buildings 
are relatively fixed.  If they are movable at all, the costs of doing so 
are substantial. 
Attributing “real estate tax” as the hard-core meaning of “direct 
tax” makes good sense.  First, since the value of real estate is largely a 
function of population density, tax rates would tend to equalize 
across states.  The lower the population density in a given geographi-
cal area, the lower the per-acre value would tend to be.374  Thus, sup-
pose that, as of 1787, Pennsylvania and South Carolina had the same 
geographical area, but Pennsylvania had twice the population (and 
twice the apportionment quota) as for South Carolina.  But if the per-
acre price in Pennsylvania is twice that of South Carolina, the tax 
rates would be the same.375  This analysis underlays the widely-held as-
sumption in the Framing period that population was a reasonable, if 
not perfect, proxy for land values.376  Even if rate differentials would 
 
373 See Crane v. Comm’r, 331 U.S. 1 (1947) (finding no meaningful distinction between re-
course and nonrecourse acquisition debt). 
374 Land values are not necessarily rock-bottom in low-population large-area states such as 
Alaska, Montana, New Mexico, Wyoming, and Nevada, as large amounts of land are gov-
ernment-owned or set aside as Indian reservations. 
375 Suppose the state’s quota is $1 billion for every 2.5 million inhabitants:   
TABLE 2:  APPORTIONMENT AND LAND VALUES   
 Population Quota Acres Value/p.a. Total Value Tax Rate 
Pennsylvania 10 million 4 billion 100 million $100 1000 billion 4% 
South Carolina 5 million 2 billion 100 million $50 500 billion 4% 
 
376 See supra notes 356–57 and accompanying text. 
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exist under an apportioned federal real estate tax,377 such differentials 
would not have been perceived as being grossly inequitable.  State 
property taxes are not considered to be inherently “unfair” just be-
cause of state-to-state differences in rates.  An apportioned federal real 
estate tax can be made to look like a state tax in every respect but the 
identity of its collectors.  In addition, rates on property taxes are so 
low (usually below 1 percent) that rate differentials are hardly per-
ceptible.  Any unpopularity of the early federal apportioned real es-
tate taxes does not appear to have been on account of the inequities 
of rates among states but rather on account of inconvenience and 
high transaction costs.378 
Second, apportioned federal real estate taxes can also be fair with-
in states,379 as the rates determined for a state can be applied uni-
formly within a state.  In contrast, state real estate taxes often suffer 
from inequities resulting from different rates being set by different 
political subdivisions. 
Third, in contrast to apportioned excises where an the entire 
state’s quota could be borne by a few non-wealthy individuals,380 a fed-
 
377 See EINHORN, supra note 27, at 159 (noting that apportionment of an income tax according 
to state populations would have resulted in a maximum rate differential of 9.2% (Con-
necticut, the richest) to 17.9% (Mississippi, the poorest)).  If the four highest and lowest 
states were thrown out, the range would be a tolerable 11.1% to 16.2%.  Einhorn does 
not attempt a similar exercise for an ad valorem property tax, as one would need to know 
aggregate state real estate values.  This would be extremely difficult, as no apportioned 
federal real estate tax has been laid since the Civil War, and state property tax regimes 
use different valuation systems. 
378 Henry Carter Adams does not attribute the unpopularity of these taxes to the rate inequi-
ties (which was a concern more of the Treasury).  Adams, supra note 134, at 54–59, 64–68.  
The debates of the ratification period demonstrated that such taxes were unpopular 
without reference to inter-state inequities, partly because such taxes had to be paid out of 
the property owner’s own pocket, partly because the administration was cumbersome, 
and partly because a federal real estate tax was perceived as encroaching on state “turf.”  
Charles J. Bullock’s study of direct taxes provides figures on the inequitable operation of 
the 1861 apportioned property tax.  Bullock, Part II, supra note 23, at 464–80.  By then, 
discrepancies among states in per-capita land values had actually widened (relative to the 
1789–1916 period), and Adams (along with other commentators cited therein) be-
moaned the inequities resulting from apportionment.  However, it is not claimed that the 
inequities as such were a cause of unpopularity in the poorer states that suffered by rea-
son of the apportionment rule. 
379 A tax structure in which the entire burden is borne by only one person (or a handful of 
persons) resembles (in a structural sense) a “taking” more than a “tax.”  See Frank I. Mi-
chelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:  Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compen-
sation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967) (discussing what a “taking” is). 
380 The Justices in Hylton v. United States invoked scenarios in which the subject of the tax was 
either nonexistent in a state or present in small quantities relative to population.  3 U.S. 
(3 Dall.) 171 (1796). 
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eral ad valorem real estate tax would impact as many persons as there 
are landowners.  Even in a state where there are very few landowners, 
they would be sufficiently wealthy (on account of the landholdings 
themselves) that the tax would not be disproportionate to ability to 
pay.381 
D.  Intangible Property and Geography 
The proposed definition of direct taxes excludes acknowledged 
non-direct taxes, that is, taxes on receipts, transfers, uses, privileges, 
immunities, enjoyment, or activities.  It happens that the locations of 
the subjects of indirect taxes are geographically ambiguous.  Thus, a 
transaction (or other subject of an indirect tax) could be sourced to 
any of:  (1) the location of the seller, (2) the location of the buyer, 
(3) the location of the owner, (4) the location (if any) of the thing, 
(5) the location of an intermediary, (6) the place where title is legally 
transferred or registered, or (7) the place stipulated in a contract or 
other governing instrument.  The mere possibility that a subject could 
be assigned to geography is not sufficient to characterize a tax there-
on as a “direct tax,” because the operative rules—that would dictate the end 
results—would be produced only by implementing legislation and not by the 
Constitution itself.  A rule that would be so subject to manipulation 
provides no guarantee or certainty, and therefore defeats the entire 
purpose of placing it in the Constitution.382 
Intangible property has no inherent location in the same ways that 
the subjects of non-direct taxes lack inherent location.  Any assign-
ment of an intangible to a state can only occur pursuant to a legisla-
tive rule, since no such rules exist in nature or under the Constitu-
tion.  Shares of stock, for example, could be sourced to any of:  (a) 
the state of incorporation,383 (b) the state of the owner, (c) the state 
of the location of the stock-certificate, or (d) the state of the location 
of the transfer agent.  (Actually, some or all of these locations could 
be outside of the United States.)  Patent rights and copyrights cannot 
be assigned to states at all, because the legal rights inherent in them 
 
381 The Constitution does not require that an apportioned real estate tax be based on values 
or applied uniformly across states  or uniformly within states.  However, these possible de-
formities would raise strong political opposition. 
382 There were several comments that the enumeration be done through a precise standard 
(the census) rather than being left to the legislature, and a motion to that effect was 
adopted.  Madison’s Notes (July 11), supra note 17, at 294–95, 297, 298. 
383 Cf. I.R.C. § 861(a)(2) (2000) (sourcing dividends by nationality of corporation). 
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are granted by the federal government.  Apportionment can work on-
ly if the same item cannot be “counted” in more than one state. 
E.  Tangible Personal Property and Geography; Hylton Reconsidered 
Like real estate and individuals, tangible personal property, al-
though sometimes moveable, has a single location at any point in 
time by reason of its physical existence.  Tangible personal property 
can be hidden, but that goes only to the administrative difficulty of 
enforcing any such tax. 
Treating a tax on tangible personal property as being subject to 
apportionment eliminates the problem of what constitutes a real es-
tate tax.  Thus, any tax (imposed periodically by reason of ownership 
and according to value) on farm equipment, livestock, minerals, 
crops, and timber, whether or not harvested or extracted, would be 
subject to apportionment.384 
The federal tax on carriages that was held exempt from the rule 
of apportionment might be characterized as either a tangible per-
sonal property tax or as an excise tax by reason of being a tax on 
use.385  If Hylton is characterized as having upheld a tangible personal 
property tax, then its holding is incompatible with the thesis that 
such a tax should be subject to apportionment. 
The 1796 carriage tax at issue in Hylton was an annual tax but not 
an ad valorem tax:  the tax amount was keyed to the physical charac-
teristics of the carriage.  The tax was imposed only on carriages sub-
ject to certain uses,386 as opposed to ownership per se.  Imposing the 
tax on use rather than ownership appears to have been done pre-
ceisely to overcome constitutional objection.387  Today such a tax is 
 
384 Compare Virginia Debates (Mr. John Marshall, June 10, 1788) supra note 10, at 229–31, 
reprinted in Appendix C (stating that a tax on farm equipment and livestock was a direct 
tax), with supra text accompanying note 172 (Justice Paterson expressing doubt on this 
point and Justice Iredell suggesting that “direct tax” is limited to taxes on real estate or 
things “affixed to the land”). 
385 See sources cited supra notes 159–61. Only Justice Paterson stressed the excise-tax point, 
quoting Adam Smith.  See Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 180–81. 
386 The uses were personal use, being let out for hire, or for the conveying of passengers.  
Farm use and carrying goods and wares were excluded uses.  Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 45, 
§ 1, 1 Stat. 373, 374, repealed by Act of May 28, 1796, ch. 37, 1 Stat. 478. 
387 See supra text accompanying note 76 (colloquy between Madison and Fisher Ames in the 
House). 
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called a license fee, and license fees (as taxes on uses) are considered 
to be excises,388 which are expressly exempt from apportionment. 
Since tangible personal property is a human artifact produced for 
use, there is inherent difficulty in deciding whether such taxes are 
property taxes or excise taxes.  A test to resolve this problem that is 
simple and easy to apply is this:  a tax on tangible personal property is 
a “property” tax if it is imposed periodically on the value of the item.  
Since the carriage tax in Hylton was not imposed according to valua-
tion, it was an excise (rather than a tangible personal property tax) 
under this test.  This “excise” interpretation of Hylton is paralleled in 
the regulations under section 164 of the Internal Revenue Code, 
which define “personal property taxes” (but not “real property tax-
es”) as requiring valuation.389  In contrast, valuation need not be a re-
quirement for real estate taxes.  Real estate is easy to identify on ac-
count of being immovable.  Real estate taxes of necessity are capable 
of reaching unimproved land that is not used for anything, because 
such land exists in nature and is not a human artifact.  Under this 
approach, a per-acre land tax would still be subject to apportionment 
by reason of being a real estate tax, as the Framers intended, despite 
the absence of valuation. 
The “reasonably capable” test of direct tax that is commonly at-
tributed to Hylton is not suitable as a legal principle, unless it is taken 
to refer the ability to unequivocally locate the tax subjects in states.  
If, as actually used in Hylton, it refers to the inequity of state rate dif-
ferentials caused by an erratic distribution of the item, then the test 
refers to matters of degree,390 not kind.391  Courts are not well-
equipped to apply this kind of test.  Carriages were not so erratically 
distributed among the states relative to population that a handful of 
person would be subject to astronomical tax rates in one or more 
 
388 See Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 515 (1899) (discussing the privilege of making sales and 
trades). 
389 I.R.C. § 164(a)(2) (2000) allows a deduction for state and local personal property taxes, 
but an automobile license fee is not viewed as a personal property tax unless it is assessed 
according to value.  Treas. Reg. § 1.164-3(c) (2007).  Interestingly, the definition of real 
property taxes in subsection b of the same regulation does not require valuation.  Id. 
§ 1.164-3(b). 
390 Compare supra note 374, with supra note 389, which list rate differentials for the 1798 
carriage tax and the 2000 income tax, if both had to be apportioned. 
391 Apportionment would be impossible only if there is at least one state in which the item is 
not found at all. 
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states.392  Does Hylton mean that any single-item tax would flunk the 
reasonably-capable test?  What if the class were broad enough, such as 
business-use property, inventory, or home furnishings, so that distri-
bution in relation to population were not expected to be erratic?393  
The “reasonably capable” test also raises the issue of the role of fact-
finding:  would the litigants in a case challenging such a tax have to 
introduce evidence concerning the distribution of the item?  It would 
seem that the rule would require it, but no case has relied on such a 
fact-finding, and developing the facts on a case-by-case basis would be 
very costly.  In contrast, requiring apportionment of ad valorem tangi-
ble personal property taxes would be an easy rule to apply, as no fact-
finding would be required. 
This reinterpretation of Hylton394 as an excise tax case is virtually 
cost-free to the federal government, which is wholly ill-equipped to 
administer ad valorem tangible personal property taxes in any event.  
It appears that no existing federal tax would be affected.  For exam-
ple, the federal taxes on alcoholic beverages include per-gallon taxes 
and occupational-license taxes, and none of these are subject to the 
rule of apportionment.395 
F.  Geography, Federalism, and Taxes 
The apportionment requirement for direct taxes has operated to 
institutionalize a modus operandi under which the federal government, 
in practice, cedes “jurisdiction” to the states to tax real estate (and, in 
my view, tangible personal property), subject to an exception for cases of 
national emergency.  The cession is institutionalized by giving states a 
political interest—pro or con—in the federal use of apportioned tax-
es.  The interest resides in the tax rates applicable in any state relative 
to the rates applicable in other states.  The justification for this ces-
sion is that, as a matter of both fairness and administration, it is pru-
 
392 Einhorn used the actual yield of the carriage tax in 1796 to construct a table in which the 
per-carriage rates ranged from $0.73 (Delaware) to $5.69 (Georgia).  EINHORN, supra 
note 27, at 161. 
393 See note 380. 
394 Jensen, Consumption Taxes, supra note 5, at 2362–63, also interprets Hylton as an excise tax 
case, as did Pollock II, 158 U.S. 601, 623–27 (1895). 
395 See I.R.C. §§ 5001, 5041, 5051 (2000) (imposing a tax on distilled spirits, wine, and beer).  
These are one-time taxes on production or importation.  Occupational taxes are assessed 
at a fixed annual amount on producers, etc.  See id. §§ 5081, 5111, 5121 (imposing a tax 
on alcohol proprietors).  The federal excise tax on tobacco products is a one-time tax by 
weight.  See id. §§ 5701, 5703(b) (laying out the rates of the tobacco tax). 
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dent for the federal government not to encroach on matters that are 
inherently local and state-connected. 
The state-connectedness of real estate, and taxes thereon, is indi-
cated foremost by the fact that the real estate in a state is coterminous 
with the territory and legal jurisdiction of the state.  Second, real es-
tate located in one state cannot be located in any other state, nor can 
it be moved to another state, and real estate markets tend to be local.  
Third, real estate is considered inherently local for all legal purposes 
apart from taxation.396  Fourth, all states had experience with real es-
tate taxes.397  Fifth, real estate taxes are typically administered accord-
ing to appraisals, and appraisals require knowledge of local condi-
tions.398  Sixth, a person is likely to gauge the fairness of a real estate 
tax by how his neighbors are taxed with respect to the same subject, 
not by how real estate is taxed in another state.  Seventh, real estate 
taxes can be collected from the property itself by levy and execution, 
and identification of and jurisdiction over the owner is not necessary. 
The apportionment requirement can find policy support in the 
notion of comparative advantage, which can be approached by ask-
ing, “Which tax modes are best tailored to the position of states, as 
opposed to the federal government?”  The chief problem facing the 
states, vis-à-vis other states, is the dilution of their tax base by the shift-
ing of economic activity into lower-tax jurisdictions.  Taxes on real es-
tate are immune to mobility.  Head taxes are the next best taxes from 
this angle, as the monetary and psychological costs of changing resi-
dence are high compared to that of moving economic activity.  The 
most easily avoided state taxes by far are taxes on intangibles,399 and 
 
396 It is hornbook law that the situs of real estate determines the law to be applied to ques-
tions concerning its ownership, succession, and disposition.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 223, 277, 278 (1971) (land conveyances and land 
trusts). 
397 The various kinds of real estate taxes used by the states are listed in WOLCOTT, supra note 
88, at 437. 
398 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in Appendix B; Hylton v. 
United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 177 (1796) (opinion of Paterson, J.).  However, ap-
praisals did not become universal until the nineteenth century.  For a brief history of state 
property taxation, see generally Glenn W. Fisher, History of Property Taxes in the United 
States, EH.NET ENCYCLOPEDIA, Sept. 30, 2002, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/
fisher.property.tax.history.us. 
399 Adam Smith recognized this crucial distinction between real estate taxes and intangibles.  
SMITH, supra note 77, at 373; see also Kirk J. Stark, State Tax Shelters and U.S. Fiscal Federal-
ism, 26 VA. TAX REV. 789 (2007) (discussing income from intangibles under state corpo-
rate income taxes).  The ability to move intangible investments offshore is a major prob-
lem for international taxation generally.  See I.R.C. §§ 951(a), 954(c), 1291–1297 (2000) 
(setting forth the taxation of foreign passive income of U.S. citizens and residents); see al-
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here it would be the federal government that would possess a clear 
comparative advantage, just as it does with personal taxes on annual 
income or consumption, because (1) source or situs is not a legal 
constraint on federal taxing jusrisdiction,400 and (2) the lack of geo-
graphical location is not much of a practical constraint on admini-
stration.401  The federal government would also have a comparative 
advantage with respect to transactional excises on big-ticket items402 
because state taxes of this type are easily avoided.403 
Tangible personal property, although movable, is mostly bound to 
such locations as homes and business premises.  Although wholesal-
ers can stockpile inventory (and collectors can stash collectibles) in 
states with low (or no) tangibles taxes, the situs states would be able 
tax such property if they so desired.  A tangibles tax requires a bu-
reaucracy that can enter business premises and warehouses.  States 
will want to make judgment calls as to what kinds of tangibles are 
worth taxing given the administrative and political costs.  The federal 
government labors under a comparative disadvantage in this area rel-
ative to the states. 
The relative comparative advantages are reflected in the fact that 
all states impose real estate taxes,404 but practically none impose taxes 
on intangibles.405  State taxes on tangible personal property (other 
than household goods) are fairly common, but they vary considerably 
from state to state. 
 
so id. § 871(a) (conceding virtual impossibility of trying to tax non-real-estate capital gains 
of non-resident aliens).  In contrast, the situs country can effectively tax real estate in-
come and capital gains of owners who are non-resident aliens.  See id. § 897 (taxing gains 
on real property interests located in the United States). 
400 See Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56 (1924) (holding that Congress had power to tax U.S. citi-
zen residing in Mexico on foreign-source income). 
401 For example, stocks and bonds are mostly registered as to ownership.  See, e.g., I.R.C. 
§ 163(f) (2000) (denying interest deductions on certain unregistered bonds). 
402 It is unlikely that people would go to serious efforts to avoid sales taxes on routine con-
sumer purchases. 
403 Sales of goods are exempt from situs-state sales tax if the buyer is out-of-state, and use 
taxes (on buyers) imposed by the state of residence are not enforced because enforce-
ment would entail invasion of the home.  (Use taxes are similar to tangible personal 
property taxes on personal-use items in this respect.)  Even if the situs state could tax all 
sales, sales could be shifted to lower-tax states, as occurs in international taxation. See 
I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(6), 865 (2000) (giving sellers considerable ability to choose from where 
their sales income will be sourced). 
404 See generally SUSAN PACE HAMILL, AS CERTAIN AS DEATH:  A FIFTY-STATE SURVEY OF STATE 
AND LOCAL TAX LAWS (2007) (describing revenue sources for all states). 
405 It appears that only Mississippi and Pennsylvania attempt to tax intangibles to any signifi-
cant degree.  See id. at 262, 414. 
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* * * 
To conclude this Part, apportionment should be required of taxes 
on real and personal tangible property only, excluding taxes on in-
tangible property.  Treating federal taxes on tangible personal prop-
erty as direct taxes would be inconsequential because such taxes can 
easily be structured as excises, as was the case with the 1794 carriage 
tax. 
VII.  APPLICATIONS 
Apportionment of a federal tax is required only for a direct tax 
that is not an income tax.  Limiting “direct tax” to requisitions, capi-
tation taxes, and taxes on tangible property (real and personal) does 
not solve all issues of current interest. 
A.  Can Ad Valorem Property Taxes Be Characterized as Income Taxes? 
It has been suggested that, notwithstanding all that has been said 
to this point, a federal ad valorem property tax is valid under the Six-
teenth Amendment as an “income tax,” the theory being that a tax on 
the value of the property that is less than the “natural interest rate” is 
in substance a tax on the income yield from the property.406  How-
ever, substance-over-form arguments generally do not work under the 
taxing clauses of the Constitution because then, as noted earlier, all 
distinctions collapse.407  In addition, the Supreme Court after Pollock 
has acknowledged that income and property taxes are not the same 
in substance.408  An income tax—especially a “realization” income tax 
- is a tax on economic outcomes and requires accounting for actual 
(relevant) events, namely, receipts and costs.409  A property tax, even 
 
406 See GEORGE COOPER, TAKING WEALTH TAXATION SERIOUSLY 29 (Ass’n of the Bar of the 
City of N.Y. 1979);  Schenk, supra note 4, at 441 (“To pass constitutional muster, the 
wealth tax proposed here easily could be reframed as an income tax with a base equal to 
the risk-free return to certain assets.”). 
407 See supra text accompanying notes 362–69. 
408 See sources cited supra notes 189–90. 
409 Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(3), (b)(2) (2008) (stating that “income tax” for purposes of 
the foreign tax credit entails realizations and receipts).  Incidentally, a mark-to-market in-
come tax would probably be valid under the Sixteenth Amendment as embodying a par-
ticular means of accounting for receipts and costs.  The Supreme Court has consistently 
given Congress broad discretion over income tax accounting issues.  See Burnet v. Sanford 
& Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 365 (1931) (explaining that the Sixteenth Amendment does 
not require Congress to adopt a certain income tax scheme); Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. 
Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991) (deferring to the Commissioner’s reasonable regulatory in-
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under the proffered analysis, is (at best) a tax on the potential earn-
ings of a hypothetical amount of capital (equal to the value of the 
property) that might be invested so as to produce a certain minimum 
net cash yield. 
B.  Personal Wealth Taxes 
According to the analysis heretofore, a personal wealth tax would 
be unconstitutional at least to the extent that the value of real estate 
and tangible property is included in the tax base.410  A possible argu-
ment against this result might be that such a tax is really an excise tax 
on the privilege of property ownership.  The Supreme Court has held 
on various occasions that a federal tax on a “privilege” is an “excise” 
not subject to apportionment.411  However, the kinds of privileges in-
volved in these cases involve discrete positive-law benefits conferred 
by government, such as licenses, charters, limited liability, immuni-
ties, and rights of succession.  Extending the concept to “basic” rights 
 
terpretation of the Internal Revenue Code because power had been delegated to him by 
Congress). 
410 Jensen appears to argue that all personal taxes are capitation taxes or direct taxes by rea-
son of the aggregation of economic attributes to the person.  See Jensen, Consumption Tax-
es, supra note 5, at 2392–93, 2407.  Adam Smith included personal wealth taxes in the cat-
egory of “capitation” taxes, but he used them to refer only to certain taxes paid out of 
pocket, as opposed to taxes payable out of rents, profits, or wages.  See SMITH, supra note 
77, at 382.  However, Smith attached no particular consequence to this terminology.  
Most property taxes in Smith’s scheme were not capitation taxes but taxes on cash or in-
kind rents.  See id. at 362–72.  There is no evidence that the Framers used “capitation tax” 
in the way Smith used it.  References to capitation taxes in the Convention and ratifica-
tion debates were uniformly to head taxes (poll taxes).  See sources cited supra note 232 
(explaining why these kinds of taxes were relatively common in the colonies); see also su-
pra note 216 and accompanying text.  “Capitation tax” in Article I, Section 9, Clause 4, 
was clearly meant to cover a tax on slaves and poll taxes.  Although the Wolcott Report of 
1796 observed that four states had primitive personal wealth taxes, that Report did not re-
fer to them as “capitation taxes.”  Taxes on trades and professions (which were forerun-
ners of income taxes and taxes on wages) were likewise not considered capitation taxes 
either by Smith or in the colonies, nor apportionable direct taxes by the Wolcott Report.  
WOLCOTT, supra note 88, at 439.  See generally BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 223 (8th ed. 2004) 
(cross-referencing capitation tax with “poll tax,” which means fixed per-person tax).  The 
categorization of any tax should not be altered simply on the basis of aggregating eco-
nomic attributes to the person.  Aggregation is only relevant as an accounting device that 
renders graduated rate schedules possible.  Rate schedules have nothing to do with what 
is a “direct tax.” 
411 See, e.g., Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911) (holding an income tax on the pri-
vilege of doing business as a corporation as an excise); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 
(1900) (holding a tax on the privilege of succession as an excise); Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 
509 (1899) (holding a tax on the privilege of making sales and trades on an exchange as 
an excise). 
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held by everyone would open up the “excise” concept to the point 
where all other tax categories (except possibly requisitions and capi-
tation taxes) would be swallowed up.  Since “excises” stands besides 
“imposts,” “duties,” and “direct taxes” in the constitutional text, such 
a view is untenable. 
Ackerman concedes that a federal real estate tax might be a “di-
rect tax” but contends that a tax on a person’s aggregate net wealth 
would not be a direct tax412 on the ground that a personal wealth tax 
(unlike a classic property tax) would be net of liabilities.413  However, 
possible subtractions from a tax base414 do not define the tax.415  For 
example, per-person fixed-dollar exemptions under any tax do not 
convert the tax into a capitation tax.  In addition, subtractions are 
simply the negative (mirror) of the gross tax base.  Negative wealth 
would be subtracted only because the tax base is initially constituted 
by positive wealth.  Only positive net tax bases matter. 
C.  Taxing Imputed Income 
The term “imputed income” has traditionally been used to refer 
to the rental value of an asset owned by the taxpayer that is held for 
personal use.  Many commentators argue that net imputed income 
from homes should be taxed like other investments,416 and taxes of 
 
412 See Ackerman, supra note 6, at 56. 
413 See id. at 56–57.  The other reason offered by Ackerman is that the Hylton justices “self-
consciously” refused to define direct tax as a comprehensive wealth tax.  But why take on 
an irrelevant issue?  It was enough for the Hylton justices to distinguish the carriage tax 
from a real estate tax. 
414 Allowing liabilities to reduce the tax base would open up tax-avoidance possibilities, such 
as the incurring of phantom debt or debt used to purchase cash or assets that can be rea-
dily concealed.  Thus, it is likely that any wealth tax would contain rules disallowing de-
ductions for certain liabilities.  Indeed, allowing deductions for liabilities is no more an 
inevitability under a wealth tax as it would be under a property tax. 
415 Deductions and exemptions did not cause any problem for the Pollock holdings that taxes 
on rents and investment income were direct taxes.  In a similar vein, I argue that an “in-
come tax” (at least under the Sixteenth Amendment) is a tax on gross receipts.  See Jo-
seph M. Dodge, Murphy and the Sixteenth Amendment in Relation to the Taxation of Non-
Excludible Personal Injury Awards, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 369, 391–407 (2007); Zelenak, supra note 
267, at 847–55 (arguing persuasively that a cash-flow consumption tax cannot be distin-
guished from an income tax on the basis of tax treatment of borrowing and capital ex-
penditures). 
416 See RICHARD GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 139–43 (2d ed. 1976) (analyzing the 
tax exemption for interest on government-issued bonds); HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL 
INCOME TAXATION, 110–24 (1938) (discussing the pros and cons of non-taxation of home 
ownership). 
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this type are not unprecedented.417  The constitutionality of such a tax 
could be a meaningful issue.  Unfortunately, the answer is not clear. 
Although economists refer to such a tax as being on “income,” the 
benefits obtained from home ownership are not income in a tax 
sense.  Economists sometimes define “income” as a flow of psychic sa-
tisfactions or the power to obtain such a flow,418 but pure psychic en-
joyment is not income in the tax sense, and pure psychic pain is not 
negative income.  Although home ownership allows one to avoid the 
costs of paying rent, the avoidance of costs is also not income in the 
tax sense, especially since the amount of foregone rent is uncertain.  
Income in the tax sense means an increase in material wealth (cash, 
property received in kind), or the equivalent thereof.419 
However, a provision of the income tax that imposes a (non-
apportioned) tax on non-income is valid if the effect of the provision 
is to impose an indirect tax.420  A tax on the “imputed income” from 
owner-occupied homes could be valid as an excise on the ground that 
it is a tax on “use,” rather than ownership, and many early authorities 
can be cited for such a proposition.421  Also, the Wolcott Report (al-
though not a legal opinion) considered a “homes tax” to be outside 
of the apportionment requirement.422 
 
417 See SIMONS, supra note 416, at 112 n.3, 116–17 (citing examples from several countries). 
418 See Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income—Economic and Legal Aspects, reprinted in 4 
READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 59 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl Shoup eds., 
1959). 
419 See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (citing “accession to wealth” 
as the core of the gross income concept); accord Thomas Chancellor, Imputed Income and 
the Ideal Income Tax, 67 OR. L. REV. 561 (1988).  Positive income tax law generally taxes 
consumption by disallowing deductions for consumption outlays.  See I.R.C. § 165(c) 
(2000) (limiting deductions to trade or business losses, losses in profit-seeking activity, 
and certain casualty losses); id. § 167(a) (disallowing depreciation deductions on per-
sonal-use property); id. § 262 (denying a deduction for personal expenses).  Consump-
tion received in-kind is taxed only in cases (such as employee fringe benefits and prizes) 
where the transaction as a whole can be viewed as the receipt of cash followed by the 
spending of the cash.  Otherwise, psychic benefits and intangible economic benefits are 
not taxed.  See United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118, 121 (5th Cir. 1968) (noting that for 
something to be considered income, “[t]here must be an economic gain”).  Finally, the 
consumption attributable to homes is taxed:  the purchase price (present value of future 
net use value) is taxed by never being deductible.  Those who advocate taxing imputed 
income really want consumer durables to be taxed the same as income-producing invest-
ments. 
420 See cases cited supra note 192. 
421 See SMITH, supra note 77, at 370 (equating a tax on habitations as a tax on consumption); 
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796) (opinion of Paterson, J.) (view-
ing a tax on use as an excise); supra note 61 (Representative Fisher Ames in debating the 
1794 carriage tax in the House). 
422 WOLCOTT, supra note 88, at 440. 
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A tax on imputed income from homes might also be considered a 
property tax.  The apportioned federal tax of 1798 was on homes, as 
well as on lands and slaves.423  A tax on a percentage of a property 
item’s value has been held to be a direct tax not only by lower 
courts424 but also by the Supreme Court, if without discussion, in the 
famous case of Eisner v. Macomber.425  The Supreme Court has stated in 
dictum that an unapportioned federal tax on imputed income is not 
valid.426  The Hylton case is not clearly to the contrary, since the car-
riage tax was not assessed on the basis of value. 
It is awkward to view a tax as being both an excise tax and a direct 
tax, because a tax cannot satisfy the uniformity and apportionment 
requirements at the same time and because there is no constitutional 
tie-breaker.427  If “direct tax” and “excise” are defined independently 
of each other428 there could be gaps (as well as overlaps) in the consti-
tutional scheme,429 but that would lie contrary to the settled doctrine 
 
423 Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 75, 1 Stat. 597. 
424 Indep. Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Comm’r, 17 B.T.A. 757 (1929), aff’d, 67 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 
1933), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371 
(1934). 
425 252 U.S. 189, 217–19 (1920) (holding that a tax on a pro-rata stock dividend, which is a 
tax on a percentage of the value of the taxpayer’s stock ownership in a company, is an 
unapportioned direct tax). 
426 Helvering v. Independent Life Insurance Co. considered a provision relating to the taxation of 
insurance companies that disallowed certain deductions relating to real estate unless the 
taxpayer included in gross income an amount equal to four percent of its value.  292 U.S. 
371, 375 (1934).  The Board of Tax Appeals held that imputed income was not “income” 
under the Sixteenth Amendment, and that a tax on a percentage of the value of real 
property is a direct tax.  See Indep. Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Comm’r, 17 B.T.A. 757 (1929), 
aff’d, 67 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1933).  The Supreme Court, although assuming that a tax on a 
percentage of the value of the property would be a direct tax, reversed on the ground 
that the provision in question was essentially a deduction-disallowance rule (akin to I.R.C. 
§ 265(a)), and therefore valid.  252 U.S. at 380–81.  Thus, it can be said that the Supreme 
Court has not directly considered the excise tax theory. 
427 Since apportionment and uniformity are incompatible, it has to be decided, for any given 
tax, which one of these principles controls. 
428 It appears that no Supreme Court case has held an excise to be also a direct tax.  Justice 
Chase’s opinion in Hylton suggested the possibility of both overlap and non-coverage, Pol-
lock I hints at a priority for direct-tax characterization in case of overlap, and Flint v. Stone 
Tracy Co. hints at just the opposite, but ultimately the doctrine has settled on the proposi-
tion that an excise cannot also be a direct tax and vice versa.  See 220 U.S. 107 (1911) 
(upholding unapportioned corporate income tax as an excise). 
429 Overlap is avoided only if (a) one category includes all taxes (with the other category be-
ing a subset)—an untenable position here—or (b) one category is the negative of the 
other.  Otherwise, the two categories would be defined independently of each other, re-
sulting in overlaps and gaps. 
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that all federal taxes should be subject to one geographic non-
discrimination principle or the other.430 
If “use” were determinative of excise status, then about the only 
clear direct tax would be one on unused land, contrary to the intent 
of the Framers.  In addition, “use” is a poor legal test, because it re-
quires fact-finding, and would create incentives for fraud and perjury.  
A much cleaner approach (that avoids any fact-finding) is that which 
limits “direct tax” to requisitions, capitation taxes, and tangible prop-
erty taxes.  The definitions of “real estate tax” and “tangible personal 
property tax” offered earlier are not dependent on the concept of 
use:  the touchstone for real estate taxes is attachment to the land, 
and the touchstone for tangible personal property taxes is valuation 
and periodic imposition.  Moreover, ownership is prior to use, be-
cause use derives from, and is an incident of, ownership.  Although 
the “legislative history” of “direct tax” excludes taxes on “consump-
tion,”431 that term was probably used by the Framers as a shorthand 
term that would encompass imposts, duties, and excises.  In any 
event, an annual tax on a percentage of the value of property is not a 
tax on actual consumption, but only on a hypothetical monetary re-
turn.  Treating imputed income as consumption would erase the sig-
nificance of ownership, whereas viewing imputed income as an inci-
dent of ownership would not erode the concept of taxable 
consumption, which can be easily reached by one-time taxes on 
spending for consumption and in-kind consumption benefits re-
ceived from third parties. 
Therefore, I conclude that a tax on imputed income from tangi-
ble property should be treated as being subject to the rule of appor-
tionment.  Such a proposition is of negligible consequence, since a 
political system that cannot swallow a tax on the unrealized apprecia-
tion of publicly-traded securities would hardly have an appetite for a 
tax on hypothetical income from non-liquid tangible assets.  More-
over, apportionment can be avoided by license fees not keyed to 
value, as was the case in Hylton. 
 
430 See Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916) (holding that all non-direct taxes 
are subject to the uniformity requirement). 
431 See text accompanying supra note 52, reprinted in Appendix A; THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 
(Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in Appendix B. 
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D.  Taxing Personal Endowment 
An endowment tax, as distinguished from a wealth tax, is a tax on 
a person’s human capital, or wage-earning capacity.432 
There being, apparently, no authority or even speculation on the 
constitutional status of a federal endowment tax, the issue will be ap-
proached indirectly by examining whether endowment taxes are 
closer to excises or taxes on tangible property.  Like a property tax, a 
tax on personal endowment is a tax on income-producing potential, 
as opposed to economic uses or outcomes.  A person can allow hu-
man capital to lie fallow just as in the case of real estate.  In both cas-
es, the subject of the tax is not intrinsically linked to the means of 
paying it.  Like property taxes, a tax on personal endowment as such 
is a tax on “being” rather than “becoming,” “potentiality” rather than 
“actualization,” and “existence” rather than “use.”  Personal endow-
ment resembles property in that its possessor has the right to exclu-
sive use.  Also, it is viewed as “capital” that, if used, produces income.  
Although property is inherently transferable and human capital is 
not, this difference only describes an added barrier to liquidity in the 
case of an endowment tax.  In Smithian terms, an endowment tax is 
not a means of indirectly taxing some other economic attribute, such 
as income, wealth, or consumption, nor is its incidence shiftable. 
Approaching the matter from the notion of apportionment, a tax 
on human capital is capable of apportionment because of the fact 
that personal endowment is attached to individuals and because indi-
viduals can be geographically linked to states.  Moreover, human cap-
ital is probably allocated among states in rough proportion to popu-
lation because genetic endowment, education, and family status, 
which are major components of human capital, are likely to be ran-
domly distributed among population groups, so that such a tax would 
be “reasonably” capable of apportionment among the states in accor-
dance with population. 
 
432 Discussion of taxation of endowment is found in David Hasen, Liberalism and Ability Taxa-
tion, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1057 (2007); Daniel Shaviro, Endowment and Inequality, in TAX 
JUSTICE:  THE ONGOING DEBATE 123 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr, eds., 
2002); Kirk J. Stark, Enslaving the Beachcomber:  Some Thoughts on the Liberty Objections to En-
dowment Taxation, 18 CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 47 (2005); Lawrence Zelenak, Tax-
ing Endowment, 55 DUKE L.J. 1145 (2006) (critiquing earning-capacity concept of endow-
ment as too narrow); Linda Sugin, Let the Beachcomber Drown:  Why Taxing Endowment Is 
Unjust (Fordham Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 959710, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1102370. 
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Thus, althought it is hard to discern any state interest or capability 
to be served by the apportionment of an endowment tax, it cannot 
simply be assumed that such a tax, if enacted, would be exempt from 
the rule of apportionment.  But even if a personal endowment tax 
were held to be a direct tax, the revenue-raising ability of the federal 
government would not be seriously disabled, because various compo-
nents of endowment are reachable under taxes that would not need 
to be apportioned.  For example, occupational license fees are clearly 
excises, as are taxes on inherited wealth.  From the big-picture per-
spective, the constitutional values of individual liberty and autonomy 
are undermined by a personal endowment tax,433 and, if apportion-
ment were to render such a tax more difficult to enact at the federal 
level, then (ironically) the apportionment requirement, deemed to 
be useful in preserving that one social institution that wholly negated 
liberty, would operate to preserve liberty.434 
 
433 The tax would force one to work or, if the tax were high enough, to force one to work at 
a job she would dislike.  See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP:  
TAXES AND JUSTICE 123 (2002) (explaining that endowment taxation restricts one’s 
choices of work); Sugin, supra note 432, at 36–37. 
434 Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections invalidated payment of a slight, but universal, head tax 
as a qualification for voting on the grounds that payment of a head tax bore no rational 
relation to voting qualifications.  383 U.S. 663 (1966).  Similarly, an endowment-type ca-
pitation tax could be invalidated if it were found to impinge on one’s liberty interest of 
shaping one’s vocational life plan.  See generally TRIBE, supra note 335, at § 15-14 (discuss-
ing right to pursue a vocation).  Because an endowment tax operates without regard to 
specific taxpayer actions or economic outcomes, it amounts to a penalty on “status” or 
“selfhood.”  Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (invalidating as cruel 
and unusual punishment a criminal conviction for the status of being a drug addict).  A 
policy of curbing a fundamental right in itself cannot count as a valid government inter-
est, and the government interest in raising revenue can be satisfied by other means that 
are less intrusive on liberty interests.  See Guy Miller Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative 
Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1463 (1967) (explaining the less-
restrictive-alternative principle and advocating for its expanded use by the Supreme 
Court). 
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APPENDIX A 
THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787435 
BY JAMES MADISON 
 
THURSDAY.  JULY 12.  IN CONVENTION 
 
Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to add to the clause empowering the 
Legislature to vary the Representation according to the principles of 
wealth & number of inhabts. a “proviso that taxation shall be in pro-
portion to Representation.” 
Mr. BUTLER contended again that Representation Sd.. be accord-
ing to the full number of inhabts. including all the blacks; admitting 
the justice of Mr. Govr. Morris’s motion. 
Mr. MASON also admitted the justice of the principle, but was 
afraid embarrassments might be occasioned to the Legislature by it.  
It might drive the Legislature to the plan of Requisitions. 
Mr. GOVr. MORRIS, admitted that some objections lay agst. his 
motion, but supposed they would be removed by restraining the rule 
to direct taxation.  With regard to indirect taxes on exports & imports & 
on consumption, the rule would be inapplicable.  Notwithstanding 
what had been said to the contrary he was persuaded that the imports 
& consumption were pretty nearly equal throughout the Union. 
General PINKNEY liked the idea.  He thought it so just that it 
could not be objected to.  But foresaw that if the revision of the cen-
sus was left to the discretion of the Legislature, it would never be car-
ried into execution.  The rule must be fixed, and the execution of it 
enforced by the Constitution.  He was alarmed at what was said yes-
terday, concerning the negroes.  He was now again alarmed at what 
had been thrown out concerning the taxing of exports. S. Carola. has 
in one year exported to the amount of £600,000 Sterling all which 
was the fruit of the labor of her blacks.  Will she be represented in 
proportion to this amount?  She will not.  Neither ought she then to 
be subject to a tax on it.  He hoped a clause would be inserted in the 
system, restraining the Legislature from taxing Exports. 
Mr. WILSON approved the principle, but could not see how it 
could be carried into execution; unless restrained to direct taxation. 
 
435 Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, at 302–06 (footnotes omitted).  There was no 
Rhode Island delegation, and the delegations from New Hampshire and New York were 
absent on this date. 
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Mr. GOVr. MORRIS having so varied his Motion by inserting the 
word “direct.”  It passd. nem. con. as follows—”provided the always 
that direct taxation ought to be proportioned to representation.” 
Mr. DAVIE, said it was high time now to speak out.  He saw that it 
was meant by some gentlemen to deprive the Southern States of any 
share of Representation for their blacks.  He was sure that N. Carola. 
would never confederate on any terms that did not rate them at least 
as 3/5 .  If the Eastern States meant therefore to exclude them alto-
gether the business was at an end. 
Dr. JOHNSON, thought that wealth and population were the true, 
equitable rule of representation; but he conceived that these two 
principles resolved themselves into one; population being the best 
measure of wealth.  He concluded therefore that ye. number of peo-
ple ought to be established as the rule, and that all descriptions in-
cluding blacks equally with the whites, ought to fall within the compu-
tation.  As various opinions had been expressed on the subject, he 
would move that a Committee might be appointed to take them into 
consideration and report thereon. 
Mr. GOVr. MORRIS.  It has been said that it is high time to speak 
out, as one member, he would candidly do so.  He came here to form 
a compact for the good of America.  He was ready to do so with all 
the States.  He hoped & believed that all would enter into such a 
Compact.  If they would not he was ready to join with any States that 
would.  But as the Compact was to be voluntary, it is in vain for the 
Eastern States to insist on what the Southn.  States will never agree to.  
It is equally vain for the latter to require what the other States can 
never admit; and he verily believed the people of Pena. will never 
agree to a representation of Negroes.  What can be desired by these 
States more than has been already proposed; that the Legislature 
shall from time to time regulate Representation according to popula-
tion & wealth. 
Gen. PINKNEY desired that the rule of wealth should be ascer-
tained and not left to the pleasure of the Legislature; and that prop-
erty in slaves should not be exposed to danger under a Govr. insti-
tuted for the protection of property. 
The first clause in the Report of the first Grand Committee was 
postponed. 
Mr. ELSEWORTH.  In order to carry into effect the principle es-
tablished, moved to add to the last clause adopted by the House the 
words following “and that the rule of contribution by direct taxation 
for the support of the Government of the U. States shall be the num-
ber of white inhabitants, and three fifths of every other description in 
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the several States, until some other rule that shall more accurately as-
certain the wealth of the several States can be devised and adopted by 
the Legislature.” 
Mr. BUTLER seconded the motion in order that it might be 
committed. 
Mr. RANDOLPH was not satisfied with the motion.  The danger 
will be revived that the ingenuity of the Legislature may evade or per-
vert the rule so as to perpetuate the power where it shall be lodged in 
the first instance.  He proposed in lieu of Mr. Elseworth’s motion, 
“that in order to ascertain the alterations in Representation that may 
be required from time to time by changes in the relative circum-
stances of the States, a census shall be taken within two years from the 
1st. meeting of the Genl. Legislature of the U.S., and once within the 
term of every year afterwards, of all the inhabitants in the manner & 
according to the ratio recommended by Congress in their resolution 
of the 18th day of Apl. 1783; [rating the blacks at 3/5 of their num-
ber] and, that the Legislature of the U.S. shall arrange the Represen-
tation accordingly.”—He urged strenuously that express security 
ought to be provided for including slaves in the ratio of Representa-
tion.  He lamented that such a species of property existed.  But as it 
did exist the holders of it would require this security.  It was perceived 
that the design was entertained by some of excluding slaves alto-
gether; the Legislature therefore ought not to be left at liberty. 
Mr. ELSEWORTH withdraws his motion & seconds that of Mr. 
Randolph. 
Mr. WILSON observed that less umbrage would perhaps be taken 
agst. an admission of the slaves into the Rule of representation, if it 
should be so expressed as to make them indirectly only an ingredient 
in the rule, by saying that they should enter into the rule of taxation:  
and as representation was to be according to taxation, the end would 
be equally attained.  He accordingly moved & was 2ded. so to alter 
the last clause adopted by the House, that together with the amend-
ment proposed the whole should read as follows—provided always 
that the representation ought to be proportioned according to direct 
taxation, and in order to ascertain the alterations in the direct taxa-
tion which may be required from time to time by the changes in the 
relative circumstances of the States.  Resolved that a census be taken 
within two years from the first meeting of the Legislature of the U. 
States, and once within the term of every years afterwards of all the 
inhabitants of the U.S. in the manner and according to the ratio rec-
ommended by Congress in their Resolution of April 18.1783; and 
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that the Legislature of the U. S. shall proportion the direct taxation 
accordingly.” 
Mr. KING.  Altho’ this amendment varies the aspect somewhat, he 
had still two powerful objections agst. tying down the Legislature to 
the rule of numbers.  1. they were at this time an uncertain index of 
the relative wealth of the States.  2. if they were a just index at this 
time it can not be supposed always to continue so.  He was far from 
wishing to retain any unjust advantage whatever in one part of the 
Republic.  If justice was not the basis of the connection it could not 
be of long duration.  He must be shortsighted indeed who does not 
foresee that whenever the Southern States shall be more numerous 
than the Northern, they can & will hold a language that will awe them 
into justice.  If they threaten to separate now in case injury shall be 
done them, will their threats be less urgent or effectual, when force 
shall back their demands.  Even in the intervening period, there will 
no point of time at which they will not be able to say, do us justice or 
we will separate.  He urged the necessity of placing confidence to a 
certain degree in every Govt. and did not conceive that the proposed 
confidence as to a periodical readjustment, of the representation ex-
ceeded that degree. 
Mr. PINKNEY moved to amend Mr. Randolph’s motion so as to 
make “blacks equal to the whites in the ratio of representation.”  This 
he urged was nothing more than justice.  The blacks are the labour-
ers, the peasants of the Southern States:  they are as productive of pe-
cuniary resources as those of the Northern States.  They add equally 
to the wealth, and considering money as the sinew of war, to the 
strength of the nation.  It will also be politic with regard to the 
Northern States, as taxation is to keep pace with Representation. 
Genl. PINKNEY moves to insert 6 years instead of two, as the pe-
riod computing from 1st. meeting of ye. Legis—within which the first 
census should be taken.  On this question for inserting six instead of 
“two” in the proposition of Mr. Wilson, it passed in the affirmative 
Masts. no.  Ct. ay.  N. J. ay.  Pa. ay.  Del. Divd.  Md. ay.  Va. no.  
N.C. no.  S.C. ay.  Geo. no. 
On a question for filling the blank for ye. periodical census with 
20 years, it passed in the negative. 
Masts. no.  Ct.ay.  N.J.ay.  P.ay.  Del.no.  Md.no.  Va.no.  N.C.no.  
S.C.no.  Geo.no. 
On a question for 10 years, it passed in the affirmative. 
Mas. ay.  Cont.no.  N.J.no.  P.ay.  Del.ay.  Md.ay.  Va. ay.  N.C.ay.  
S.C.ay.  Geo.ay. 
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On Mr. Pinkney’s motion for rating blacks as equal to Whites in-
stead of as 3/5— 
Mas.no.  Cont.no. [Dr Johnson ay]  N.J.no.  Pa.no. [3 agst. 2.]  
Del.no.  Md.no.  Va.no.  N.C.no.  S.C.ay.  Geo—ay. 
Mr. RANDOLPH’s proposition as varied by Mr. Wilson being read 
for question on the whole. 
Mr. GERRY, urged that the principle of it could not be carried in-
to execution as the States were not to be taxed as States.  With regard 
to taxes in imports, he conceived they would be more productive.  
Where there were no slaves than where there were; the consumption 
being greater— 
Mr. ELSEWORTH.  In case of a poll tax there wd. be no difficulty.  
But there wd. probably be none.  The sum allotted to a State may be 
levied without difficulty according to the plan used by the State in 
raising its own supplies.  On the question on ye. whole proposition; as 
proportioning representation to direct taxation & both to the white 
& 3/5 of black inhabitants, & requiring a Census within six years—& 
within every ten years afterwards. 
Mas.divd.  Cont.ay.  N.J.no.  Pa.ay.  Del.no.  Md.ay.  Va.ay.  N.C.ay.  
S.C.divd.  Geo.ay. 
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APPENDIX B 
EXCERPT FROM:  FEDERALIST NO. 36 
Concerning the General Power of Taxation.  Tuesday January 8, 
1788. 
HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: 
* * * 
. . . It has been asserted that a power of internal taxation in the 
national legislature could never be exercised with advantage, as well 
from the want of a sufficient knowledge of local circumstances, as 
from an interference between the revenue laws of the Union and of 
the particular States.  The supposition of a want of proper knowledge 
seems to be entirely destitute of foundation.  If any question is de-
pending in a State legislature respecting one of the counties, which 
demands a knowledge of local details, how is it acquired?  No doubt 
from the information of the members of the county.  Cannot the like 
knowledge be obtained in the national legislature from the represen-
tatives of each State?  And is it not to be presumed that the men who 
will generally be sent there will be possessed of the necessary degree 
of intelligence to be able to communicate that information?  Is the 
knowledge of local circumstances, as applied to taxation, a minute 
topographical acquaintance with all the mountains, rivers, streams, 
highways, and bypaths in each State; or is it a general acquaintance 
with its situation and resources, with the state of its agriculture, com-
merce, manufactures, with the nature of its products and consump-
tions, with the different degrees and kinds of its wealth, property, and 
industry? 
Nations in general, even under governments of the more popular 
kind, usually commit the administration of their finances to single 
men or to boards composed of a few individuals, who digest and pre-
pare, in the first instance, the plans of taxation, which are afterwards 
passed into laws by the authority of the sovereign or legislature. 
Inquisitive and enlightened statesmen are deemed everywhere 
best qualified to make a judicious selection of the objects proper for 
revenue; which is a clear indication, as far as the sense of mankind 
can have weight in the question, of the species of knowledge of local 
circumstances requisite to the purposes of taxation. 
The taxes intended to be comprised under the general denomina-
tion of internal taxes may be subdivided into those of the DIRECT 
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and those of the INDIRECT kind.  Though the objection be made to 
both, yet the reasoning upon it seems to be confined to the former 
branch.  And indeed, as to the latter, by which must be understood 
duties and excises on articles of consumption, one is at a loss to con-
ceive what can be the nature of the difficulties apprehended.  The 
knowledge relating to them must evidently be of a kind that will ei-
ther be suggested by the nature of the article itself, or can easily be 
procured from any well-informed man, especially of the mercantile 
class.  The circumstances that may distinguish its situation in one 
State from its situation in another must be few, simple, and easy to be 
comprehended.  The principal thing to be attended to, would be to 
avoid those articles which had been previously appropriated to the 
use of a particular State; and there could be no difficulty in ascertain-
ing the revenue system of each.  This could always be known from the 
respective codes of laws, as well as from the information of the mem-
bers from the several States. 
The objection, when applied to real property or to houses and 
lands, appears to have, at first sight, more foundation, but even in 
this view it will not bear a close examination.  Land taxes are com-
monly laid in one of two modes, either by ACTUAL valuations, per-
manent or periodical, or by OCCASIONAL assessments, at the discre-
tion, or according to the best judgment, of certain officers whose 
duty it is to make them.  In either case, the EXECUTION of the busi-
ness, which alone requires the knowledge of local details, must be de-
volved upon discreet persons in the character of commissioners or 
assessors, elected by the people or appointed by the government for 
the purpose.  All that the law can do must be to name the persons or 
to prescribe the manner of their election or appointment, to fix their 
numbers and qualifications and to draw the general outlines of their 
powers and duties.  And what is there in all this that cannot as well be 
performed by the national legislature as by a State legislature?  The 
attention of either can only reach to general principles; local details, 
as already observed, must be referred to those who are to execute the 
plan. 
But there is a simple point of view in which this matter may be 
placed that must be altogether satisfactory.  The national legislature 
can make use of the SYSTEM OF EACH STATE WITHIN THAT 
STATE.  The method of laying and collecting this species of taxes in 
each State can, in all its parts, be adopted and employed by the fed-
eral government. 
Let it be recollected that the proportion of these taxes is not to be 
left to the discretion of the national legislature, but is to be deter-
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mined by the numbers of each State, as described in the second sec-
tion of the first article.  An actual census or enumeration of the peo-
ple must furnish the rule, a circumstance which effectually shuts the 
door to partiality or oppression.  The abuse of this power of taxation 
seems to have been provided against with guarded circumspection.  
In addition to the precaution just mentioned, there is a provision that 
“all duties, imposts, and excises shall be UNIFORM throughout the 
United States.’’ 
It has been very properly observed by different speakers and writ-
ers on the side of the Constitution, that if the exercise of the power of 
internal taxation by the Union should be discovered on experiment 
to be really inconvenient, the federal government may then forbear 
the use of it, and have recourse to requisitions in its stead.  By way of 
answer to this, it has been triumphantly asked, Why not in the first in-
stance omit that ambiguous power, and rely upon the latter resource?  
Two solid answers may be given.  The first is, that the exercise of that 
power, if convenient, will be preferable, because it will be more effec-
tual; and it is impossible to prove in theory, or otherwise than by the 
experiment, that it cannot be advantageously exercised.  The con-
trary, indeed, appears most probable.  The second answer is, that the 
existence of such a power in the Constitution will have a strong influ-
ence in giving efficacy to requisitions.  When the States know that the 
Union can apply itself without their agency, it will be a powerful mo-
tive for exertion on their part. 
As to the interference of the revenue laws of the Union, and of its 
members, we have already seen that there can be no clashing or re-
pugnancy of authority.  The laws cannot, therefore, in a legal sense, 
interfere with each other; and it is far from impossible to avoid an in-
terference even in the policy of their different systems.  An effectual 
expedient for this purpose will be, mutually, to abstain from those ob-
jects which either side may have first had recourse to.  As neither can 
CONTROL the other, each will have an obvious and sensible interest 
in this reciprocal forbearance.  And where there is an IMMEDIATE 
common interest, we may safely count upon its operation.  When the 
particular debts of the States are done away, and their expenses come 
to be limited within their natural compass, the possibility almost of 
interference will vanish.  A small land tax will answer the purpose of 
the States, and will be their most simple and most fit resource. 
Many spectres have been raised out of this power of internal taxa-
tion, to excite the apprehensions of the people:  double sets of reve-
nue officers, a duplication of their burdens by double taxations, and 
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the frightful forms of odious and oppressive poll-taxes, have been 
played off with all the ingenious dexterity of political legerdemain. 
As to the first point, there are two cases in which there can be no 
room for double sets of officers:  one, where the right of imposing 
the tax is exclusively vested in the Union, which applies to the duties 
on imports; the other, where the object has not fallen under any State 
regulation or provision, which may be applicable to a variety of ob-
jects.  In other cases, the probability is that the United States will ei-
ther wholly abstain from the objects preoccupied for local purposes, 
or will make use of the State officers and State regulations for collect-
ing the additional imposition.  This will best answer the views of reve-
nue, because it will save expense in the collection, and will best avoid 
any occasion of disgust to the State governments and to the people.  
At all events, here is a practicable expedient for avoiding such an in-
convenience; and nothing more can be required than to show that 
evils predicted to not necessarily result from the plan. 
As to any argument derived from a supposed system of influence, 
it is a sufficient answer to say that it ought not to be presumed; but 
the supposition is susceptible of a more precise answer.  If such a spi-
rit should infest the councils of the Union, the most certain road to 
the accomplishment of its aim would be to employ the State officers 
as much as possible, and to attach them to the Union by an accumu-
lation of their emoluments.  This would serve to turn the tide of State 
influence into the channels of the national government, instead of 
making federal influence flow in an opposite and adverse current.  
But all suppositions of this kind are invidious, and ought to be ban-
ished from the consideration of the great question before the people.  
They can answer no other end than to cast a mist over the truth. 
As to the suggestion of double taxation, the answer is plain.  The 
wants of the Union are to be supplied in one way or another; if to be 
done by the authority of the federal government, it will not be to be 
done by that of the State government.  The quantity of taxes to be 
paid by the community must be the same in either case; with this ad-
vantage, if the provision is to be made by the Union that the capital 
resource of commercial imposts, which is the most convenient 
branch of revenue, can be prudently improved to a much greater ex-
tent under federal than under State regulation, and of course will 
render it less necessary to recur to more inconvenient methods; and 
with this further advantage, that as far as there may be any real diffi-
culty in the exercise of the power of internal taxation, it will impose a 
disposition to greater care in the choice and arrangement of the 
means; and must naturally tend to make it a fixed point of policy in 
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the national administration to go as far as may be practicable in mak-
ing the luxury of the rich tributary to the public treasury, in order to 
diminish the necessity of those impositions which might create dissat-
isfaction in the poorer and most numerous classes of the society.  
Happy it is when the interest which the government has in the pres-
ervation of its own power, coincides with a proper distribution of the 
public burdens, and tends to guard the least wealthy part of the 
community from oppression! 
As to poll taxes, I, without scruple, confess my disapprobation of 
them; and though they have prevailed from an early period in those 
[New England] States which have uniformly been the most tenacious 
of their rights, I should lament to see them introduced into practice 
under the national government.  But does it follow because there is a 
power to lay them that they will actually be laid?  Every State in the 
Union has power to impose taxes of this kind; and yet in several of 
them they are unknown in practice.  Are the State governments to be 
stigmatized as tyrannies, because they possess this power?  If they are 
not, with what propriety can the like power justify such a charge 
against the national government, or even be urged as an obstacle to 
its adoption?  As little friendly as I am to the species of imposition, I 
still feel a thorough conviction that the power of having recourse to it 
ought to exist in the federal government.  There are certain emer-
gencies of nations, in which expedients, that in the ordinary state of 
things ought to be forborne, become essential to the public weal.  
And the government, from the possibility of such emergencies, ought 
ever to have the option of making use of them.  The real scarcity of 
objects in this country, which may be considered as productive 
sources of revenue, is a reason peculiar to itself, for not abridging the 
discretion of the national councils in this respect.  There may exist 
certain critical and tempestuous conjunctures of the State, in which a 
poll tax may become an inestimable resource.  And as I know nothing 
to exempt this portion of the globe from the common calamities that 
have befallen other parts of it, I acknowledge my aversion to every 
project that is calculated to disarm the government of a single wea-
pon, which in any possible contingency might be usefully employed 
for the general defense and security. 
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APPENDIX C 
EXCERPTS FROM DEBATES IN THE VIRGINIA RATIFYING 
CONVENTION (1788) [Emphasis added.] 
 
Gov. Randolph (June 7)436: 
 
The difficulty of justly apportioning the taxes among the states, 
under the present system, has been complained of; the rule of appor-
tionment being the value of all lands and improvements within the 
states.  The inequality between the rich lands of James River and the barrens 
of Massachusetts has been thought to militate against Virginia.  If taxes could 
be laid according to the real value, no inconvenience could follow; but, from a 
variety of reasons, this value was very difficult to be ascertained; and an error 
in the estimation must necessarily have been oppressive to a part of the com-
munity.  But in this new Constitution, there is a more just and equitable rule 
fixed—a limitation beyond which they cannot go.  Representatives and taxes 
go hand in hand:  according to the one will the other be regulated.  The 
number of representatives is determined by the number of inhabi-
tants; they have nothing to do but to lay taxes accordingly.  I will illus-
trate it by a familiar example.  At present, before the population is ac-
tually numbered, the number of representatives is sixty-five.  Of this 
number, Virginia has a right to send ten; consequently she will have 
to pay ten parts out of sixty-five parts of any sum that may be neces-
sary to be raised by Congress.  This, sir, is the line.  Can Congress go 
beyond the bounds prescribed in the Constitution?  Has Congress a 
power to say that she shall pay fifteen parts out of sixty-five parts?  
Were they to assume such a power, it would be a usurpation so glar-
ing, that rebellion would be the immediate consequence.  Congress is 
only to say on what subject the tax is to be laid.  It is a matter of very little con-
sequence how it will be imposed, since it must be clearly laid on the most pro-
ductive article in each particular state.  I am surprised that such strong objec-
tions should have been made to, and such fears and alarms excited by, this 
power of direct taxation, since experience shows daily that it is neither incon-
venient nor oppressive.  A collector goes to a man’s house; the man pays him 
with freedom, or makes an apology for his inability to do it then:  at a future 
day, if payment be not made, distress is made, and acquiesced in by the party.  
What difference is there between this and a tax imposed by Congress?  Is it nor 
 
436 Virginia Debates, supra note 10, at 121–22. 
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done by lawful authority?  The distinction is between a Virginian and Conti-
nental authority.  Yet, in both cases, it is imposed by ourselves, through the 
medium of our representatives.  When a tax will come to be laid by Con-
gress, the collector will apply in like manner, and in the same manner 
receive payment, or an apology; at a future day, likewise, the same 
consequences will result from a failure. I presume, sir, there is a ma-
nifest similarity between the two cases.  When gentlemen complain of 
the novelty, they ought to advert to the singular one that must be the 
consequence of the requisitions—an army sent into your country to 
force you to comply.  Will not this be the dissolution of the Union, if 
ever it takes effect?  Let us be candid on this subject:  let us see if the 
criterion here fixed be not equal and just.  Were the tax laid on one uni-
form article through the Union, its operation would be oppressive on a consid-
erable part of the people.  When any sum is necessary for the general govern-
ment, every state will immediately know its exact proportion of it, from the 
number of their people and representatives; nor can it be doubted that the tax 
will be laid on each state, in the manner that will best accommodate the people 
of such state, as thereby it will be raised with more facility; for an oppressive 
mode can never be so productive as the most easy for the people. 
 
John Marshall (June 10)437: 
 
The objects of direct taxes are well understood:  they are but few:  
what are they?  Lands, slaves, stock of all kinds, and a few other arti-
cles of domestic property.  Can you believe that ten men selected 
from all parts of the state, chosen because they know the situation of 
the people, will be unable to determine so as to make the tax equal 
on, and convenient for, the people at large?  Does any man believe 
that they would lay the tax without the aid of other information be-
sides their own knowledge, when they know that the very object for 
which they are elected is to lay the taxes in a judicious and conven-
ient manner?  If they wish to retain the affections of the people at 
large, will they not inform themselves of every circumstance that can 
throw light on the subject?  Have they but one source of information?  
Besides their own experience—their knowledge of what will suit their 
constituents—they will have the benefit of the knowledge and experi-
ence of the state legislature.  They will see in what manner the legisla-
ture of Virginia collects its taxes.  Will they be unable to follow their 
example?  The gentlemen who shall be delegated to Congress will 
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have every source of information that the legislatures of the states can 
have, and can lay the taxes as equally on the people, and with as little 
oppression, as they can.  If, then, it be admitted that they can under-
stand how to lay them equally and conveniently, are we to admit that 
they will not do it, but that, in violation of every principle that ought 
to govern men, they will lay them so as to oppress us?  What benefit 
will they have by it?  Will it be promotive of their reëlection?  Will it 
be by wantonly imposing hardships and difficulties on the people at 
large, that they will promote their own interest, and secure their 
reëlection?  To me it appears incontrovertible that they will settle 
them in such a manner as to be easy for the people.  Is the system so 
organized as to make taxation dangerous?  I shall not go to the vari-
ous checks of the government, but examine whether the immediate 
representation of the people be well constructed.  I conceive its or-
ganization to be sufficiently satisfactory to the warmest friend of free-
dom.  No tax can be laid without the consent of the House of Repre-
sentatives.  If there, be no impropriety in the mode of electing the 
representatives, can any danger be apprehended? . . .  To procure 
their reëlection, it will be necessary for them to confer with the peo-
ple at large, and convince them that the taxes laid are for their good.  
If I am able to judge on the subject, the power of taxation now before 
us is wisely conceded, and the representatives are wisely elected. 
 
George Nicholas (June 10)438: 
 
The gentleman relies much on the force of requisitions.  I shall 
mention two examples which will show their inutility.  They are fruit-
less without the coercion of arms.  If large states refuse, a complete 
civil war, or dissolution of the confederacy, will result.  If small states 
refuse, they will be destroyed, or Obliged to comply.  From the his-
tory of the United Netherlands, the inutility of requisitions, without 
recurring to force, may be proved.  The small provinces refused to 
comply, Holland, the most powerful, marched into their territories 
with an army, and compelled them to pay.  The other example is 
from the New England confederacy. Massachusetts, the most wealthy 
and populous state, refused to contribute her share.  The rest were 
unable to compel her, and the league was dissolved. Attend to a reso-
lution of the Assembly of Virginia in the year 1784. 
 
438 Id. at 242–43. 
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* * * 
We are next terrified with the thought of excises.  In some coun-
tries excises are terrible.  In others, they are not only harmless, but 
useful.  In our sister states, they are excised without any inconven-
ience.  They are a kind of tax on manufactures.  Our manufactures 
are few in proportion to those of other states.  We may be assured 
that Congress will make such regulations as shall make excises con-
venient and easy for the people. 
Another argument made use of is, that ours is the largest state, 
and must pay in proportion to the other states.  How does that ap-
pear?  The proportion of taxes are fixed by the number of inhabi-
tants, and not regulated by the extent of territory, or fertility of soil.  
If we be wealthier, in proportion, than other states, it will fall lighter upon us 
than upon poorer states.  They must fix the taxes so that the poorest states can 
pay; and Virginia, being richer, will bear it easier. 
 
Madison (June 11)439: 
 
Let us consider the alternatives proposed by gentlemen, instead of 
the power of laying direct taxes.  After the states shall have refused to 
comply, weigh the consequences of the exercise of this power by 
Congress.  When it comes in the form of a punishment, great clamors 
will be raised among the people against the government; hatred will 
be excited against it.  It will be considered as an ignominious stigma 
on the state. . . .  The general government, to avoid those disap-
pointments which I first described, and to avoid the contentions and 
embarrassments which I last described, will, in all probability, throw 
the public burdens on those branches of revenue which will be more 
in their power.  They will be continually necessitated to augment the 
imposts.  If we throw a disproportion of the burdens on that side, 
shall we not discourage commerce and suffer many political evils?  
Shall we not increase that disproportion on the Southern States, 
which for some time will operate against us?  The Southern States, 
from having fewer manufactures, will import and consume more.  
They will therefore pay more of the imposts.  The more commerce is 
burdened, the more the disproportion will operate against them.  If 
direct taxation be mixed with other taxes, it will be in the power of 
the general government to lessen that inequality.  But this inequality 
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will be increased to the utmost extent, if the general government 
have not this power. 
There is another point of view in which this subject affords us in-
struction.  The imports will decrease in time of war. . . .  At present, 
our importations bear a full proportion to the full amount of our 
sales, and to the number of our inhabitants; but when we have in-
habitants enough, our imposts will decrease, and as the national de-
mands will increase with our population, our resources will increase 
as our wants increase.  The other consideration which I will submit 
on this part of the subject is this:  I believe that it will be found, in 
practice, that those who fix the public burdens will feel a greater de-
gree of responsibility, when they are to impose them on the citizens 
immediately than if they were to say what sum should be paid by the 
states.  If they exceed the limits of propriety, universal discontent and 
clamor will arise.  Let us suppose they were to collect the taxes from 
the citizens of America; would they not consider their circumstances?  
Would they not attentively consider what could be done by the citi-
zens at large?  Were they to exceed, in their demands, what were rea-
sonable burdens, the people would impute it to the right source, and 
look on the imposers as odious. 
It has been said that ten men deputed from this state, and others 
in proportion from other states, will not be able to adjust direct taxes, 
so as to accommodate the various citizens in thirteen states. 
. . . My honorable friend over the way, (Mr. Monroe,) yesterday, 
seemed to conceive, as an insuperable objection, that, if land were 
made the particular object of taxation, it would be unjust, as it would 
exonerate the commercial part of the community; that, if it were laid 
on trade, it would be unjust, in discharging the landholders; and that 
any exclusive selection would be unequal and unfair.  If the general 
government were tied down to one object, I confess the objection 
would have some force in it.  But if this be not the case, it can have no 
weight.  If it should have a general power of taxation, they could se-
lect the most proper objects, and distribute the taxes in such a man-
ner as that they should fall in a due degree on every member of the 
community.  They will be limited to fix the proportion of each state, 
and they must raise it in the most convenient and satisfactory manner 
to the public. 
The honorable member considered it as another insuperable ob-
jection, that uniform laws could not be made for thirteen states, and 
that dissonance would produce inconvenience and oppression.  Per-
haps it may not be found, on due inquiry, to be so impracticable as 
he supposes.  But were it so, where is the evil for different states to 
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raise money for the general government?  Where is the evil of such 
laws?  There are instances in other countries of different laws operat-
ing in different parts of the Country, without producing any kind of 
opposition. . . . There is a land tax in England, and a land tax in Scot-
land; but the laws concerning them are not the same.  It is much 
heavier, in proportion, in the former than in the latter.  The mode of 
collection is different; yet this is not productive of any national in-
convenience. . . . . 
I will make another observation on the objection of my honorable 
friend.  He seemed to conclude that concurrent collections under 
different authorities were not reducible to practice.  I agree that, 
were they independent of the people, the argument would be good.  
But they must serve one common master.  They must act in concert, 
or the defaulting party must bring on itself the resentment of the 
people.  If the general government be so constructed that it will not 
dare to impose such burdens as will distress the people, where is the 
evil of its having a power of taxation concurrent with the states?  The 
people would not support it, were it to impose oppressive burdens.  
Let me make one more comparison of the state governments to this 
plan.  Do not the states impose taxes for local purposes?  Does the 
concurrent collection of taxes, imposed by the legislatures for gen-
eral purposes, and of levies laid by the counties for parochial and 
county purposes, produce any inconvenience or oppression?  The 
collection of these taxes is perfectly practicable, and consistent with 
the views of both parties.  The people at large are the common supe-
rior of the state governments and the general government.  It is rea-
sonable to conclude that they will avoid interferences, for two 
causes—to avoid public oppression, and to render the collections 
more productive. 
 
Madison (June 12)440: 
 
He compares resistance of the people to collectors to refusal of 
requisitions.  This goes against all government.  It is as much as to 
urge that there should be no legislature.  The gentlemen, who fa-
vored us with their observations on this subject, seemed to reason on 
a supposition that the general government was confined, by the pa-
per on your table, to lay general, uniform taxes.  Is it necessary that 
there should be a tax on any given article throughout the United States?  It is 
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represented to be oppressive, that the states which have slaves, and make to-
bacco, should pay taxes on these for federal wants, when other states, which 
have them not, would escape.  But does the Constitution on the table admit of 
this?  On the contrary, there is a proportion to be hid on each state, according 
to its population.  The most proper articles will be selected in each state.  If one 
article, in any state, should be deficient, it will be laid on another article.  Our 
state is secured on this foundation.  Its proportion will be commensurate to its 
population.  This is a constitutional scale, which is an insuperable bar 
against disproportion, and ought to satisfy all reasonable minds.  If 
the taxes be not uniform, and the representatives of some states con-
tribute to lay a tax of which they bear no proportion, is not this prin-
ciple reciprocal?  Does not the same principle hold in our state gov-
ernment in some degree?  It has been found inconvenient to fix on 
uniform objects of taxation in this state, as the back parts are not cir-
cumstanced like the lower parts of the country.  In both cases, the re-
ciprocity of the principle will prevent a disposition in one part to op-
press the other. 
 
Madison (June 15)441: 
 
The census in the Constitution was intended to introduce equality 
in the burdens to be laid on the community.  No gentleman objected 
to laying duties, imposts, and excises, uniformly.  But uniformity of 
taxes would be subversive of the principles of equality; for it was not 
possible to select any article which would be easy for one state but 
what would be heavy for another; that, the proportion of each state 
being ascertained, it would be raised by the general government in 
the most convenient manner for the people, and not by the selection 
of any one particular object; that there must be some degree of con-
fidence put in agents, or else we must reject a state of civil society al-
together. 
 
441 Id. at 458–59. 
